I explore how agent-regret and its object—faultlessly harming someone—can call for various responses. I look at two sorts of responses. Firstly, I explore responses that respect the agent’s role as an agent. This revolves around a feature of “it was just an accident”—a common response to agent-regret—that has largely gone ignored in the literature: that it can downplay one’s role as an agent. I argue that we need to take seriously the fact that those who have caused harms are genuine (...) agents, to ignore this fails to allow these agents to move on. Secondly, following Sussman and MacKenzie, I explore responses that benefit the victim. I argue that we should strive to understand how to configure these responses in a way that does not blame the agent. To do this I look at the role of actions in our self-understanding, as people who have done particular things. I end by briefly considering the ways in which tort law and restorative justice might help us to understand how to appropriately respond to accidentally harming someone. I urge that we need to take this as a starting point to find a better way to respond to the agents of faultless harms. (shrink)

Despite numerous ethical examinations of automated vehicles, philosophers have neglected to address how these technologies will affect vulnerable people. To account for this lacuna, researchers must analyze how driverless cars could hinder or help social justice. In addition to thinking through these aspects, scholars must also pay attention to the extensive moral dimensions of automated vehicles, including how they will affect the public, nonhumans, future generations, and culturally significant artifacts. If planners and engineers undertake this task, then they will have (...) to prioritize their efforts to avoid additional harm. The author shows how employing an approach called a “complex moral assessment” can help professionals implement these technologies into existing mobility systems in a just and moral fashion. (shrink)

In order for states to fulfil their moral duties, costs must be passed to individual citizens. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.

: International instruments now defend a "right to the truth " for victims of political repression and violence and include truth telling about human rights violations as a kind of reparation as well as a form of redress. While truth telling about violations is obviously a condition of redress or repair for violations, it may not be clear how truth telling itself is a kind of reparations. By showing that concerted truth telling can satisfy four features of suitable reparations vehicles, (...) I defend the idea that politically implemented modes of truth telling to, for, and by those who are victims of gross violation and injustice may with good reason be counted as a kind of reparations. Understanding the doubly symbolic character of reparations, however, makes clearer why truth telling is unlikely to be sufficient reparation for serious wrongs and is likely to be sensitive to the larger context of reparative activity and its social, political, and historical background. (shrink)

Implementing equity principles in resource allocation is challenging. In one approach, some US states implemented race-based prioritisation of COVID-19 vaccines in response to vast racial inequities in COVID-19 outcomes, while others used place-based allocation. In a nationally representative survey of n=2067 US residents, fielded in mid-April 2021, we explored the public acceptability of race-based prioritisation compared with place-based prioritisation, by offering vaccines to harder hit zip codes before residents of other zip codes. We found that in general, a majority of (...) respondents supported the place-based approach, and a substantial proportion supported the race-based plan. Support was higher among Democrats compared with Republicans. All US residents became eligible for vaccines on 19 April 2021 but as of this writing, equitable uptake of vaccines remains urgent not only for first doses for adults but also for boosters and for children. Our findings also provide a benchmark for future pandemic planning that racial and social justice in vaccine allocation are salient considerations for the public. The findings may furthermore be of interest to policy makers designing vaccine allocation frameworks in countries with comparable health disparities across social, ethnic and racial groups, and more broadly, for those exploring ways of promoting equity in resource allocation outside of a pandemic setting. (shrink)

In this paper I am interested in the question of whether and why states should prioritize child refugees over adult refugees in cases where they are not able to grant refuge to all those who are entitled to it. In particular I discuss three grounds on which such a prioritization could be based: (a) vulnerability, (b) efficiency and (c) life phase and life span. As can be shown, these grounds also apply, to some extent, to particular groups of adults such (...) as women, the elderly, or people with special needs. Based on this I conclude that states should invest significant resources into filtering out those who are the most needy and vulnerable although there are several limitations to doing that. Only if such a selection process were impossible, or so costly and time-consuming that it would result in significantly fewer refugees being admitted, would states have good moral reasons to prioritize children without further screening. (shrink)

Is it possible to redress a wrong specifically in one’s capacity as a knower? Epistemic justice has largely been conceived of as either an ideal goal guiding present and future societal endeavours, or a set of ameliorative character virtues. Yet there is also a backward-looking component of epistemic justice, which has so far been neglected. I argue that exercises of our cognitive and epistemic capacities can constitute moral redress for wrong actions and wrongful harms for which we are responsible. Epistemic (...) redress can take non-doxastic forms, but can also involve the formation of new beliefs. Acts of epistemic redress can redress not only epistemic but also non-epistemic wrongs. In the practice of natural science, epistemic redress can play legitimate and necessary roles both within and outside the core procedures of scientific reasoning, without compromising science’s truth-orientated epistemic credentials. When it plays these roles, it can contribute to generating restitutive knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore how theorists might navigate a course between the twin dangers of piety and excess cynicism when thinking critically about state apologies, by focusing on two government apologies to indigenous peoples: namely, those made by the Australian and Canadian Prime Ministers in 2008. Both apologies are notable for several reasons: they were both issued by heads of government, and spoken on record within the space of government: the national parliaments of both countries. Furthermore, in each case, (...) the object of the apology – that which was apologized for – comes closer to disrupting the idea both countries have of themselves, and their image in the global political community, than any previous apologies made by either government. Perhaps as a result, both apologies were surrounded by celebration and controversy alike, and tracing their consequences – even in the short term – is a difficult business. We avoid excessive piety or cynicism, I argue, when we take several things into account. First, apologies have multiple functions: they narrate particular histories of wrongdoing, they express disavowal of that wrongdoing, and they commit to appropriate forms of repair or renewal. Second, the significance and the success of each function must be assessed contextually. Third, when turning to official political apologies, in particular, appropriate assessment of their capacity to disavow or to commit requires that consider apologies both as performance and as political action. While there remain significant questions regarding the practice of political apology – in particular, its relationship to practices of reparation, forgiveness and reconciliation – this approach can provide a framework with which to best consider them. (shrink)

An important question in the business ethics literature concerns organizational response in the aftermath of an unethical business practice. This study examines factors affecting firms’ decision to take reparative action in the aftermath of an environmental violation. Specifically, we investigate environmental violators’ decision to undertake a Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP), which is an initiative that promotes restorative justice. To settle an environmental violation, the United States’ environmental regulator allows offenders the option of either paying the full penalty or a reduced (...) sum while spending additional effort and engaging in an environmental project. As predicted, we find that firms with poorer past environmental performance and greater shareholder environmental activism are more likely to engage and invest in a SEP. Additionally, there is a stronger association between shareholder activism and SEP investment when firms have poorer past environmental performance. Our findings inform regulators, stakeholders, and business ethics researchers on the factors that lead firms to undertake reparative action following unethical business practices. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 2, February 2020, Page 20-22.

Misgendering is perceived as the use of incorrect pronouns and gender categories when addressing Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming people. This common habit is widely observed in reports, surveys and assessments, where the pressures to comply with a binary understanding of gender are high and alternative options for self-identification are not frequently offered. The present study reads misgendering as a manifestation of epistemic injustice, and uses resources from Science, Technology and Society Studies in order to highlight the importance of situated perspectives (...) on the matter. After being analysed as a commonplace microaggression, misgendering is conceptualised as an act of structural hermeneutical marginalisation that is not usually intentional but product of society’s lack of sensibility towards gender diversity. Finally, a reparative approach against misgendering is offered through the Gender Fair Language model, which involves relational and situated contributions in order to prevent already marginalised people and experiences from being further excluded. (shrink)

This essay seeks to understand the domain and demands of reparative justice in terms of moral vulnerability. Significant harms raise the question of whether victims stand in truly reciprocal practices of accountability; if they do, they enjoy the power of calling others to account as well as bearing the liability of being accountable to others. In the aftermath of harms, victims’ moral vulnerability is tested: they may be exposed to the insult and injury of discovering that they do not enjoy (...) the moral standing of holding others accountable. While the occasion of reparative justice is significant wrongs and wrongful harms and losses, this essay argues that the aim of reparative practices is not only or even primarily to redress those harms and losses, but to address the moral vulnerability of victims by affirming their status in accountability relations. (shrink)

This paper argues that bioethics as a field should broaden its scope to include the ethics of war, focusing on war’s public health effects. The “Introduction” section describes the bioethics literature on war, which emphasizes clinical and research topics while omitting public health. The section, “War as a public health crisis” demonstrates the need for a public health ethics approach by framing war as a public health crisis. The section, “Bioethics principles for war and public health” proposes six bioethics principles (...) for war that address its public health dimensions: health justice, accountability, dignified lives, public health sustainability, nonmaleficence, and public health maximization. The section, “Justifying and applying bioethical principles” shows how these principles inform ethical analysis, including just war theory and military ethics. The section, “From principles to practice” envisions ways in which bioethicists can promote these principles in practice through research, teaching, and service. The “Conclusion” section urges bioethicists to engage with war as a public health crisis, including calling attention to war’s impact on civilians, especially women, children, and other vulnerable groups. (shrink)

Roma in Europe are suffering from manifold injustices and are subject to serious discrimination; carried out both interpersonally as well as institutionally. As with most forms of oppression, the oppression of Roma has a long history in Europe. This paper shows how a genealogy of the oppression of Roma in Europe provides a more adequate understanding of the oppression that Roma face within Europe nowadays. Furthermore, the paper delineates the particular epistemic features of said oppression with the help of some (...) examples and argues that it takes three forms: epistemic segregation, dominant intelligibility frameworks of white supremacy, and dismissal of ‘the right to be known’. The paper then uses the epistemic dimension of the ongoing oppression to argue that Roma can be accurately described as (a) internally colonized subjects and (b) as suffering from internal colonization – in the midst of Europe. (shrink)

Beim eingeschränkten Fokus auf Wahrheit und dem Hervorbringen von „Beweisen“ im Kontext der türkischen Leugnung des Genozids an den ArmenierInnen wurde einem wesentlichen ethischen Problem bisher keine sonderliche Beachtung geschenkt: Dass innerhalb dieser sozial situierten, kooperativen Praxis der Etablierung von Wissen über die historischen Tatsachen – also darüber, was passiert ist und wie diese Geschehnisse zu interpretieren sind – Ungerechtigkeiten im Hinblick darauf entstehen können, wen man als glaubwürdige epistemische Akteure anerkennt. Gemäss dieser Überlegung soll dieser Beitrag zeigen, inwiefern Nachfahren (...) von Genozidopfern durch institutionalisierte Genozidleugnung einer erneuten Dehumanisierung zum Opfer fallen, nämlich der epistemischen Ungerechtigkeit. Diese besagt, dass den Nachfahren der Opfergruppe die Glaubwürdigkeit und damit epistemische Autorität auf der Grundlage ihrer sozialen Zugehörigkeit abgesprochen wird. In diesem Sinne kann die Genozidleugnung als eine fortgesetzte Unterdrückung und Delegitimierung der Opfergruppe, respektive Herabwürdigung ihrer Mitglieder verstanden werden, diesmal im Gewand einer Aberkennung ihrer essentiellen menschlichen Fähigkeit, Wissen zu generieren und weiterzugeben, sowie ihre Unrechtserfahrungen sich und andern intelligibel zu machen. (shrink)

A number of authors make a seemingly compelling case for holding the victim of a wrong morally obliged to accept the genuine apology of the wrongdoer. This is a crucial issue in questions of reparative justice, since reparation typically requires not just the giving but also the acceptance of an apology. Yet it is a case that we should ultimately reject. If it is credible to think that the victim might suffer anew in exercising any duty of this kind, that (...) suffering must be factored into the moral reckoning from the outset. It is only if we can be sure that the victim will not suffer again by attending to, and ultimately accepting, the wrongdoer’s apology that it would be right to impose upon her any duty of this kind. Yet, in all non-trivial cases, the victim’s burden is unknowable in advance and has the potential to be considerable. In such situations, I argue, the victim has no duty to accept the wrongdoer’s apology. There are limits, too, to the utility of the bipartite victim-wrongdoer account of reparation on which such arguments are typically predicated. For the harm the wrongdoer causes is not exclusively suffered by the immediate victim but also by the community of all potential victims. Genuine reparative justice requires more than a recalibration of the relative moral standing of the wrongdoer and the victim through the giving and receiving of an apology. I consider how this might be achieved without imposing upon the victim a burden that fails to achieve the moral reckoning anticipated. (shrink)

Environmental philosophies concerning our obligations to each other and the natural world too rarely address the aftermath of environmental injustice. Ideally we would never do each other wrong; given that we do, as fallible and imperfect agents, we require non-ideal ethical guidance. Margaret Walker’s work on moral repair and Annette Baier’s work on cross-generational communality together provide useful hermeneutical tools for understanding and enacting meaningful responses to intergenerational injustice, and in particular, for anthropogenic climate change. By blending Baier’s cross-generational approach (...) with Walker’s emphasis on victim subjectivity and moral repair, I propose that a reparative model of intergenerational justice can provide some much needed direction on non-ideal moral issues comparatively neglected in climate-ethics debates today. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Contemporary US discourse on reparations tends to focus on the suppression of Black economic interests, but the harms of slavery are not exhausted by the labor expropriation of slaves and its concomitant wealth accumulation for white people and the United States at large. Reproductive oppression was constitutive of the institution of slavery, and its harms continue to reverberate today. This article thus calls for reproductive reparations, or the transparent and sustained attention to the effects of racialized reproductive oppression as (...) they intersect with calls for reparations for slavery. Reconceiving reparations through histories and presents of reproductive harm is required to more fully account for the wrongs of slavery and provide a broader reach for radical societal transformation in our present. (shrink)

Corrective measures and remediation efforts aimed at alleviating the conditions of environmental injustice usually depend on federal or state funding. However, such resources could disappear, leavi...

Volume 20, Issue 2, February 2020, Page 22-24.

Research Ethics, Volume 18, Issue 1, Page 51-63, January 2022. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia, have historically experienced research as another means of colonialization and oppression. Although there are existing frameworks, guidelines and policies in place that respond to this history, the risk of exploitation and oppression arising from research still raises challenging ethical questions. Since the 1990s the National Health and Medical Research Council in Australia has developed specific sets of guidelines that govern research with these (...) populations in an attempt to redress injustices of the past. The current guidelines: Ethical Conduct in Research with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and Communities: Guidelines for Researchers and Stakeholders, 2018, emphasis six core values which are bound together by “spirit and integrity.” The values are reflected through respect for cultural inheritance, and genuine negotiation of partnerships between researchers, other stakeholders, and communities. We examine whether these guidelines can lead to research and research practices that redress some of the ongoing traumas of colonialization and racism. We draw upon Margaret Urban Walker’s formulation of restorative justice, based upon her “pragmatics of repair” which relies upon “voice, validation and vindication” and at its core, the restoration of relationships. (shrink)

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia, have historically experienced research as another means of colonialization and oppression. Although there are existing frameworks, guidelines and policies in place that respond to this history, the risk of exploitation and oppression arising from research still raises challenging ethical questions. Since the 1990s the National Health and Medical Research Council in Australia has developed specific sets of guidelines that govern research with these populations in an attempt to redress injustices of the past. (...) The current guidelines: Ethical Conduct in Research with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and Communities: Guidelines for Researchers and Stakeholders, 2018, emphasis six core values which are bound together by “spirit and integrity.” The values are reflected through respect for cultural inheritance, and genuine negotiation of partnerships between researchers, other stakeholders, and communities. We examine whether these guidelines can lead to research and research practices that redress some of the ongoing traumas of colonialization and racism. We draw upon Margaret Urban Walker’s formulation of restorative justice, based upon her “pragmatics of repair” which relies upon “voice, validation and vindication” and at its core, the restoration of relationships. (shrink)

This paper describes developments in punishment theory since the middle of the twentieth century. After the mid–1960s, what Stanley I. Benn called “preventive theories of punishment”—whether strictly utilitarian or more loosely consequentialist like his—entered a long and steep decline, beginning with the virtual disappearance of reform theory in the 1970s. Crowding out preventive theories were various alternatives generally (but, as I shall argue, misleadingly) categorized as “retributive”. These alternatives include both old theories (such as the education theory) resurrected after many (...) decades in philosophy’s graveyard and some new ones (such as the fairness theory). Only in the last decade or so have new vares o “consequentialism” appeared to dilute a debate among philosophers that had become almost entirely about “retributivism”. I shall describe this trend in more detail. The description will be less an update of my 1990 survey than a rethinking of it. The conclusion I draw from this rethinking is that we need to drop the utilitarian–retributivist (and nonconsequentialist–nonconsequentialist) distinction in favor of one sorting punishment theories according to whether they rely in part on empirical considerations (externalist theories) or instead rely (almost) entirely on conceptual relations (internalist theories). (shrink)

Around the world, millions of children are in need of parental care. In response to this global crisis, some philosophers defend a moral duty for prospective parents to adopt children rather than procreate. Challenges to the duty focus almost exclusively on parents’ desires to have biological children. However, reasons deriving primarily from one’s membership in a social group that favour procreation over adoption or oppose transracial adoptions are largely overlooked. In this dissertation, I examine whether group-based reasons could justifiably override (...) a duty to adopt for prospective parents who are members of racially oppressed groups. I ultimately argue that group-based interests cannot outweigh the needs of existing children for parental care, and thus provide further support for the duty to adopt. My thesis is divided into four chapters. In Chapter 1, I introduce a duty to adopt and argue that it is resilient against a series of proposed defeating conditions and foundational challenges. In Chapter 2, I develop three group-based reasons in favour of procreation that challenge the duty: reparative justice, racial solidarity, and cultural preservation. In Chapter 3, I argue that these reasons do not definitively support procreation over adoption and, instead, seem to favour adopting children either within or outside one’s racial group. I then identify remaining challenges to the duty that take issue with transracial adoptions and place a high value on children’s belonging in same-race families or in their communities of origin. In Chapter 4, I argue that the needs of individual children to receive timely parental care should not be compromised by groups’ interests and that children’s relationships with their communities of origin can be maintained in transracial or extra-communal adoptive placements. (shrink)

Throughout history governments have neglected, mistreated, or intentionally harmed their own citizens. In Canada this includes the denial of equal rights, the internment of Japanese Canadians during and after WWII, and the forced expulsion of the Acadians in1755, as well as other events. In the literature on reparations, the most popular examples of harm perpetrated by a state is the capture and enslavement of Africans and the acquisition of Aboriginal lands during European exploration and colonization in North America. In this (...) paper I will examine the argument for reparative claims against nations. I will argue that when we closely examine the case for reparative justice, it becomes clear that a distributive justice account would be more effective and less problematic than appeals to corrective justice. Further, when looking at the claims of past versus present citizens upon the nation, distributive justice provides a method to determine where responsibility lies. (shrink)