- John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Is there reason to be theoretically rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Possessing moral concepts.David Merli - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):535-556.details
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(1 other version)An argument against motivational internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt2):135-156.details
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Naturalism.Davidn D. Papineau - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Normative Judgments, Motivation, and Evolution.Jussi Suikkanen - 2023 - Filosofiska Notiser 10 (1):23-48.details
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Nomic moral naturalness.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.details
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Varieties of Normativity: Reasons, Expectations, Wide-scope oughts, and Ought-to-be’s.Arto Laitinen - 2020 - In Rachael Mellin, Raimo Tuomela & Miguel Garcia-Godinez (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 133-158.details
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Against Schmought.Matthew Vermaire - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (9):465-485.details
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Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):107-121.details
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The Epistemology of Group Disagreement: An Introduction.Fernandfo Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge. pp. 1-8.details
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Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content.Derek Green - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):159-69.details
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Moral Disagreement and Inexcusable Irrationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):97.details
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Epistemic Schmagency?A. K. Flowerree - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 289-310.details
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Moral supervenience.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):592-615.details
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Coherence and Deontology.Ram Neta - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):284-304.details
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A new moral sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.details
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Against deliberative indispensability as an independent guide to what there is.Brendan Cline - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3235-3254.details
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The Case of the Disappearing Semicolon: Expressive-Assertivism and the Embedding Problem.Thorsten Sander - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):959-979.details
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The epistemic dimension of reasonableness.Federica Liveriero - 2015 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (6):517-535.details
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A Frege‐Geach Style Objection to Cognitivist Judgment Internalism.Thorsten Sander - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (3):391-408.details
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Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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Moral Realism and Anti-Realism outside the West: A Meta-Ethical Turn in Buddhist Ethics.Gordon Fraser Davis - 2013 - Comparative Philosophy 4 (2).details
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Defending David Lewis’s modal reduction.Barry Maguire - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):129-147.details
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Moral motivation pluralism.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.details
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Recent work on ethical realism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):746-760.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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What Are We to Do? Making Sense of 'Joint Ought' Talk.Rowan Mellor & Margaret Shea - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
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Inferential Roles and Truth: Conceptual Foundations for Modest Inferentialism.Simon Vonlanthen - manuscriptdetails
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Relativized Essentialism about Modalities.Salim Hirèche - 2022 - Argumenta 7 (2):463-484.details
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Handling rejection.Derek Baker & Jack Woods - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):159-190.details
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Assertion, expression, experience.Christopher Kennedy & Malte Willer - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (7):821-857.details
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A defence of the evolutionary debunking argument.Man Him Ip - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Can the predictive processing model of the mind ameliorate the value-alignment problem?William Ratoff - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (4):739-750.details
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Getting a Moral Thing Into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists.Preston J. Werner - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140-169.details
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AI Systems and Respect for Human Autonomy.Arto Laitinen & Otto Sahlgren - 2021 - Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence.details
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Pragmatist Ethics: A Problem-Based Approach to What Matters.James Jakób Liszka - 2021 - Albany, NY, USA: Suny American Philosophy and C.details
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Conceptual Role Expressivism and Defective Concepts.James L. D. Brown - 2022 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17. pp. 225-53.details
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Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse.Pekka Vayrynen - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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Epistemically flawless false beliefs.Kate Nolfi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309.details
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The Revisionist’s Rubric: Conceptual Engineering and the Discontinuity Objection.Michael Prinzing - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):854-880.details
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The Unity of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-45.details
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Admiration and Motivation.Alfred Archer - 2019 - Emotion Review 11 (2):140-150.details
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Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor.Bjørn G. Hallsson & Klemens Kappel - 2018 - Synthese 197 (7):2823-2847.details
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Reasons and Promotion.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):98-122.details
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Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.details
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Moral Disagreement among Philosophers.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-39.details
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Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification.Svein Eng - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (1):138-154.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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