- On Second Thought: Reflections on the Reflection Defense.Markus Kneer, David Colaco, Joshua Alexander & Edouard Machery - 2022 - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 257–296.details
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Experimental Aesthetics and Conceptual Engineering.Clotilde Torregrossa - 2022 - Erkenntnis (3):1027-1041.details
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Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reflective Reasoning & Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12786.details
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(1 other version)Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):590-611.details
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Knowing how as a philosophical hybrid.Chad Gonnerman, Kaija Mortensen & Jacob Robbins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11323-11354.details
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Experimental Philosophy of Technology.Steven R. Kraaijeveld - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34:993-1012.details
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(1 other version)Turingův test: filozofické aspekty umělé inteligence.Filip Tvrdý - 2011 - Dissertation, Palacky Universitydetails
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A defence of experimental philosophy in aesthetics.Clotilde Torregrossa - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):885-907.details
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Keep the chickens cooped: the epistemic inadequacy of free range metaphysics.Amanda Bryant - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):1867-1887.details
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In Defence of Armchair Expertise.Theodore Bach - 2019 - Theoria 85 (5):350-382.details
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Why the Empirical Study of Non-philosophical Expertise Does not Undermine the Status of Philosophical Expertise.Theodore Bach - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):999-1023.details
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Intuition, intelligence, data compression.Jens Kipper - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6469-6489.details
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Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?James Andow - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):257-269.details
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Framing how we think about disagreement.Joshua Alexander, Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2539-2566.details
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Epistemología Craiguiana y El Rol de Las Intuiciones En El Teorizar Epistemológico.Leandro De Brasi - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):533-552.details
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The Reference of Proper Names: Testing Usage and Intuitions.Michael Devitt & Nicolas Porot - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1552-1585.details
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How People Think About Distributing Aid.Nicole Hassoun, Nathan Lubchenco & Emir Malikov - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1029-1044.details
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A Pragmatic View of Proper Name Reference.Peter Ridley - 2016 - Dissertation, King's College Londondetails
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Philosophical expertise under the microscope.Miguel Egler & Lewis Dylan Ross - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1077-1098.details
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Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World.David G. Limbaugh & Robert M. Kelly - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):42-44.details
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The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy.Manuel Doria - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (3):17.details
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Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2017 - Cognition 169 (C):139-146.details
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Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.details
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(1 other version)Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.details
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Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):378-410.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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What Do the Folk Think about Composition and Does it Matter?Daniel Z. Korman & Chad Carmichael - 2017 - In David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 187-206.details
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Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141 (C):127-137.details
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Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.details
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How not to test for philosophical expertise.Regina Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.details
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Reframing the Disease Debate and Defending the Biostatistical Theory.Peter H. Schwartz - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):572-589.details
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Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Coloradodetails
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Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):52-64.details
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(1 other version)Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.details
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Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach.Martin Bruder & Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (3):250-275.details
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Feedback from moral philosophy to cognitive science.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):569-588.details
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Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case.S. Matthew Liao, Alex Wiegmann, Joshua Alexander & Gerard Vong - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):661-671.details
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Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge.Steve Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.details
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Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.details
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Interpreting intuition: Experimental philosophy of language.Jeffrey Maynes - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):260-278.details
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Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1263-1281.details
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Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological Concepts.Helen De Cruz - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):487-497.details
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Argumente für die naturaliste Erkenntnistheorie.Joshua Shepherd & Michael Bishop - 2015 - In Stefan Tolksdorf & Dirk Koppleberg (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu? Mentis Publishers. pp. 245-274.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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The folk conception of knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.details
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Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2021-2046.details
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The Role of Justification in the Ordinary Concept of Scientific Progress.Moti Mizrahi & Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):151-166.details
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A New Hope for Philosophers' Appeal to Intuition.Damián Enrique Szmuc - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):336-353.details
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