- Asking expresses a desire to know.Peter van Elswyk - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Kindliche Theory of Mind und Mutter-Kind-Interaktion.Joana Taczkowski - 2020 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Münchendetails
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Culture moderates the relationship between self-control ability and free will beliefs in childhood.Xin Zhao, Adrienne Wente, María Fernández Flecha, Denise Segovia Galvan, Alison Gopnik & Tamar Kushnir - 2021 - Cognition 210 (C):104609.details
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What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Springer. pp. 9-40.details
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(4 other versions)Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017.Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: Springer.details
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Pragmatic Development and the False Belief Task.Evan Westra - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):235-257.details
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Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age.György Gergely, Zoltán Nádasdy, Gergely Csibra & Szilvia Bíró - 1995 - Cognition 56 (2):165-193.details
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On leaving your children wrapped in thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.details
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Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.details
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Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.details
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Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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An ambiguity.Jennifer Church - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):126-127.details
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Understanding that looking causes knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.details
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Development of social emotions and constructive agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124-125.details
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Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.details
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Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: 'Theory of mind' and moral judgment.Joshua Knobe, Adam Cohen & Alan Leslie - 2006 - Psychological Science 17:421-427.details
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Self and other in the explanation of behavior: 30 years later.Joshua Knobe & Bertram Malle - 2002 - Psychologica Belgica 42:113-130.details
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(1 other version)Folk theory of mind: Conceptual foundations of social cognition.Bertram F. Malle - 2003 - In [Book Chapter] (in Press). pp. 225-255.details
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(1 other version)Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition.Bertram F. Malle - 2005 - In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 225-255.details
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Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.details
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(4 other versions)The scientist as child.Alison Gopnik - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):485-514.details
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(1 other version)The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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Finding the force: How children discern possibility and necessity modals.Anouk Dieuleveut, Annemarie van Dooren, Ailís Cournane & Valentine Hacquard - 2022 - Natural Language Semantics 30 (3):269-310.details
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Five-Year-Olds’ and Adults’ Use of Paralinguistic Cues to Overcome Referential Uncertainty.Justine M. Thacker, Craig G. Chambers & Susan A. Graham - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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(1 other version)Empathy and Self-Recognition in Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Perspective.Doris Bischof-Köhler - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):40-48.details
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The Invisible Hand: Toddlers Connect Probabilistic Events With Agentive Causes.Yang Wu, Paul Muentener & Laura E. Schulz - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (8):1854-1876.details
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Developmental Readiness in the Understanding of Own and Other's False Beliefs.Anna Amadó Codony, Elisabet Serrat Sellabona & Francesc Sidera Caballero - unknowndetails
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Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):526-549.details
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The many faces of belief: reflections on Fodor's and the child's theory of mind.Josef Perner - 1995 - Cognition 57 (3):241-269.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.details
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Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
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Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.details
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First person representations need a methodology based on simulation or theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.details
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Understanding minds and selves.R. Peter Hobson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):132-132.details
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But what is the intentional schema?Adam Morton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-134.details
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Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.details
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Omitting the second person in social understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.details
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