John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of moral objectivism with two quick arguments. The second, the so-called “argument from queerness,” proceeds as follows. A commitment to moral objectivism brings with it a commitment to the existence of moral properties as “queer” as Platonic Forms that are apprehended only through occult faculties like so-called “moral intuition” (Mackie 1977, 38). Since we have no reason to believe that there is any faculty such as moral intuition that serves as a reliable Form (...) detector, we equally have no reason to accept moral objectivism (1977, 23–24, 38–41). Recently, Julia Annas has observed that Mackie has offered us “a coarse and imperceptive interpretation of Plato,” in addition to a mistaken account of the epistemic requirements of moral objectivism (2001, 238). But one might worry that the case Annas makes for the homely nature of Platonic moral knowledge—it’s just like plumbing, only non-optional (2001, 246)—rests, as she admits, on her focus on dialogues like the Laches, in which the analogy between the moral virtues and crafts like flute-playing, shoe-making, and navigating is emphasized (2001, 244). Annas explicitly leaves open the question whether Mackie’s interpretation might capture Plato’s conception of moral knowledge in dialogues like the Republic, in which the analogy between moral and mathematical knowledge is emphasized (2001, 243). Yet it is clear from Mackie’s brief remarks about Plato that he has the Republic primarily in mind (Mackie 1977, 23–24). (shrink)

Considerações sobre filosofia, retórica, imagem e verossimilhança em Platão.

At Phaedo 74b–c an important argument is given for the non–identity of perceptible equals and equality. The argument is usually understood as an application of Leibniz’s Law in which the predicate appears unequal is affirmed of perceptible equals but not equality. But this reading requires explaining why the plural locution the equals themselves is initially used for equality, and why the additional predicate appears as inequality is denied of it. In this paper, an account of the equality premise is given (...) which allows for an initial grasp of equality as a plurality (suitably expressed by a plural locution), and introduces a generic predicate for appearance, appears its opposite (rightly denied of equality). The former ensures that the question of non–identity is not begged, while the latter secures a role for every element in the premise. So understood, the argument is both more robust and carefully formulated than is usually thought. (shrink)

Within the framework of the discussion about the existence of a spokesman in the Platonic dialogues, we look, in the first part, into the possible transfer of this spokesman’s function from Socrates to the Eleatic Stranger, identifying the contact and divergence points between both characters. In the second part, we try to show that this transfer has a dramatic staging at the beginning of the Sophist dialogue, where Socrates makes a demand that enables the Stranger to demonstrate his genuine philosophical (...) condition. (shrink)

El artículo analiza algunos aspectos de la concepción de verdad moral que presenta el filósofo argentino Carlos Nino. En particular, intentaremos probar dos puntos. En primer lugar, buscaremos mostrar que las concepciones de verdad moral y de democracia deliberativa formuladas por Nino son incompatibles con un idealismo de corte platónico, a diferencia de lo que sostienen algunos análisis teóricos que aquí discutiremos. La postura constructivista que Nino sostiene es lo que impide pensarla desde puntos de vista trascendentes. En segundo lugar, (...) trataremos de mostrar las inconsistencias que conlleva otro aspecto del conocimiento moral que aparece en Nino: el acceso individual a la verdad moral. Para dar cuenta de esto nos ocuparemos de analizar la dimensión del conocimiento moral que nuestro autor presenta. (shrink)

The focus on this contribution is on the ‘late-learners’ digression. In Sph. 251a8-c6, the Eleatic Stranger briefly discusses the view of some ‘young and old late-learners’ who hold that, from a logico-metaphysical point of view, unlike ‘a man is a man’ or ‘a good is good’, the statement ‘a man is good’ is neither a well-formed nor a grammatical sentence. Usually, modern commentators devote little energy to interpreting this passage since they are content to note that it suffices to discriminate (...) identity and predication to avoid the sophism. The aim of this paper is to show that the position of the ‘late-learners’ is in fact more subtle than it seems, since it is widely open to many readings, and that the chosen reading of the digression has a direct impact on the general interpretation of the rest of the dialogue (communication of kinds, semantic distinction between names and verbs, etc.). To this end, the view of the ‘late-learners’ will be compared with a similar position discussed in a quite different philosophical ecosystem: the White-Horse Paradox forged by Gōngsūn Lóng, a dialectician of the ‘School of Names’. This paradox states that the sentence ‘a white horse is not a horse’ is true. Many readings of the White-Horse Paradox have been offered: some of these readings are the same as those suggested for the ‘late-learners’ view, but others are absent from the scholarly literature, although they provide interesting insights into the interpretation of Sph. 251a8-c6. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that ruling is the sole prerogative of Plato’s philosopher-rulers because they alone possess knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). This knowledge is knowledge of the Good, taken to be the only knowledge there is in Kallipolis. Let us call this the sufficiency condition thesis (the SCT). In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I cast doubt on the adequacy of the SCT, arguing that part of the training and education of the philosopher-rulers involves their gaining practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and experience (...) (ἐμπειρία). To succeed in this, I have two main aims. First, I argue that the philosopher-rulers must attain optimum cognitive success in these three modes of cognition to function efficiently in ruling. This involves showing that Plato, for his political project, appeals to other senses of cognitive successes besides his strictly metaphysical epistemology. Second, I attempt to demonstrate how these three modes of cognition coalesce or coincide in ruling the perceptible world, especially in the judgement and determination of concrete perceptible matters. (shrink)

Many assume that Plato's Form of the Good is a final cause. This might be true if one assumes an Aristotelian definition of final cause; however, I argue that if one adopts Plato's conception of final causation as evidenced in the Phaedo and Timaeus, the claim that the Form of the Good is a final cause for Plato is untenable.

En este trabajo planteo la pregunta de si la lógica de Aristóteles es o no una lógica formal. Respondo que, aunque las doctrinas contenidas en el Organon inauguren, efectivamente, la lógica formal, hay también buenas razones para pensar que Aristóteles no creía que la lógica fuese una disciplina que pudiera prescindir por completo del contenido. In this paper I discuss the question of whether Aristotle’s logic is a formal logic or not. I answer that, although the doctrines contained in the (...) Organon inaugurate indeed formal logic, there are also good reasons to think that Aristotle did not believe that logic was a discipline that ought to prescind completely from content. (shrink)

Frente a quienes sostienen una incompatibilidad entre historia de la filosofía y filosofía, en cuanto plantean una disyuntiva entre una práctica descriptiva y una argumentativa, en este trabajo nos proponemos mostrar, examinando la labor histórico-filosófica de Aris- tóteles, que esa disyuntiva no es excluyente. Para ello, en primer lugar, examinaremos algunos pasajes de su obra en los que ofrece indicaciones metodológicas que permiten comprender la doble función que cumplen las exposiciones críticas de los filósofos precedentes en la constitución misma de (...) su filosofía. En segundo lugar, ilustraremos el tipo de argumentación aristotélica a través del análisis de las críticas que dirige a las Ideas platónicas como causas. Contra Platón, Aristóteles establece que, para dar cuenta de la ingenerabilidad e incorruptibilidad de las formas, no es necesario caracterizarlas como entidades separadas de la materia y del movimiento. Basta asegurar la eternidad de la forma a través de su reproducción en otros individuos de la misma especie. Tal análisis nos permite concluir, finalmente, que filosofía o historia de la filosofía constitu- yen una falsa disyuntiva en Aristóteles, por lo que el examen dialéctico de las doctrinas precedentes es un método adecuado de indagación filosófica. (shrink)

Varlığın mahiyeti meselesi, insanın varlığa hangi açıdan muhatap olduğu ile doğrudan ilgilidir. Felsefe tarihinde ortaya çıkmış olan farklı ekoller arasındaki ayrımı oluşturan da, temelde bu mesele karşısındaki tutumlarıdır. Nicholas of Cusa düşüncesinde varlık, insanın salt epistemik yetileri ile vukufiyet kesp edebileceği bir alan değildir. Bundan dolayı Mutlak Varlık, olduğu haliyle kendi mükemmelliği içerisinde kavranamaz. Bunun için öncelikli olarak gerekli olan, aklın bütün olumlayıcı bilgi iddialarından vazgeçtiği bir tür zihinsel arınmadır. Bu, aslında bir bilinç durumudur ve bu düzeye erişen idrak, varlığı (...) kendi kaynağında temaşa eder. Zıtlığın uyumda, çoğulluğun ise birlikte herhangi bir çelişki olmaksızın göründüğü bu hâl içerisinde, Tanrı artık bir bilgi konusu olmanın ötesinde bir tecrübe konusudur. Cusa’ya göre, insanın iç tecrübesinden hareket eden mistik karakterli bir varlık görüşü ile ancak idrake dayalı yetkin bir bilinç sağlanabilir. Burada artık asıl olan bilme değil, asla bilemeyeceğini bilmedir. Cusa’ya göre, bu idraki seviyeye ulaşmanın yolu ruhsal bir eğitimin yanında Tanrısal lütuftur. The issue of the nature of existence is directly related to the way in which man deals with existence. What makes a difference between the schools in the history of philosophy is their attitudes towards this issue. In the thought of Nicholas of Cusa, existence is not something that a person can realize with purely epistemic abilities. Therefore, Absolute Being cannot be grasped in its own perfection as it is. What is primarily necessary for this is a kind of intellectual purification in which the reason renounces all affirmative claims of knowledge. This actually is a state of consciousness and the intellect that reaches this level contemplates existence at its source. In this state, where opposites appear in harmony and plurality in unity without any contradiction, God is no longer a subject of knowledge but a subject of experience. According to Cusa, only an intellectual comprehension can be achieved with a mystical view of being based on the inner experience of the human being in this way. The main thing is not knowing anymore but knowing that you can never know. According to Cusa, the way to reach this level of understanding is divine grace as well as spiritual education. (shrink)

Xenophon’s conception of the dialectical method shares many similarities with Antisthenes’ point of view regarding the relation between language and reality. The key element supporting this reading is the parallel between Xenophon’s method of dialegein kata genē and Antisthenes’ method of episkepsis tōn onomatōn. In this paper, I claim that a correct understanding of both methods yields a clear structural proximity between the two Socratics on the issue of dialectics. Although they present some significant differences, which I will also explore, (...) I will argue that both variants express a single Socratic motive with regard to dialectics. That is that dialectics, in its basic structure, consists of organizing reality through discourse in order to make it comprehensible. In particular, this is done through establishing unified instances capable of comprehending a multiplicity. This nuclear position could also be extended to include middle Plato’s concept of dialectics. This concurrence takes up different forms in Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes. Nevertheless, they share the same structure, which indicates quite plausibly a major characteristic of Socratic philosophies, as opposed to previous attempts by the Presocratics and the Sophists. (shrink)

The argument at Phaedo 74 B 4‐C 6 that the equal itself is ‘something different from’ sets of physical equals depends on Leibniz's Law: there is a property that perceptible equals have that the equal itself does not have. What I call the ‘epistemic interpretation’ holds that the property is an epistemic one: having appeared unequal. The ‘ontological interpretation’ holds that the property is not epistemic, but simply the property of being unequal. The most natural reading of the text favours (...) the epistemic interpretation; scholarly support for the ontological interpretation is based on the widely held view that on the epistemic interpretation the argument is manifestly invalid. But this view implicitly relies on an impoverished sense of ‘appearing’ as equivalent to ‘being thought’. Drawing on an analogy with colour perception, I elaborate an experiential sense of ‘appearing’ which makes Plato's argument on the epistemic interpretation philosophically defensible. (shrink)

Here I interpret a central passage in Plato's Sophist by focusing on understudied elements that provide insight into the fit of the dialogue's parts and the Sophist-Statesman diptych as a whole. I argue that the Eleatic Stranger's account of what the dialectician "adequately views" at Sophist 253d1-e3 involves both division and the communion of ontological kinds, not just one or the other as has been typically argued. I also consider other key passages and the turn throughout the dialogue from imagistic (...) opining toward noetic understanding. (shrink)

Plato’s theory of recollection is classically treated as an account of “concept-acquisition” or “concept-possession,” explaining how the mind is able to employ general concepts, despite the senses only perceiving particulars. Against this, recent scholars (esp. Dominic Scott) have argued that recollection is not necessary for ordinary reasoning. Recollection is not about ordinary concepts that humans use; rather, recollection is a rare, prototypically philosophic affair that is satisfied by becoming aware of Forms or principles associated with them, which most people never (...) experience. On this view, most people do not recollect. A third position accepts both views: there are two types of recollection in Plato, one concerned with ordinary cognition, and one concerned with philosophical awareness of the Forms. This paper argues for the narrow reading, focusing on the Phaedrus. (shrink)

Abstract: Plato’s theory of recollection is classically treated as an account of “concept-acquisition” or “concept-possession,” explaining how the mind is able to employ general concepts, despite the senses only perceiving particulars. Against this, recent scholars (esp. Dominic Scott) have argued that recollection is not necessary for ordinary reasoning. Recollection is not about ordinary concepts that humans use; rather, recollection is a rare, prototypically philosophic affair that is satisfied by becoming aware of Forms or principles associated with them, which most people (...) never experience. On this view, most people do not recollect. A third position accepts both views: there are two types of recollection in Plato, one concerned with ordinary cognition, and one concerned with philosophical awareness of the Forms. This paper argues for the narrow reading, focusing on the Phaedrus. (shrink)

In contemporary literature, one can find much information concerning Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of intelligible species. However, none of the literature takes into account how and why Aquinas developed his doctrine of intelligible species. Often, it is purported that Aquinas is just following Aristotle. However, this is not the case. There are aporiae in the Aristotelian corpus, and those who followed Aristotle tried to resolve the intellection and hylomorphism aporia, an aporia that arose as a result of denying Platonic forms and (...) affirming hylomorphism. Among those who attempted to resolve this aporia were Avicenna and Averroes from whom Aquinas drew and developed his doctrine of intelligible species. Avicenna's and Averroes' influence on Aquinas's doctrine of intelligible species is the focus of this dissertation. In addition, Aquinas's hylomorphic doctrines and natural and supernatural psychologies are explicated, and the influence of Avicenna and Averroes on Aquinas's psychologies is highlighted. Finally, the arguments posed by contemporary scholars as to whether Aquinas is a direct realist or a representationalist are reviewed in light of the Arabic contributions and Aquinas's synthesis. (shrink)

Introducción al pensamiento ético de Platón.

Passage 228a7-8 of Plato’s Sophist has been the object of a broad debate by reason of a number of subtle interpretative problems. The present work attempts to take stock of this passage and to put forward a satisfying solution from both a philological and an exegetic perspective. I seek to show that the reading cited by Galen and adopted in the editions of the Sophist (τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν) cannot be preferred to the variant found in (...) the manuscripts of the dialogue (τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν). As for the interpretation, both readings stand out as problematic. I propose to reconsider the interpretation of the syntagma τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς and to translate it as “the natural kinship” rather than as “what is naturally kindred”. The paper continues with an analysis of the role played by kinship in Plato’s philosophy, showing how its sundering can be identified with stasis. (shrink)