- Vagueness, uncertainty and degrees of clarity.Paul Égré & Denis Bonnay - 2010 - Synthese 174 (1):47 - 78.details
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Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.details
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The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.details
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Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.details
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One Kiss Too Many? Giving, Luck Egalitarianism and Other-affecting Choice.Hugh Lazenby - 2009 - Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (3):271-286.details
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Undermining the case for contrastivism.Ram Neta - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):289 – 304.details
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Contrastivism and closure.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.details
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Aiming at truth.Nicholas Unwin - 2007 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and concessive knowledge attributions.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.details
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Margins for error and sensitivity: What Nozick might have said. [REVIEW]Kelly Becker - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.details
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Can realists know that they know?Murat Baç - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):65-90.details
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Contrastivism and lucky questions.Kelly Becker - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):245-260.details
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An externalist's guide to inner experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.details
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Closure principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.details
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How hard are the sceptical paradoxes?Alex Byrne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):299–325.details
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Norms of assertion.Matthew Weiner - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187–195.details
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Topical epistemologies.Todd Stewart - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (1):23–43.details
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Moore’s Paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox.Timothy Chan - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.details
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(2 other versions)Inexpressible truths and the allure of the knowledge argument.Benj Hellie - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 333.details
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Constitution and the explanatory gap.Hagit Benbaji - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):183-202.details
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Familiarity inferences, subjective attitudes and counterstance contingency: towards a pragmatic theory of subjective meaning.Christopher Kennedy & Malte Willer - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1395-1445.details
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Against Irrealism.Nilanjan Das - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):101-114.details
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(1 other version)Act or Object.John Butterworth - 2021 - Informal Logic 42 (4):335-358.details
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Knowledge and reasoning.Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):10371-10388.details
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Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
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Conceptual analysis without concepts.Max Deutsch - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):11125-11157.details
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I know how I know: perception, self-awareness, self-knowledge.Andrea Giananti - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10355-10375.details
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Assertion, action, and context.Robin McKenna & Michael Hannon - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):731-743.details
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Evil and the god of indifference.László Bernáth & Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (3):259-272.details
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Denn as a highlighting-sensitive particle.Nadine Theiler - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (2):323-362.details
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Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1705-1711.details
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Communities of Judgment : Towards a Teleosemantic Theory of Moral Thought and Discourse.Karl Bergman - 2019 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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(1 other version)Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William J. Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators.Anthony Booth & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):169-179.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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No, one should not believe all truths.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1091-1103.details
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A case for a certainty norm of assertion.Esben Nedenskov Petersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4691-4710.details
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Rejectivism and the Challenge of Pragmatic Contradictions.Ben Martin - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):253-267.details
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(2 other versions)Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity.Michael Nielsen - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1461-1491.details
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What Is Bayesian Confirmation for?Darren Bradley - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):229-241.details
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Knowledge as a social kind.Leandro De Brasi - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (3):130-139.details
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(1 other version)On the Pareto Condition on Permissible Belief.Jakob Koscholke - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1183-1188.details
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Kitcher, Mathematics, and Apriority.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):687-702.details
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Fallibility and Normativity.DiPaolo Joshua - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherstdetails
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¿Puede el conocimiento ser un estado mental?Florencia Rimoldi - 2014 - Análisis Filosófico 34 (2):171-201.details
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The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1107-1168.details
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Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.details
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Knowledge and Explanation.C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):137-164.details
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A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.details
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On the Standards-Variantist Solution to Skepticism.Kok Yong Lee - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (3):173-198.details
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