One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its sequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In this paper, we make this norm mathematically precise in various ways. We describe three epistemic dilemmas that an agent might face if she attempts (...) to follow Accuracy, and we show that the only inaccuracy measures that do not give rise to such dilemmas are the quadratic inaccuracy measures. In the sequel, we derive the main tenets of Bayesianism from the relevant mathematical versions of Accuracy to which this characterization of the legitimate inaccuracy measures gives rise, but we also show that Jeffrey conditionalization has to be replaced by a different method of update in order for Accuracy to be satisfied. (shrink)

Hájek has recently presented the following paradox. You are certain that a cable guy will visit you tomorrow between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. but you have no further information about when. And you agree to a bet on whether he will come in the morning interval (8, 12] or in the afternoon interval (12, 4). At first, you have no reason to prefer one possibility rather than the other. But you soon realise that there will definitely be a future (...) time at which you will (rationally) assign higher probability to an afternoon arrival than a morning one, due to time elapsing. You are also sure there may not be a future time at which you will (rationally) assign a higher probability to a morning arrival than an afternoon one. It would therefore appear that you ought to bet on an afternoon arrival. The paradox is based on the apparent incompatibility of the principle of expected utility and principles of diachronic rationality which are prima facie plausible. Hájek concludes that the latter are false, but doesn't provide a clear diagnosis as to why. We endeavour to further our understanding of the paradox by providing such a diagnosis. (shrink)

Rescorla explores the relation between Reflection, Conditionalization, and Dutch book arguments in the presence of a weakened concept of sure loss and weakened conditions of self‐transparency for doxastic agents. The literature about Reflection and about Dutch Book arguments, though overlapping, are distinct, and its history illuminates the import of Rescorla's investigation. With examples from a previous debate in the 70s and results about Reflection and Conditionalization in the 80s, I propose a way of seeing the epistemic enterprise in the light (...) of practical requirements to be met by demands for synchronic coherence and probability updating policies. This includes a defense of principles rejected by Rescorla, while allowing for the value of his results in the borderland between theories of cognition and formal epistemology. (shrink)

If there are two dependent positive real variables x1 and x2, and only x1 is known, what is the probability that x2 is larger versus smaller than x1? There is no uniquely correct answer according to “frequentist” and “subjective Bayesian” definitions of probability. Here we derive the answer given the “objective Bayesian” definition developed by Jeffreys, Cox, and Jaynes. We declare the standard distance metric in one dimension, d(A,B)≡|A−B|, and the uniform prior distribution, as axioms. If neither variable is known, (...) P(x2x1)=P(x2>x1). This appears obvious, since the state spaces x2x1 and x2>x1 have equal size. However, if x1 is known and x2 unknown, there are infinitely more numbers in the space x2>x1 than x2x1. Despite this asymmetry, we prove P(x2x1∣x1)=P(x2>x1∣x1), so that x1 is the median of p(x2|x1), and x1 is statistically independent of ratio x2/x1. We present three proofs that apply to all members of a set of distributions. Each member is distinguished by the form of dependence between variables implicit within a statistical model (gamma, Gaussian, etc.), but all exhibit two symmetries in the joint distribution p(x1,x2) that are required in the absence of prior information: exchangeability of variables, and non-informative priors over the marginal distributions p(x1) and p(x2). We relate our conclusion to physical models of prediction and intelligence, where the known ’sample’ could be the present internal energy within a sensor, and the unknown the energy in its external sensory cause or future motor effect. (shrink)

ABSTRACT For changing opinion, represented by an assignment of probabilities to propositions, the criterion proposed is motivated by the requirement that the assignment should have, and maintain, the possibility of matching in some appropriate sense statistical proportions in a population. This ‘tracking’ criterion implies limitations on policies for updating in response to a wide range of types of new input. Satisfying the criterion is shown equivalent to the principle that the prior must be a convex combination of the possible posteriors. (...) Furthermore, this is equivalent to the requirement that prior expected values must fall inside the range spanned by possible posterior expected values. The tracking criterion is liberal; it allows for, but does not require, a policy such as Bayesian conditionalization, and can be offered as a general constraint on policies for managing opinion over time. Examples are given of non-Bayesian policies, both ones that satisfy and ones that violate the criterion. _1_ Introduction _2_ Alternative Updating Policies _3_ Modelling the Situation for Normal Updating _4_ Tracking: A Criterion for Updating Policies _5_ Tracking: Precise Formulation and Relation to Convexity _6_ The Spanning Criterion _7_ Non-Bayesian Policies that Satisfy the Spanning and Tracking Criteria _8_ Policies that Violate the Spanning and Tracking Criteria Appendix Appendix. (shrink)

Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al., 2011, Part 1). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010, Chapter 7). §1 introduces the semantics and then, in §2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008). §3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (i) (...) that it is language independent in a key sense, (ii) that it admits connections with the Principle of Indifference but these connections do not lead to paradox, (iii) that it can capture the phenomenon of learning from experience, and (iv) that while the logic advocates scepticism with regard to some universal hypotheses, such scepticism is not problematic from the point of view of scientific theorising. (shrink)

Objective Bayesian probability is often defined over rather simple domains, e.g., finite event spaces or propositional languages. This paper investigates the extension of objective Bayesianism to first-order logical languages. It is argued that the objective Bayesian should choose a probability function, from all those that satisfy constraints imposed by background knowledge, that is closest to a particular frequency-induced probability function which generalises the λ = 0 function of Carnap’s continuum of inductive methods.

A paper on how to adapt your probabilisitc beliefs when learning a conditional.

The orthodox view in statistics has it that frequentism and Bayesianism are diametrically opposed—two totally incompatible takes on the problem of statistical inference. This paper argues to the contrary that the two approaches are complementary and need to mesh if probabilistic reasoning is to be carried out correctly.

Whilst Bayesian epistemology is widely regarded nowadays as our best theory of knowledge, there are still a relatively large number of incompatible and competing approaches falling under that umbrella. Very recently, Wallmann and Williamson wrote an interesting article that aims at showing that a subjective Bayesian who accepts the principal principle and uses a known physical chance as her degree of belief for an event A could end up having incoherent or very implausible beliefs if she subjectively chooses the probability (...) of an event F for which she has much poorer evidence. They also argued that their own version of objective Bayesianism is completely immune to that challenge. In this article, after having presented the strongest version of Wallmann’s and Williamson’s argument, I will show that if successful, it has far-reaching consequences and would not only invalidate moderate subjective Bayesianism and imprecise probalism but also a form of objective Bayesianism that relies on conditionalisation, the principal principle, reference classes, and the principle of indifference applied to the most basic partitions. I then argue that their argument can be defeated by adding the rule that it is always irrational to choose a probability that can be computed from the known probabilities associated to one’s other beliefs. I finally argue that the authors’ main intuition that probabilities have different degrees of reliability favours imprecise Bayesianism over precise Bayesianism. (shrink)

Towards the end of Decision Theory with a Human Face, Richard Bradley discusses various ways a rational yet human agent, who, due to lack of evidence, is unable to make some fine-grained credibility judgments, may nonetheless make systematic decisions. One proposal is that such an agent can simply “reach judgments” on the fly, as needed for decision making. In effect, she can adopt a precise probability function to serve as proxy for her imprecise credences at the point of decision, and (...) then subsequently abandon the proxy as she proceeds to learn more about the world. Contra Bradley, I argue that an agent who employs this strategy does not necessarily act like a precise Bayesian, since she is not necessarily immune to sure loss in diachronic, as well as synchronic, settings. I go on to suggest a method for determining a proxy probability function whereby the agent does act like a precise Bayesian, so understood. (shrink)

:A normative Bayesian theory of deliberation and judgement requires a procedure for merging the evidence of a collection of agents. In order to provide such a procedure, one needs to ask what the evidence is that grounds Bayesian probabilities. After finding fault with several views on the nature of evidence, it is argued that evidence is whatever is rationally taken for granted. This view is shown to have consequences for an account of merging evidence, and it is argued that standard (...) axioms for merging need to be altered somewhat. (shrink)

This paper discusses simultaneous belief updates. I argue here that modeling such belief updates using the Principle of Minimum Information can be regarded as applying Jeffrey conditionalization successively, and so that, contrary to what many probabilists have thought, the simultaneous belief updates can be successfully modeled by means of Jeffrey conditionalization.