- Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.Timothy Bowen - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Empirical evidence for moral Bayesianism.Haim Cohen, Ittay Nissan-Rozen & Anat Maril - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):801-830.details
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Accuracy and infinity: a dilemma for subjective Bayesians.Mikayla Kelley & Sven Neth - 2023 - Synthese 201 (12):1-14.details
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Policymaking under scientific uncertainty.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Abstracta and Possibilia: Hyperintensional Foundations of Mathematical Platonism.Timothy Bowen - manuscriptdetails
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Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1095-1116.details
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'Explicating ways of consensus-making: Distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus.Laszlo Kosolosky & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In Martini Carlo (ed.), Experts and Consensus in Social Science. Springer. pp. 71-92.details
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Justifying the principle of indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Forms of Luminosity.Hasen Khudairi - 2017details
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Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (31):874–907.details
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Clarifying the relationship between coherence and accuracy in probability judgments.Jian-Qiao Zhu, Philip W. S. Newall, Joakim Sundh, Nick Chater & Adam N. Sanborn - 2022 - Cognition 223 (C):105022.details
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The Representation of Belief.Isaac Wilhelm - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):715-732.details
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Gradational accuracy and nonclassical semantics.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):513-537.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.details
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Bayes et les biais. Le « biais de confirmation » en question.Marion Vorms - 2021 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 112 (4):567-590.details
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Reflection and conditionalization: Comments on Michael Rescorla.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):539-552.details
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Bayesian Measures of Confirmation from Scoring Rules.Steven J. van Enk - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):101-113.details
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Philosophy of Science in Germany, 1992–2012: Survey-Based Overview and Quantitative Analysis.Matthias Unterhuber, Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):71-160.details
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Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations.Borut Trpin & Max Pellert - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):977-1001.details
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Lying, more or less: a computer simulation study of graded lies and trust dynamics.Borut Trpin, Anna Dobrosovestnova & Sebastian J. Götzendorfer - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1-28.details
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Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.details
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On the preference for more specific reference classes.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2025-2051.details
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Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778.details
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Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.details
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Real and ideal rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):879-910.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Probability and proximity in surprise.Tomoji Shogenji - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10939-10957.details
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Thick credence and pragmatic encroachment.Jeremy Shipley - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):339-361.details
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The Problem of Modally Bad Company.Tom Schoonen - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):639-659.details
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Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):639-663.details
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Cognitive Success: A Consequentialist Account of Rationality in Cognition.Gerhard Schurz & Ralph Hertwig - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (1):7-36.details
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Belief Update across Fission.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):659-682.details
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Ideological innocence.Daniel Rubio - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-22.details
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Making Confident Decisions with Model Ensembles.Joe Roussos, Richard Bradley & Roman Frigg - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (3):439-460.details
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Information and Inaccuracy.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):577-604.details
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Information and Inaccuracy.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw025.details
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An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1013-1041.details
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Risk, rationality and expected utility theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):798-826.details
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Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.details
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A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
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Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2737-2776.details
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Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.details
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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2009 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.details
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The very idea of rational irrationality.Spencer Paulson - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (1):3-21.details
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Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-conformists.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):239-247.details
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The Evolution of Bayesian Updating.Samir Okasha - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):745-757.details
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What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.details
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