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  1. Probability for Trivalent Conditionals.Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi & Jan Sprenger - manuscript
    This paper presents a unified theory of the truth conditions and probability of indicative conditionals and their compounds in a trivalent framework. The semantics validates a Reduction Theorem: any compound of conditionals is semantically equivalent to a simple conditional. This allows us to validate Stalnaker's Thesis in full generality and to use Adams's notion of $p$-validity as a criterion for valid inference. Finally, this gives us an elegant account of Bayesian update with indicative conditionals, establishing that despite differences in meaning, (...)
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  • Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals.Mario Günther & Borut Trpin - 2022 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):439-451.
    One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (Mind 129(514):461–508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a “uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario”. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians.
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  • The Logic of Conditional Belief.Benjamin Eva - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):759-779.
    The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker’s semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the (...)
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  • Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):199-221.
    This position paper advocates combining formal epistemology and the new paradigm psychology of reasoning in the studies of conditionals and reasoning with uncertainty. The new paradigm psychology of reasoning is characterized by the use of probability theory as a rationality framework instead of classical logic, used by more traditional approaches to the psychology of reasoning. This paper presents a new interdisciplinary research program which involves both formal and experimental work. To illustrate the program, the paper discusses recent work on the (...)
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  • Learning from Conditionals.Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):461-508.
    In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: how should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional? A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow upon learning an indicative conditional. Here we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is (...)
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  • Independence Day?Matthew Mandelkern & Daniel Rothschild - 2019 - Journal of Semantics 36 (2):193-210.
    Two recent and influential papers, van Rooij 2007 and Lassiter 2012, propose solutions to the proviso problem that make central use of related notions of independence—qualitative in the first case, probabilistic in the second. We argue here that, if these solutions are to work, they must incorporate an implicit assumption about presupposition accommodation, namely that accommodation does not interfere with existing qualitative or probabilistic independencies. We show, however, that this assumption is implausible, as updating beliefs with conditional information does not (...)
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  • Regression to the Mean and Judy Benjamin.Randall G. McCutcheon - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1343-1355.
    Van Fraassen's Judy Benjamin problem asks how one ought to update one's credence in A upon receiving evidence of the sort ``A may or may not obtain, but B is k times likelier than C'', where {A,B,C} is a partition. Van Fraassen's solution, in the limiting case of increasing k, recommends a posterior converging to the probability of A conditional on A union B, where P is one's prior probability function. Grove and Halpern, and more recently Douven and Romeijn, have (...)
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  • Learning Conditional Information by Jeffrey Imaging on Stalnaker Conditionals.Mario Günther - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (5):851-876.
    We propose a method of learning indicative conditional information. An agent learns conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on the minimally informative proposition expressed by a Stalnaker conditional. We show that the predictions of the proposed method align with the intuitions in Douven, 239–263 2012)’s benchmark examples. Jeffrey imaging on Stalnaker conditionals can also capture the learning of uncertain conditional information, which we illustrate by generating predictions for the Judy Benjamin Problem.
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  • Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2015 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
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  • Ramsey’s test, adams’ thesis, and left-nested conditionals.Richard Dietz & Igor Douven - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):467-484.
    Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramsey’s test, which characterizes graded acceptability for conditionals in terms of hypothetical updates on the antecedent. Some results in van Fraassen may raise hope that this explicatory approach to Ramsey’s test is extendible to left-nested conditionals, that (...)
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  • Learning not to be Naïve: A comment on the exchange between Perrine/Wykstra and Draper.Lara Buchak - 2014 - In Justin McBrayer Trent Dougherty (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Does postulating skeptical theism undermine the claim that evil strongly confirms atheism over theism? According to Perrine and Wykstra, it does undermine the claim, because evil is no more likely on atheism than on skeptical theism. According to Draper, it does not undermine the claim, because evil is much more likely on atheism than on theism in general. I show that the probability facts alone do not resolve their disagreement, which ultimately rests on which updating procedure – conditionalizing or updating (...)
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  • (1 other version)Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulford - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).
    Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.
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  • The principle of maximum entropy and a problem in probability kinematics.Stefan Lukits - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1-23.
    Sometimes we receive evidence in a form that standard conditioning (or Jeffrey conditioning) cannot accommodate. The principle of maximum entropy (MAXENT) provides a unique solution for the posterior probability distribution based on the intuition that the information gain consistent with assumptions and evidence should be minimal. Opponents of objective methods to determine these probabilities prominently cite van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin case to undermine the generality of maxent. This article shows that an intuitive approach to Judy Benjamin’s case supports maxent. This (...)
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  • Learning Conditional Information.Igor Douven - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):239-263.
    Some of the information we receive comes to us in an explicitly conditional form. It is an open question how to model the accommodation of such information in a Bayesian framework. This paper presents data suggesting that there may be no strictly Bayesian account of updating on conditionals. Specifically, the data seem to indicate that such updating at least sometimes proceeds on the basis of explanatory considerations, which famously have no home in standard Bayesian epistemology. The paper also proposes a (...)
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  • Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.
    Sometimes appearances provide epistemic support that gets undercut later. In an earlier paper I argued that standard Bayesian update rules are at odds with this phenomenon because they are ‘rigid’. Here I generalize and bolster that argument. I first show that the update rules of Dempster–Shafer theory and ranking theory are rigid too, hence also at odds with the defeasibility of appearances. I then rebut three Bayesian attempts to solve the problem. I conclude that defeasible appearances pose a more difficult (...)
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  • Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. (...)
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  • Entropy and Insufficient Reason: A Note on the Judy Benjamin Problem.Anubav Vasudevan - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):1113-1141.
    One well-known objection to the principle of maximum entropy is the so-called Judy Benjamin problem, first introduced by van Fraassen. The problem turns on the apparently puzzling fact that, on the basis of information relating an event’s conditional probability, the maximum entropy distribution will almost always assign to the event conditionalized on a probability strictly less than that assigned to it by the uniform distribution. In this article, I present an analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem that can help to (...)
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  • Proposition-valued random variables as information.Richard Bradley - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):17 - 38.
    The notion of a proposition as a set of possible worlds or states occupies central stage in probability theory, semantics and epistemology, where it serves as the fundamental unit both of information and meaning. But this fact should not blind us to the existence of prospects with a different structure. In the paper I examine the use of random variables—in particular, proposition-valued random variables— in these fields and argue that we need a general account of rational attitude formation with respect (...)
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  • Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
    How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. They present good arguments and good inferences as being characterized by their effect on our rational degrees of belief. Refuting the view that there is no place for subjective attitudes in 'objective science', Sprenger and Hartmann explain the value of convincing evidence in terms (...)
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  • On Indeterminate Updating of Credences.Leendert Huisman - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):537-557.
    The strategy of updating credences by minimizing the relative entropy has been questioned by many authors, most strongly by means of the Judy Benjamin puzzle. I present a new analysis of Judy Benjamin–like forms of new information and defend the thesis that in general the rational posterior is indeterminate, meaning that a family of posterior credence functions rather than a single one is the rational response when that type of information becomes available. The proposed thesis extends naturally to all cases (...)
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  • Logic and Probability: Reasoning in Uncertain Environments – Introduction to the Special Issue.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):663-671.
    The current special issue focuses on logical and probabilistic approaches to reasoning in uncertain environments, both from a formal, conceptual and argumentative perspective as well as an empirical point of view. In the present introduction we give an overview of the types of problems addressed by the individual contributions of the special issue, based on fundamental distinctions employed in this area. We furthermore describe some of the general features of the special issue.
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  • Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):269-295.
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  • A Puzzle About Stalnaker’s Hypothesis.Igor Douven & Richard Dietz - 2011 - Topoi 30 (1):31-37.
    According to Stalnaker’s Hypothesis, the probability of an indicative conditional, $\Pr(\varphi \rightarrow \psi),$ equals the probability of the consequent conditional on its antecedent, $\Pr(\psi | \varphi)$ . While the hypothesis is generally taken to have been conclusively refuted by Lewis’ and others’ triviality arguments, its descriptive adequacy has been confirmed in many experimental studies. In this paper, we consider some possible ways of resolving the apparent tension between the analytical and the empirical results relating to Stalnaker’s Hypothesis and we argue (...)
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  • Simultaneous belief updates via successive Jeffrey conditionalization.Ilho Park - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3511-3533.
    This paper discusses simultaneous belief updates. I argue here that modeling such belief updates using the Principle of Minimum Information can be regarded as applying Jeffrey conditionalization successively, and so that, contrary to what many probabilists have thought, the simultaneous belief updates can be successfully modeled by means of Jeffrey conditionalization.
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  • Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):346-379.
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  • Learning from conditional probabilities.Corina Strößner & Ulrike Hahn - 2025 - Cognition 254 (C):105962.
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  • How to Learn Concepts, Consequences, and Conditionals.Franz Huber - 2015 - Analytica: an electronic, open-access journal for philosophy of science 1 (1):20-36.
    In this brief note I show how to model conceptual change, logical learning, and revision of one's beliefs in response to conditional information such as indicative conditionals that do not express propositions.
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  • Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities.Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.
    The current debate about peer disagreement has so far mainly focused on the question of whether peer disagreements provide genuine counterevidence to which we should respond by revising our credences. By contrast, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the question by which process, if any, such revision should be brought about. The standard assumption is that we update our credences by conditionalizing on the evidence that peer disagreements provide. In this paper, we argue that non-dogmatist views have good reasons (...)
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  • A role for normativism.Igor Douven - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):252-253.
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue against prescriptive normativism and in favor of descriptivism. I challenge the assumption, implicit in their article, that there is a choice to be made between the two approaches. While descriptivism may be the right approach for some questions, others call for a normativist approach. To illustrate the point, I briefly discuss two questions of the latter sort.
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  • Eva, Hartmann and Rad on Kullback-Leibler Minimization.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    We address problems (that have since been addressed) in a proofs-version of a paper by Eva, Hartmann and Rad, who where attempting to justify the Kullback-Leibler divergence minimization solution to van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin problem.
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