- A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem.Paul Oghenovo Irikefe - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):840-867.details
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Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):435 - 443.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.details
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Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction.Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246.details
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Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):287 - 313.details
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Philosophical Clarification, its Possibility and Point.Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):629–652.details
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Methodology in aesthetics: the case of musical expressivity.Erkki Huovinen & Tobias Pontara - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):45 - 64.details
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New foundations for counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.details
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Understanding as a Source of Justification.Joachim Horvath - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):509-534.details
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Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View.Joachim Horvath - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):724-750.details
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Lowe on Modal Knowledge.Joachim Horvath - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):208-217.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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How (not) to react to experimental philosophy.Joachim Horvath - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):447-480.details
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Metafysikkens uunnværlige elendighetArmen AvanessianMetafysikk for vår tidExistenz forlag, Oslo 2021, ISBN 9788269190939.Heine Alexander Holmen - 2023 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 58 (1):46-60.details
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What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):250-282.details
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Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.details
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The modal status of the laws of nature. Tahko’s hybrid view and the kinematical/dynamical distinction.Salim Hireche, Niels Linnemann, Robert Michels & Lisa Vogt - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-15.details
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Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies.Ilmari Hirvonen, Rami Koskinen & Ilkka Pättiniemi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13823-13843.details
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Explanatory Unification in Experimental Philosophy: Let’s Keep It Real.Frank Hindriks - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):219-242.details
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What Killed Your Plant? Profligate Omissions and Weak Centering.Johannes Himmelreich - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1683-1703.details
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Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Philosophy.Andrew Higgins & Alexis Dyschkant - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (3):372-398.details
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Thought Experiments, Formalization, and Disagreement.Sören Häggqvist - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):801-810.details
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Closure of A Priori Knowability Under A Priori Knowable Material Implication.Jan Heylen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):359-380.details
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Semantic Realism, Actually.Simon Hewitt - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (2):237-254.details
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Entitlement in Gutting's Epistemology of Philosophy: Comments on What Philosophers Know.David Henderson - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):121-132.details
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Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering Plants.Paul Henne, Ángel Pinillos & Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):270-283.details
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An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’.Paul Henne, Vladimir Chituc, Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):283-290.details
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Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and Intuition.Richard G. Heck - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):251-269.details
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Intuition and the Substitution Argument.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):1-30.details
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Are Gettier cases disturbing?Peter Hawke & Tom Schoonen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1503-1527.details
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Review of Avner Baz, The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nat Hansen - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):963-970.details
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“Nobody would really talk that way!”: the critical project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy.Nat Hansen - 2018 - Synthese 197 (6):2433-2464.details
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Contemporary ordinary language philosophy.Nat Hansen - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):556-569.details
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The faculty of intuition.Steven D. Hales - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.details
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Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations.Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):525-533.details
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How reliabilism saves the apriori/aposteriori distinction.Thomas Grundmann - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2747-2768.details
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A defence of conceptual analysis as a linguistic endeavour.Jumbly Grindrod - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):516-534.details
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Moral concepts and motivation.Mark Greenberg - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):137-164.details
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Imagery and Possibility.Dominic Gregory - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):755-773.details
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Epistemological Open Questions.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):509-523.details
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Counterfactual reasoning and knowledge of possibilities.Dominic Gregory - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):821-835.details
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Counterfactuals and modality.Gabriel Greenberg - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (6):1255-1280.details
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Minimal Descriptivism.Aidan Gray - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):343-364.details
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Hybrid expressivism and epistemic justification.Martin Grajner - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2349-2369.details
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Why Being Necessary Really Is Not the Same As Being Not Possibly Not.Dana Goswick - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):267-274.details
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Perception and reflection.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):131-152.details
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Nonconceptualism, Hume’s Problem, and the Deduction.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1687-1698.details
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Reliabilism in philosophy.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.details
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What’s wrong with strong necessities.Philip Goff & David Papineau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):749-762.details
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Expressive Responding, Experimental Philosophy, and Philosophical Expertise.Shane Nicholas Glackin - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.details
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