Professor Foot's Hart Lecture, now published (1995), is largely devoted to an attack on people she calls ‘subjectivists’ and ‘noncognitivists', among whom she includes myself, although she is so good as to allow me, in a footnote, to reject thenames.She seems to imply thereby that this is a mere matter of nomenclature or terminology. But in truth her use of these terms makes one suspect that she has not fully understood either the issues or what I have said about them.It (...) may therefore be useful to explain yet again why I reject these descriptions. I have done so already in a paper to a conference in Moscow which she heard, and to which she kindly refers (Hare 1993a). These explanations would not be important if she were the only person to be confused about this matter; but the confusions are so widespread, even among professional philosophers who should know better, and are so often taught to succeeding generations of students, that it is worth while to make yet another attempt to clear them up - though the confusions are so insidious that I have not much hope that they will ever be eradicated. (shrink)

Résumé Steven Burns soutient que les œuvres d'art riches ont tendance à donner lieu à des lectures meilleures plutôt qu’à des interprétations ambiguës. Ce n'est pas une simple affirmation statistique. Burns soutient qu'une telle richesse rendra l'ambiguïté moins probable ou moins durable. Dans cet article, je critique la position de Burns à partir de mon point de vue de champion de l'interprétabilité multiple. Ajouter des détails à une œuvre ambiguë pourrait ne pas lever son ambiguïté, et pourrait au contraire augmenter (...) la gamme d'interprétations tout aussi enrichissantes les unes que les autres. Les œuvres ambiguës sont nombreuses et remarquables, et couvrent diverses formes d'art. Toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, l'ambiguïté semble ajouter à la richesse de la plupart des œuvres plutôt que la réduire. (shrink)

The goal of the paper is to present a Simplified Offensive Language (SOL) Taxonomy, its application and testing in the Second Annotation Campaign conducted between March-May 2023 on four languages: English, Czech, Lithuanian, and Polish to be verified and located in LLOD. Making reference to the previous Offensive Language taxonomic models proposed mostly by the same COST Action Nexus Linguarum WG 4.1.1 team, the number and variety of the categories underwent the definitional revision, and the present typology was tested in (...) the annotation on the publicly available offensive language datasets of each of the four languages. The results of the annotation are presented and as they are contained within the accepted statistical values on the inter-annotator agreement in the SOL categories and their aspects, we propose this taxonomy as a core ontology which represents the encoding of the supported offensive languages and justify its use on new data in terms of a more universal Linguistic Linked Open Data (LLOD) schema. (shrink)

Cohen (2023), Rahimzadeh and colleagues (2023), and Porsdam Mann and colleagues (2023) have written thorough and well-canvassed pieces about the ethical and conceptual challenges of large language...

In 2016, France passed a major law that is unique in giving terminally ill and suffering patients the right to the controversial procedure of continuous deep sedation until death (CDS). In so doing, the law identifies CDS as a sui generis clinical practice, distinct from other forms of palliative sedation therapy, as well as from euthanasia. As such, it reconfigures the ethical debate over CDS in interesting ways. This paper addresses one aspect of this reconfiguration and its implications for the (...) intentions at work in this complex time at the end of life. The concept of intention is often considered central to the ethics of end-of-life care, but its role is recognized to be problematic, with charges of elusiveness and ambiguity. I aim to show that consideration of the French law affords a new understanding of the intentionality of CDS, and that in addition to the obvious importance of this for clarifying the ethics of the practice, it may suggest new ways of addressing the wider problem of ambiguous clinical intentions at end of life. (shrink)

How do we get into trouble in philosophy, and what do pictures have to do with it? This article addresses Frank Ebersole's thoughts on (Wittgenstein's remarks on) pictures in philosophy. It identifies the puzzlement generated for Ebersole by what Wittgenstein says and also considers some puzzling aspects of Ebersole's own renderings of pictures. It distinguishes between the philosophical picture and the pictorial form in which it may be crystalized and shows how philosophy's reliance on situationally disembedded grammatical stories (pictorial or (...) not) leads us into trouble. Accordingly, responding to such trouble consists not inrecovering thepicture, in the sense of a single “object” or image we had before our mind's eye, but in—what is better described as Ebersole's strategy of—supplying agrammatical example (pictorial or otherwise) to go with our thinking, an example that makes what we think and say clear to ourselves. (shrink)

It is possible to tease out two questions in connection with the epistemological problem of other minds: (i) How do I know what others think and feel? and (ii) How do I know that others think and feel? Fred Dretske offers a perceptual account of our knowledge of other minds that yields an answer to (i) but not (ii). Quassim Cassam uses Dretske’s perceptual account to show how we can answer both (i) and (ii). In this paper I show how (...) we can use Dretske’s work to understand some work by Stanley Cavell. I suggest that, where Dretske claims that we cannot answer (ii), Cavell holds that (ii) is a question that reflects a misunderstanding of our relations to others. In the place of asking how I can know that others think and feel, Cavell holds that I must acknowledge the other. And at the heart of this acknowledgment is an acceptance of others as separate from me. I must acknowledge the other as an other to me. (shrink)

Practice-based philosophy of science has gradually arisen in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and science and technology studies (STS) during the past decades. It studies science as an ensemble of practices and theorising as one of these practices. A recent study has shown how the practice-based approach can be methodologically justified with reference to Peirce and Dewey. In this article, I will explore one consequence of that notion: science, as practice, is necessarily social. I will disambiguate five different senses (...) in which science is social. First, science presupposes language, which is essentially social. Second, practices, including science, are adaptations of the behaviour of an organism to an environment, of which other organisms are a part. Third, practices, including science, are public and hence shareable. Fourth, scientific knowledge can serve as a vehicle of social and moral reform. Fifth, scientific knowledge can be applied to improve the human condition. This fivefold result bears on the problem of realism. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline and defend the view that variations in compliance levels with one and the same norm represent differentnorms about following norms. In support of this claim, I first argue that classic game-theoretic accounts, which define norms as Nash equilibria of noncooperative games, typically consider variations in compliance levels as separate norms. After that, I suggest a more fine-grained, game-theoretic distinction that accounts for degrees of compliance with the same norm and I show how to incorporate such (...) an account into a psychological framework. Finally, the paper examines what given degrees of compliance can reveal about the dynamics underlying the process of norm change. I will argue that they are indicators of different reactions to the introduction of new norms. (shrink)

How is word meaning established, and how do individuals acquire it? What ensures the uniform understanding of word meaning in a linguistic community? In this paper I draw from cultural attraction theory and use folk biology as an example domain and address these questions by treating meaning acquisition as an inferential process. I show that significant variation exists in how individuals understand the meaning of inclusive biological labels such as “plant” and “animal” due to variation in their salience in contemporary (...) ethnic minority groups in southwest China, and I present historical textual evidence that the meaning of inclusive terms is often unstable but can be sustained by such cultural institutions as religion and education, which provide situations in which the meaning of linguistic labels can be unambiguously inferred. (shrink)

McCaffery's definition of pain has proven to be one of the most consequential in nursing and healthcare more generally. She put forward this definition in response to the persistent undertreatment of pain. However, despite raising her definition to the status of a dogma, the undertreatment remains a real problem. This essay explores the contention that McCaffery's definition of pain elides critical aspects of it, aspects that demand consideration when treating pain. In section I, I set the stage. I discuss how (...) McCaffery's definition and her understanding of pain science interrelate. In section II, I raise three problems for this understanding. In section III, I argue that these problems stem from an incoherency in her definition. Finally, in section IV, I draw from hospice nursing as well as philosophy and the social sciences to redefine ‘pain’ so that an intersubjective feature of it is foregrounded. I also briefly discuss one implication this redefinition has for pain management. (shrink)

The invisible object, in the eighteenth century, is not an evidence. It is the result of textual and semantic learning. Which concrete strategies are used to construct and depict objects out of sight? How do we make them a cognitive reality acceptable to a scientific community? This paper first highlights the conditions for the emergence of a field of microscopic knowledge and its epistemological consequences. Then we consider the microscopic gaze in terms of learning, situated between the act of observation (...) as such and discursive practices. We conclude by studying a concrete case of “negotiation of the invisible” in a correspondence between Carl Linnaeus and John Ellis concerning corpuscles observed in mushroom infusions. (shrink)

We agree with Heintz & Scott-Phillips that pragmatics does not supplement, but is prior to and underpins, language. Indeed, human non-linguistic communication is astonishingly rich, flexible, and subtle, as we illustrate through the game of charades, where people improvise communicative signals when linguistic channels are blocked. The route from non-linguistic charade-like communication to combinatorial language involves (1) local processes of conventionalization and grammaticalization and (2) spontaneous order arising from mutual constraints between different communicative signals.

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a critical overview of the key contributions made by Luc Boltanski and Arnaud Esquerre in Qu’est-ce que l’actualité politique? Événements et opinions aux XXIe siècle. Whereas Enrichment: A Critique of Commodities is essentially a study in economic sociology, Boltanski and Esquerre’s latest book reflects a shift in emphasis towards political sociology. As demonstrated in this paper, their inquiry into the ontologie de l’actualité – that is, the ontology of contemporary reality – (...) contains valuable insights into the relationship between the production, circulation, and consumption of news, on the one hand, and the emergence of processes of politicization, on the other. The first half of this paper comprises a summary of the central arguments developed in Boltanski and Esquerre’s investigation, before moving, in the second half, to an assessment of its most significant limitations. (shrink)

The question of truth is central to current discussions in both of the major contemporary styles of philosophizing. In the Anglo-American linguistic and empiricist tradition there is a lively response (some might say backlash) to apparent difficulties caused by recent recognition of theory change and meaning variance in science. And within the Continental hermeneutio tradition there is raised the central question of the truth status of interpretations in the cultural sciences where these appear not to be subject to the criteria (...) of empirical science. Let me say straight away that I believe that the almost universal dependence on versions of the correspondence theory of truth among analytical philosophers will prove seriously inadequate to both forms of the epistemological problem, and that we have to face here a deep challenge to many entrenched assumptions of empiricism — assumptions that are too infrequently brought to the light of day in these discussions.2. (shrink)

This article critiques Stephen Mulhall's reading of Cavell's response to skepticism. In the first half of the article, I argue that Mulhall is mistaken in two respects: he elides differences Cavell notes between external world and other minds skepticism as well as conflates empathetic projection and acknowledgment. In the second half of the article, I argue for a novel reading of Cavell's account of acknowledgment, which addresses the concerns I raise for Mulhall. The paper closes by considering and responding to (...) a worry that one's efforts at acknowledgment are more complicated projections of one's self onto the other. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that there are pre-political, ‘natural’ characteristics that have a significant role in rendering political subjects, for instance that women are the subjects of feminism. These same arguments criticise transfeminism as a usurper of feminist priorities because it changes focus to the rights of groups whose members are not exclusively women. This essay challenges such criticism. It begins by defining transfeminism as a form of activism and an epistemological tool, in order to cogently address some of the (...) views that oppose it. I then propose a way out of the conflict by showing how we can make better sense of transfeminism aided by Wittgenstein’s concept of forms of life, since both views contend that there are biological and environmental features that constitute the uniqueness as well as the diversity of the given human form of life, without implying that said diversity leads to relativism. The paper concludes that transfeminism, when conceptualised correctly, can indeed work with other feminisms and political movements in order to counter institutionalised and market-driven gender politics that only simulate to address feminist concerns. Key words: transfeminism, Wittgenstein, forms of life, Judith Butler, feminist subject. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that mental concepts are natural kind concepts. By ‘mental concepts’ I mean the ordinary words belonging to our everyday languages (English, Spanish, and so on) that we use in order to describe our mental life. The plan of the paper is as follows. In the first part, I shall present the hypothesis: firstly, I shall present a theory about the meaning of natural kind concepts following Putnam's 1975 proposal, with some (...) modifications; secondly, I shall present a taxonomy of mental concepts and, thirdly, I shall explain what the meaning of each kind of mental concept would be on the hypothesis defended in this paper. In the second part of the paper, I shall present two interesting consequences of the hypothesis proposed: first, that it is preferable to avoid a certain way of conceiving phenomenal concepts which does not fit with the hypothesis proposed; second, that folk psychology could fruitfully be considered a theory, and why, ultimately, it will not be eliminated. (shrink)

Christopher Peacocke’s Interlocking Account offers an example of the identity-based strategy for resolving the conceptual problem of other minds. According to the Identity Model, the sameness of meaning of a mental concept across inter-subjective domains is guaranteed by the sameness of the mental states to which the concept refers. Hence, for example, the meaning of the concept “pain” is fixed by the sameness of the sensation of pain to which the concept refers across inter-subjective fields. As an instance of this (...) model, the Interlocking Account draws its most fundamental strength from the claim that human beings are similar in so far as they are carriers of conscious mental states, and that similar mental concepts have similar mental contents across individuals. The implication of this is that when similar mental concepts are used to describe contents of experience by different persons, the meanings of the concepts used are fixed by the similarity of the contents of experience to which the concepts refer. This paper argues that this identity-based strategy fails for three main reasons: the identity relation it purports to establish between one’s own case and those of others is difficult to achieve; “the sense in which the relation of one's mind and those of others exhibits that identity is not clear;” and it is an argument by analogy in disguise. (shrink)

The questions of how we can understand others and how we can know what they feel, think and sense have repeatedly preoccupied Wittgenstein since the 1930s and especially in his last writings. In this article, the author will tackle these questions by focusing on the other as other or strange. For it is also the strangeness of others, their otherness as such, that makes it difficult and even impossible to recognize and understand their inner life. As she will show, such (...) otherness can be made comprehensible by fictional narratives, in which aspects of others’ lives are related to what is one’s own, i.e., our own inner experience, such that we can find ourselves in them. Moreover, she will argue that this idea of making something comprehensible through fictional narratives has a special methodological relevance for Wittgenstein when it comes to understanding what is ‘one’s own’ in the broadest sense. (shrink)

A lack of consensus persists as to whom exactly the dialogues of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations are between: Wittgenstein and an interlocutor? Or perhaps a variety of interlocutors, none of whom can be identified with Wittgenstein himself? I argue here that this lack of consensus is possibly due to an ambiguity in the ordinary concept of “talking to oneself,” and that a new concept of “talking to oneself” appropriate to Wittgenstein's dialogues is needed to properly understand them. Wittgenstein is talking to (...) himself—but he is doing so in the way we talk to other people. (shrink)

Intuition is frequently used in medicine. Along with the use of existing medical rules, there is a separate channel that physicians rely on when making decisions: their intuition. To cope with the epistemic problem of using intuition, I use some clues from Wittgenstein's philosophy to illuminate the decision-making process in medicine. First, I point to a connection between intuition as functioning in medicine and Wittgenstein's notions of "seeing as" or noticing "aspects". Secondly, I use Wittgenstein notion of empirical regularities hardened (...) into rules to suggest that there are two stages that should be addressed in the analysis of medical practice: the first concerns the accumulation of cases and the second pertains to the setting a rule based on these cases. I argue further that the medical context is exceptional in that the two stages are intertwined and, and explain the consequences of this fact for the physician's work. Finally, inspired by Wittgenstein's rule-following conundrum, I argue that medicine is particularly prone to difficulties in applying a general rule to a specific case represented by an individual patient. Recourse to intuition is reflects the physicians' efforts to bridge this gap. (shrink)

The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused (...) the idea of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. In this classical view, an intellectually autonomous explorer of knowledge must not depend on a belief that is obtained from another’s testimony, until one can justify it to oneself. However, accompanying the growing focus on the importance of social dimensions of acquiring knowledge and understanding, recent epistemologists have doubted the classical view and have since reconsidered intellectual autonomy from distinct approaches such as social and virtue epistemology. This paper propounds an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy. First, it is argued that thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers is an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Second, it is demonstrated that with particular cognitive features inherent within us, an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning in necessary situations. This interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy can conceptually enrich intellectual autonomy by considering its relationship with not only responsibility but also with vulnerability. Specifically, regarding responsibility, an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout questioning processes. Regarding vulnerability, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability in the plastic control of the questioning processes. (shrink)

This article will continue Jose Medina's work on “resistant imaginations” by developing the concepts of “internal resistant imagination” and “external resistant imagination” through readings of Assata Shakur's and Mamphela Ramphele's autobiographies. By introducing the problem of location and its relation to race it will show that one's geographical location affects their location in relation to hegemonic imaginations. This in turn requires different strategies of resistance. Using Medina's work this article will argue that Shakur and Ramphele explore these two different avenues (...) for undoing harmful truths within racist and sexist hegemonic imaginaries. (shrink)

William James advocates strenuousness as the key to the moral life yet his hunger for extreme experiences sometimes leads him to risk sacrificing morality in their pursuit. This paradox is best represented by James’s fascination with soldiers and warfare as exemplars of the strenuous life. This essay examines the tension between strenuousness and morality in James’s ethical thought through the lens of his celebration of wildness. Wildness, I argue, names the hungry craving for meaning, lust for intense, novel, and risky (...) experiences, and contempt for the banality of American modernity. In response to Sarin Marchetti and Trygve Throntveit’s recent interpretations of James’s moral thought, I argue that a fuller account of a radical empiricist approach to ethics – its originality, its contributions, its shortcomings – demands a deeper engagement with James’s craving for wildness and its implications for grasping the aesthetic-affective registers of his social criticism and political thought. (shrink)

The study of social inequality and stratification has long been at the core of sociology and the social sciences. In this article, I argue that certain tendencies have become entrenched in our dominant paradigm that leave many researchers pursuing coarse-grained analyses of how difference relates to inequality. Centrally, despite the importance of categories and categorization for how researchers study social inequality, contemporary theories of categories are poorly integrated into conventional research. I contend that the widespread and often unquestioned use of (...) state categories as categories of analysis reinforces these tendencies. Using research on colorism as an inspiration, I highlight several components of what I call the infracategorical model of inequality, which urges researchers to disaggregate difference by shifting our focus from membership in categories to the cues of categories, membership in subcategories, and perceived typicality. (shrink)

What would a romantic relationship between a biological human and an artificial intelligence system look like? The question is explored through a fictional correspondence between Alan Turing and Ada Lovelace.

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke articulates a form of scepticism about meaning. Even though there is considerable disagreement among critics about the reasoning in which the sceptic engages, there is little doubt that he seeks to offer constraints for an adequate account of the facts that constitute the meaningfulness of expressions. Many of the sceptic's remarks concern the nature of the guidance involved in a speaker's meaningful uses of expressions. I propose that we understand those remarks (...) as seeking to give shape to the idea that to use an expression under the guidance of one's understanding is to have a reason for that use, which one's understanding allows one to discern and act on. Any philosophical elucidation of meaning must adequately capture the rational nature of our linguistic acts. (shrink)

Are kind properties presented to us in visual experience? I propose an account of kind recognition that incorporates two conflicting intuitions: Kind properties a...

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 3, Page 1062-1076, September 2022.

This paper offers an alternative theoretical consideration of ethnic identification in psychology. Mainstream social psychological theories are largely positivist and individualistic. New possibilities of theoretical understanding open up as the relational and symbolic nature of ethnicity enters psychological inquiry. This paper takes culture and self as two conceptual domains of social identification, following a meta-theoretical position of cultural psychology. The central focus is the cultural development of the person in social context of a given culture, specifically their ethnic identification, to (...) which end, it looks at several processual aspects. First, ethnic culture is approached as a guiding principle and practice in everyday understanding and experience of one?s own ethnicity. Second, ethnic identification is considered a social and personal act of meaning making, which happens in a given social context, through practical activity and the discursive positioning of a person. Third, since rather than considered a conscious aspect of belonging, ethnicity is assumed and taken for granted, ruptures are considered as destabilizing events that create an opportunity for ethnic meaning reinterpretation and developmental transition. In the meaning making process, symbolic resources are conceived of as primary self-configuring tools, which are also culture-configuring. Ethnic meaning making is theorized as a central social-psychological process through which ethnic culture and a person as an ethnic subject emerge in historical perspective. Finally, the uniqueness of a singular person in the shared ethnic culture is conceptualized based on symbolic distancing from the immediate social context, through the model of knitting personal and socio-historical semiotic threads. (shrink)

As one indispensable part of signs, blank-sign, also called zero sign or the void of sign, has not been given enough or due attention in semiotics. What is worse is that researchers have not reached agreement on some basic issues in blank-signs, such as the nature of the absence of the signifier, the criteria for identifying blank-signs, the scope of the blank-sign research, etc. These questions are of vital importance for more comprehensive exploration of the blank-sign issue. After analyzing three (...) types of blank-signs, the paper concludes that: In blank-signs, both signifier and signified must be present. The so-called “absent signifier” actually means the absence of the representation of the signifier, and the “absent signified” suggests some unspecified meanings; Being a blank-sign is a matter of degree, with the typical blank-signs having a closed borderline, and the atypical ones a partial borderline; Neighboring substantial context and general context are crucial for determining the status of a blank-sign. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 258-281, April 2022.

In this paper, I examine the grammatical nature of Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA). On my interpretation, the definition of private language implies that the private speaker has no natural expressions for his sensations. This in turn implies that he has no criterion of correctness for using his sensation‐words. This then implies, together with the grammatical rule that a word is senseless without a criterion of correctness for its use, that private sensation‐words are senseless, and hence also that private language (...) is senseless. So in my analysis, Wittgenstein succeeds in dissolving the problem of private language through a grammatical investigation, and therefore, his treatment of private language is consistent with his metaphilosophy. I further explain that Wittgenstein provides a diagnosis of the error of the philosopher who thinks that private language is possible and that he also offers a therapy consisting of analogies or objects of comparison. I also make a comparison with previous studies on the PLA and discuss a number of novelties in my interpretation. (shrink)

In this study, we use temporally aligned word embeddings and a large diachronic corpus of English to quantify language change in a data-driven, scalable way, which is grounded in language use. We show a unique and reliable relation between measures of language change and age of acquisition (AoA) while controlling for frequency, contextual diversity, concreteness, length, dominant part of speech, orthographic neighborhood density, and diachronic frequency variation. We analyze measures of language change tackling both the change in lexical representations and (...) the change in the relation between lexical representations and the words with the most similar usage patterns, showing that they capture different aspects of language change. Our results show a unique relation between language change and AoA, which is stronger when considering neighborhood-level measures of language change: Words with more coherent diachronic usage patterns tend to be acquired earlier. The results support theories positing a link between ontogenetic and ethnogenetic processes in language. (shrink)

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-021-09793-2.

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 1, Page 21-39, January 2022.

The paper analyzes the nature and scope of Moore’s paradox, articulates the desiderata of a successful solution and claims that psychological expressivism best meets these desiderata. After a brief discussion of prominent responses to Moore’s paradox, the paper offers a solution based on a theory of expressive acts: a Moorean utterance is absurd because the speaker expresses mental states with conflicting contents in commissive versions of the paradox and conflicting states of mind in omissive versions. The paper presents a theory (...) of expressivism for self-ascriptions of mental states. In addition, it introduces the idea of expressive denegation—the speaker’s expressing the absence of a mental state—as an analysis of negative self-ascriptions of mental states. Some of the consequences of expressivism for avowals are explored. (shrink)

This paper is an account of the co-construction of categorical identity and personal identity among human beings. As people recognize themselves within a socially sanctioned categorical scheme, they reproduce that scheme, and hence institutional and personal reflexivity occur as a joint movement that, at the same time, can be seen as an exercise in social control. The inspirations for this account are lan Hacking's view about the distinctiveness of social kinds from natural kinds, and Dan Sperber's idea about cultural communication (...) as a form of social epidemiology. (shrink)

Democratic politics might be defined as the agonistic struggle of different parties, groups or individuals over resources, recognition and influence under reciprocal and inclusive conditions. It is based on an unconditional orientation to equality as well as freedom of all those involved to consent to - or dissent from - the norms, policies and practices that are established in the process of public dialogue. This article reconstructs the general agent-based capabilities required for a democratically defined public sphere under conditions of (...) globalization. Making capabilities central is intended to correct a certain over-emphasis regarding institutional macro-structures in the discourse on globalization and cosmopolitanism. After setting the stage with a critical analysis of Martha Nussbaum’s concept of capabilities, the analysis proceeds in two major steps. In the first part, a notion of hermeneutic agency is introduced that avoids a Foucauldian reduction of agency to power structures, while thoroughly situating agency in a symbolically mediated social context. The symbolic mediation of agency is, in the second part, taken as a ground of potentiality for reflexive capabilities that, once actualized and enacted, allow for a normatively satisfying process of public deliberation. The aim of the analysis is to relate a normative model of value-orientation to the linguistically grounded empirical resources of social agents. The core argument lays out as basic capabilities (1) to be able to normatively orient oneself at contextually defined yet universally open postconventional commitments, (2) to be able to engage in an interpretive and dialogical perspective-taking vis-a-vis differently situated agents and backgrounds, and (3) to be able to critically distance oneself from one’s taken-for-granted assumptions and background structures via a power-alert social reflexivity. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam observes that a typical competent English speaker who cannot tell an elm tree from a beech tree may nevertheless use the word “elm” to make assertions and ask questions about elm trees. Putnam also observes that scientists may be wrong about the phenomena they investigate, while still being able to use their words to identify and raise research questions about it. This prompts him to ask what “language use” means in these contexts. He proposes two closely related methods (...) for answering this question. The first method is to investigate and clarify the uses of sentences and words in a given linguistic practice from the point of view of a participant in the practice. The second is to explain our applications of ‘is true’ and ‘refers’ to sentences and words whose uses are described in accord with the first method. In this paper I raise several problems for Putnam’s applications of these methods and sketch a different way of applying the methods that avoids the problems. (shrink)

The article describes the potential of abductive legal reasoning as a means of systematically exploring the role of inferences within legal reasoning. Starting out from the structures of abduction as originally presented by Peirce in his four‐horsemen example, the author points to the fact that Peirce actually employed a hypothesis that targeted an institutional fact. Hence the abductive inference has a great potential for categorising new phenomena under norms, yet it is undertheorised within the field of law as compared to (...) other fields of science. The article presents the idea of comparison in the frame of “double abduction” as an important feature of legal reasoning. (shrink)

This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abilities on whose behalf linguistic meaning is introduced from the proper institution of language. I call this capacity “private pattern recognition” (PPR) and argue that it plays an essential part not just in the instauration of linguistic meaning but also in other relevant cognitive phenomena such as artistic creation and understanding. Moreover, it is precisely the failure to separate both aspects that gives rise to important (...) perplexities associated with the underdetermination of meaning. The first part of the article makes a case for this thesis and addresses its compatibility with Wittgenstein's private language argument. It then focuses on the example of art to illustrate the differing roles of private pattern recognition and shared linguistic meaning. The second part of the article focuses on the paradox of resemblance (RP). It (i) considers the difficulties of Williamson's response, (ii) illustrates how they instead support the current thesis, (iii) attempts to delineate how the role of meaning should be understood, and (iv) briefly revisits the rule‐following paradox (RFP). (shrink)

This paper argues that Wittgenstein, both early and late, rejects the idea that the logically simpler and more fundamental case is that of "the mere sign" and that what a meaningful symbol is can be explained through the elaboration of an appropriately supplemented conception of the sign: the sign plus something. Rather the sign, in the logically fundamental case of its mode of occurrence, is an internal aspect of the symbol. The Tractatus puts this point as follows: “The sign is (...) that in the symbol which is perceptible by the senses.” Conversely, this means that it is essential to a symbol – to what a symbol is – that it have an essentially perceptible aspect. For Wittgenstein there is no privileged direction of explanatory priority between symbol and sign here: without signs there are no symbols and without some sort of relation to symbols there are no signs. (shrink)

Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy, by KuuselaOskari. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xi + 297.