According to a prevailing view, conceptual engineering introduces a revolutionary philosophical methodology, challenging traditional conceptual analysis. However, in our paper, we argue that closer scrutiny reveals not only the falsity but also the inherent ambiguity of this narrative. We explore four interpretations of the "Anti-Novelty Claim", the claim that conceptual engineering is not a new way of doing philosophy. Discussing the Anti-Novelty Claim from the perspective of a text’s producer, the text’s consumers, and the exegetical potential of the text, we (...) examine each perspective’s metaphilosophical implications and demonstrate that taking each perspective requires different methods. Adopting these different methods, we argue that the different interpretations of the Anti-Novelty Claim range from nearly trivially true to unlikely but untested. Importantly, we emphasize that each interpretation offers unique philosophical insights, yet addressing them requires diverse types of evidence, preventing a singular, straightforward answer to whether conceptual engineering is new. (shrink)

The paper defends the view that that a significant part of metaphysics should be understood as conceptual engineering, and explores its epistemological advantages and metaphysical implications. It discusses the challenge raised by moderate modal skepticism, which points out the lack of reliable methods for verifying modal statements through thought experiments. As I argue, a normative stance on metaphysical methodology, understanding it as engaging in conceptual engineering project, justifies the use of this method. By adopting an approach where the method of (...) cases offers reasons for adopting specific normative constraints on concept usage, the method becomes justifiable. Consequently, it can be employed to justify the revision of conceptual schemes and, in turn, validate certain modal claims about entities falling under the scrutinized concepts. The paper explores how this approach can methodologically enrich conceptual engineering-focused perspectives in metaphysics and examines its metaphysical consequences. In particular, it demonstrates that despite the mind-dependency of the method of cases results, it still leaves room for a metaphysically realistic viewpoint. (shrink)

The introspective devices framework proposed by Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) offers an attractive conceptual tool for evaluating and developing accounts of introspection. However, the framework assumes that different views about the nature of introspection can be easily evaluated against a set of common criteria. In this paper, I set out to test this assumption by analysing two formal models of introspection using the introspective device framework. The question I aim to answer is not only whether models developed outside of (...) philosophy can be successfully evaluated against the set of conceptual criteria proposed by Kammerer and Frankish, but also whether this kind of evaluation can reveal some limitations inherent to the framework. (shrink)

Nick Zangwill (2004, 2007) appears to be acquiring the status of repudiator-in-chief of emotion in music. He is invoked in this role by such authors as Kraut (2007, p. 67), Bonds (2014, p. 5), Robinson (2014), Young (2014, pp. vii, 1, 3–4, 151), Davies (2017) and Kania (2017). His ‘manifesto’ paper (2004) was recently reprinted in Lamarque and Olsen (2018, pp. 574–582). This development is unfortunate, because Zangwill, for all his radical-sounding theses, actually argues against views that hardly anyone holds. (...) What is more, some of his arguments in favour of the obvious seem confused and defective. But as for his really radical thesis that ‘Music, in itself, has nothing to do with emotion’, he provides hardly any justification. What is more, contrary to what Zangwill believes, such justification is not to be found in Hanslick, who in fact sees emotional content as a relatively important element of music. (shrink)

Since language provides the most typical paradigm of meaning, when we ask what meanings music may communicate, it will certainly be illuminative to compare these meanings with those conveyed by language. In particular we would want to ask an even more specific question: how, in general, the respective meanings of music and words are related in a vocal composition.

Nelson Goodman’s theory of symbol systems expounded in his Languages of Art has been frequently criticized on many counts (cf. list of secondary literature in the entry “Goodman’s Aesthetics” of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Sect. 3 below). Yet it exerts a strong influence and is treated as one of the major twentieth-century theories on the subject. While many of Goodman’s controversial theses are criticized, the technical notions he used to formulate them seem to have been treated as neutral tools. (...) One such technical notion is that of the density of symbol systems. This serves to distinguish linguistic symbols from pictorial representations (after Goodman entirely rejected resemblance in that role) and is a crucial part of Goodman’s explanation of what constitutes aesthetic experience (and so indirectly what is art). Thus its significance for Goodman’s theory is fundamental. The aim of this paper is a detailed, logical analysis of this notion. It turns out that Goodman’s definition is highly problematic and cannot be applied to symbol systems in the way Goodman envisaged. To conclude, Goodman’s theory is problematic not just because of its controversial theses but also because of logical problems with the technical notions used at its very core. Hence the controversial claims are not simply contestable, but inaccurately expressed. (shrink)

The founding text for the new current in modern philosophy—experi-mental philosophy—can be seen in Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Ste-phen Stich’s “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” (2001). The authors describe in this article a study to prove cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions. On the basis of their results, they argue that since epistemic intuitions seem to serve a crucial role in the use of thought experiments, contemporary philosophical methodology is highly unjustified. That study has brought about at least three replication attempts (...) (Seyedsayam-dost 2015; Kim, Yuan 2015; Nagel, San Juan, Mar 2013). None of them confirmed the original results. The aim of this article is to critically analyze in detail Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s methodology and the three replications mentioned. Regarding the results of my analysis, I will try to examine what conclusions can be drawn with regard to the outcomes of analized studies. In particular I will refer to far-reaching con-clusions about the universality of epistemic intuitions or universality of folk epis-temology, which are sometimes—hastily, as I will argue—extrapolated from the results of such kind of studies (e.g., Kim, Yuan 2015; Kim Yuan 2016). (shrink)

XENOLOGY AND XENOTOPOGRAPHY OF BERNHARD WALDENFELS The paper strives to adapt Bernhard Waldenfels’ xenology and so called ‘xenotopography’ for the philosophico-literary studies in fantastic world-building with a special concern of the ‘portal-quest’ model of fantasy and SF. Following Waldenfel’s remarks on the nature of post- Husserlian diastasis of our world [Heimwelt] and otherworld [Fremdwelt] and acknowledging the consequences of allocating one’s attitude towards the otherness in the symbolical borderland [‘sphere of intermonde’] in between, it is examined whether such a model (...) can occur in the fantastic literature and what may be the consequence of xenotopographic reconsideration of its basic ontological premises. Additionally, the article offers an original xenotopograpfic model of worldbuilding which addresses three carefully chosen case studies of fantastic worlds from Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game tetralogy, Neil Gaiman’s Stardust and George R. R. Martin’s The Song of Ice and Fire. In the end, it is suggested that hitherto presented xenotopography gravely inspired a postmodern shift in the genres of fantasy and SF which results in more ethically conscious representations of the otherness and even more concise and alien comprehensive world-building. (shrink)

STANISŁAW BRZOZOWSKI – TO THINK RADICALLY Stanisław Brzozowski is one of the most radical philosophers. Radicalism of his thought involves not only the idea of fundamental social change, but also the reinterpretation of some philosophical concepts. Two main concepts are nature and history. They are reinterpreted in order to show their human origins. According to Brzozowski nature and history are human constructions, namely they are set by human praxis. Brzozowski’s understanding changed over the time. In my article I focus on (...) two phases of Brzozowski’s thought. The first is Kantian and Fichtean. At that point Brzozowski interprets human praxis as moral act. The second one is Marxian. At that point human praxis is understood as labour. (shrink)

The objective of the research was to check whether False Consensus Effect (FCE), shown in much research,is also valid for ontological decisions. Test participants, faced with an ontological dilemma, made a choice three times,which of the 3 item set (Cracow City, Me myself, the Universe) refers to something most real. The research conducted first among psychology students (N=116), then replicated on mathematics students (N=126) and middle-aged people (N=106). Results: 1) All groups chose the Universe most seldom (4%-11% subjects), the remaining (...) two “objects” were chosen with similar frequency, 2) FCE occurred in all groups and in reference to each choice, 3) with people who made inconsequent choices (16% of test participants), FCE was notably higher (p <.001) in comparison to people making consequent choices,4)FCE with inconsequent people turned out to be higher (p <.01) even in comparison with “the smallest minority”, people who (consequently) chose the Universe. (shrink)

The dilemma referred to in the title occurs in many contexts concerned with expressive meaning in art, and especially music, which suggests that the issue it raises will be central to any complete theory of musical expressiveness. One notable attempt to resolve the paradox of simultaneous generality and particularity in music is in Aaron Ridley’s book Music, Value and the Passions. I show why I consider his account unsatisfactory and then propose my own resolution of the paradox. It takes the (...) form of distinguishing between two distinct notions of generality (which I term ‘generality’ and ‘abstractness’) and of particularity (‘specificity’ and ‘concreteness’), and of constructing two relatively independent oppositions: the concrete versus the abstract and the specifi c versus the general. Finally, I show that a description of music’s expressive meaning as abstract, but specific, rightly captures what is usually thought about music, and does not entail any contradictions. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman (1906–1998) is one of the leading American philosophers of the twentieth century. His well-known book Languages of Art is considered a major contribution to analytical aesthetics. While his views on particular issues have often been criticized, on the whole, he is considered to be a leading figure in twentieth-century aesthetics. Contrary to such a stance, I intend to argue that Goodman’s overall contribution to aesthetics is not as outstanding and valuable as is often maintained. Rather, I will try (...) to show that his aesthetic views are grounded on a distorted representation of the earlier aesthetic tradition, without which they lose the novelty and originality ascribed to them. Once that representation is corrected, some of Goodman’s proposals turn out to be derivative and redundant. Additionally, where they do actually diverge from the earlier tradition and might stake a claim to originality, they turn out to be simply erroneous and misconceived, and sometimes even logically flawed. To conclude, Goodman’s lofty reputation as an aesthetician certainly requires major revision. (shrink)

Index and icon, metaphor and metonym in music – In this paper, it is argued that the widespread attempts to use notions taken from semiotics, linguistics or literary theory – such as symbol, index, iconic sign, metaphor and metonym – to analyze the meanings of music are most often misguided. Index in particular – contrary to popular belief – does not occur in music. Of all the notions considered here – metaphor and metonym, index and icon – only the last (...) may be applied to music in any essential way. That does not mean, however, that all musical meanings are so uniform in character. On the contrary: they are highly diverse, but notions mechanically imported from other fields are not suited to describing that diversity. The paper concludes with the suggestion that in order to produce such a description, one must endeavour to construct specifically musical distinctions and categorizations of meanings. (shrink)

Seeing of emptiness and mystical experience — the case of Madhyamaka: The problem of Buddhist religiosity is one of the most classic problems of Buddhist studies. A particular version of this issue is the search for mystical experience in Buddhism. This is due to the conviction that mystical experience is the essence of religious experience itself. The discovery of such an alleged experience fuels comparative speculations between Buddhism and the philosophical and religious traditions of the Mediterranean area. Madhyamaka is the (...) Buddhist tradition which many researchers saw as the fulfillment of such mystical aspirations in Buddhism. In this paper I specify the standard parameters of mystical experience (non‑conceptuality, ineffability, paradoxicality, silence, oneness, fullness) and I conclude that they either cannot be applied to Madhyamaka or that the application is only illusory. (shrink)

In The World as Will and Representation (Vol. I, Book 3, § 52) by Arthur Schopenhauer we find the following, striking words: It is just this universality that belongs uniquely to music, together with the most precise distinctness, that gives it that high value as the panacea of all our sorrows. (p. 262) Accordingly, music ... is in the highest degree a universal language ... Yet its universality is by no means that empty universality of abstraction, but is of quite (...) a different kind; it is united with thorough and unmistakable distinctness. (p. 262) ... music expresses in an exceedingly universal language, in a material, that is, in mere tones, and with the greatest distinctness and truth, the inner being, the in-itself, of the world, which we think of under the concept of will (p. 264). These quotations contain an outright paradox: the meanings of music should be at the same time universal in the highest degree and characterised by the greatest distinctness. As it turns out this paradox does not follow merely from Schopenhauer's liking for brilliant, rethorical formulations. For it occurs in many contexts concerned with the expressive meaning of art, and especially music. Other occurrences of the dilemma are to be found in the writings of Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and in the aesthetic theory of Susanne Langer formulated in chapter VIII, >On the Significance in Music of her book Philosophy in a New Key and it would be possible to quote many other sources. The persistently recurring nature of this paradox confirms that the issue will be central to any attempt at a complete theory of musical meaning. Furthermore, it may be essential for it to be resolved first if one aims to make sense of the relationship between musical and linguistic forms of meaning and, consequent upon this, to address the much debated question of whether music itself can be considered to be a language of the emotions. An attempt at a solution to the paradox in question constitutes the subject of this paper. For this purpose the framework and some notions of Langer's theory are used. The solution which I propose takes the form of distinguishing between two distinct notions of generality (which I will term 'generality' and 'abstractness'), as well as two distinct notions of particularity (which I will term 'specificity' and 'concreteness'), and involves assigning technically precise meanings to these with a view to constructing two relatively independent oppositions: on the one hand the concrete versus the abstract and, on the other, the specific versus the general. (Hints at such a solution are to be found both in Schopenhauer and in Langer). With the help of these notions it is, I believe, then possible to show that the arguments often quoted to the effect that musical meanings possess a certain generality in fact justify no more than their abstractness, while arguments usually thought to demonstrate that they possess a certain particularity in fact show only their specificity (but not concreteness). Consequently, musical meanings are shown to be abstract but specific, which does not entail any contradiction since these notions are independent and not opposed to each other. At the same time, musical meanings may then be contrasted with linguistic meanings, which themselves are abstract and general. If, however, each of the notions of abstractness and generality is understood as also permitting gradations, it will be the case that whereas linguistic meanings may be said to be more general (i.e. less specific) than musical ones, the latter are without any doubt more abstract than the former. (shrink)

Classic expression theory identified the emotional content of works of art with the feelings of their creators or recipients. This content thus appeared to be external to the work itself. Consequently, formalism declared it to be irrelevant to a work’s value. A solution to this dilemma — one which the Polish aesthetician Henryk Elzenberg was among the first to propose — was suggested by the idea that physical, sensual objects can themselves possess emotional qualities. Thanks to Bouwsma and Beardsley, this (...) concept — of expressiveness as a quality — became common in Anglo-American aesthetics from the fifties onwards. At the same time, these authors demanded that the term “expression” be expunged from the language of aesthetics. However, the widespread tendency to conceptualise the emotional content of art in terms of the expression of a certain subject (most often the artist) still requires some explanation — interpretation, rather than negation. One interpretation construes the expressiveness of works of art in terms of the expression of a fictive subject, the “work’s persona”, conceived by Elzenberg in 1950/1960. This paper discusses his concept and explains some of its more complex aspects, before addressing the emergence of a very similar concept within Anglo-American aesthetics. This concept was gradually elaborated in the seventies and eighties, but only in the nineties did it become more fully developed and widely discussed. (shrink)

The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular (...) the Predictive Processing approach. Here, we will consider the different approaches discussed in this volume. (shrink)

Krzysztof Trzciński, ‘The Concept of an Ethnic Upper Chamber in a Bicameral Parliament in an African State (Part 2).’ The article has been published in “Afryka” 35, 2011, pp. 11-26 and is a continuation of the previous paper published under the same title in “Afryka” 34. Part 2 explains a couple of cases (of the Senate of Lesotho, and two Houses of Chiefs, in Botswana and Zambia) that seem useful in the analysis of the Nigerian political thinker Claude Ake’s (...) concept of the ‘chamber of nationalities.’ According to the concept, in a multiethnic African state, a bicameral parliament should be constituted, of which the upper house should be created based on the existing ethnic divisions, allowing all ethnic groups to be represented in a balanced way and thus empowering the smaller of them. Implementation of this concept might contribute to the building of more peaceful and politically stable states in Africa. In the latter part of this article, a study of the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is discussed in short, with a particular focus on the case of the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina that resembles Ake’s concept very closely. In the final part of the article, some drawbacks of Ake’s concept are brought up and discussed critically. (shrink)

The so-called debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concentrated mainly on the latter’s political liberalism. It dealt with the many aspects of Rawls’s philosophical project. In this article, I focus only on one of them, namely the epistemic or cognitivistic nature of principles of justice. The first part provides an overview of the debate, while the second part aims to show that Habermas has not misinterpreted Rawls’s position. I argue that Habermas rightly considers Rawls’s conception of justice as a (...) moral one. In the last part, I discuss two key questions raised by Habermas. The first concerns the relation between justification and acceptance of the principles of justice. The second concerns the relation between two validity terms: truth and reasonableness. (shrink)

Artykuł, choć traktuje głównie o statusie jednostki w realiach i myśli politycznej monarchii absolutnej doby Bodinusa i Pufendorfa, odnosi się – toutes proportions gardées – do następującej kwestii: Czy członków państw niedemokratycznych, pozbawionych pełni praw i wolności politycznych, można określać mianem obywateli? Krzysztof Trzciński, Odwrócenie perspektywy: poddany jako obywatel w monarchii absolutnej, czyli o wieloznaczności pojęć lub ich różnym rozumieniu, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 3/2004, s. 93-106.

Afryka postkolonialna była, jest i będzie targana konfliktami o naturze separatystycznej. Najsłynniejsze już próby secesji w Afryce to przypadki Katangi (w latach 1960–1963) oraz Biafry (w latach 1967–1970). Wojna w Erytrei (w latach 1961–1991) to jedyny jak dotąd afrykański konflikt separatystyczny, który skończył się ustanowieniem nowego państwa (1993 rok). Charakter separatystyczny mają również dwa krwawe konflikty w Sudanie Południowym (w latach 1961–1972 i 1983–2005). Od 1975 roku aż do dzisiaj Etiopia zmaga się ze zbrojnym separatyzmem w Ogadenie. Irredentystyczna idea budowy (...) Wielkiej Somalii, tj. zjednoczenia w jednym państwie wszystkich Somalów, leżała u podłoża wojny, jaką w Ogadenie stoczyły ze sobą Etiopia i Somalia w latach 1977–1978. W 1981 roku wybuchł konflikt w północnej Somalii, która w 1991 roku ogłosiła niepodległość jako Somaliland. Choć krajowi temu brakuje uznania międzynarodowego, Somaliland posiada wszelkie inne atrybuty państwa, w przeciwieństwie do pozostającej od lat w stanie upadku Republiki Somalii. To tylko niektóre z, często już historycznych, przykładów zbrojnego separatyzmu na kontynencie afrykańskim – te najbardziej krwawe czy długotrwałe. Zbrojny separatyzm obecny jest jednak współcześnie w wielu innych miejscach Afryki. Prawie każde położone na południe od Sahary państwo tego kontynentu posiada potencjalne warunki do rozwoju separatyzmu. Przebieg niemal wszystkich granic w Afryce został arbitralnie ustanowiony przez mocarstwa kolonialne jeszcze w XIX wieku. Większość granic dzieli jakiś lud na nominalnych obywateli różnych organizmów państwowych. Z drugiej strony w granicach jednego państwa zamieszkuje niejednokrotnie wiele ludów o odmiennym pochodzeniu etnicznym oraz różnej kulturze i wierzeniach. Wieloetniczność i różnorodność kulturowa nie są same w sobie przyczynami dążeń separatystycznych, choć zwykle stanowią dla nich bardzo ważne podłoże. (shrink)

This article argues against the concept of integration as the main mechanism allowing various sociocultural groups to live together and instead proposes ‘radical inclusivity’ as a better, less oppressive model of a pluralistic society. Through analytical and reflective research on the non-cohesion-based approach to integration or inclusion, this article is devoted to examining the affordances and limitations of integration through various forms of spatial interventions. As an example, we will discuss the Ellesmere Green Project in Sheffield (UK) as a typical (...) small urban regeneration executed in a highly diverse part of Sheffield. This piece aims to bring forward the significance of moving beyond the community-as-cohesion model in urban politics and planning for integration. (shrink)

Ethics of Richard M. Hare is widely considered as a classical example of the strong internalistic theory of motivation: he is thought to believe that having a moral motive is a sufficient condition to act accordingly. However, strong internalism has difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of acrasia and amoralism. For this reason some critics charge him with developing a false theory of moral motivation. In the article I present Hare's answer to these questions by dividing the discussion about motivation into (...) three levels: semantical, epistemological, and ontological. I also explain his concept of internal motivation and argue that his theory, contrary to what his critics assume, may be called a weak motivational internalism. (shrink)

Adam Schaff was one of the most important Marxist philosophers in Poland. His work well documents the time, when Marxism was an 'official philosophy', burdened with political responsibilities and problems of strategy. The text is a critical analysis of Schaff's political writings. It highlights the most specific traits of his often paradoxical position, that was termed in literature as 'orthodox-revisionism'. Schaff tried to meet double and often conflicting requirements: tried to develop Marxist theory by posing problems unforeseen by the classics, (...) and to stay faithful to what he understood as strategic interests of socialist countries at the same time. It will be argued, that even in its theoretical shortcomings, his writings are still among the most important resources for reflection on complex and tragic history of the Left in 20th Century. (shrink)

Antyrealizm etyczny reprezentowany jest obecnie przez około 30% filozofów analitycznych. Podzielają oni przekonanie, że nie istnieją moralne własności, fakty czy wartości. Przez długi okres rozwijany był on zwłaszcza przez akognitywistów. Jednak od czasu publikacji książki J. Mackiego Ethics. Inventingright and wrong (1977) antyrealistyczny sceptycyzm został zradykalizowany, przybierając także formę teorii globalnego błędu. Przyjęcie powyższego przekonania prowadzi do trzech strategii postępowania: 1. fikcjonalizmu asertorycznego (J. Mackie), 2. fikcjonalizmu nieasertorycznego (R. Joyce) oraz 3. eliminatywizmu (I. Hinckfuss i R. Garner). W artykule, przyjmując (...) antyrealistyczny punkt wyjścia przedstawicieli teorii globalnego błędu, analizuję powody, dla których warto wyeliminować etykę, i powody, dla których moglibyśmy mieć z tym problem. Następnie przedstawiam argumenty, ze względu na które pomysł eliminacji etyki pośrednio wspiera zmianę myślenia o realizmie etycznym z paradygmatu ontologicznego na racjonalistyczny. W związku z tym prezentuję koncepcję rewizyjnego realizmu racji oraz dowodzę, że nie poddaje się ona argumentom zwolenników eliminacji etyki. (shrink)

[Democratization in sub-Saharan Africa: West African political thought perspective]. Krzysztof Trzcinski's book deals with democratization as one of the leading themes in contemporary West African political thought. The process of establishing democracy in sub-Saharan African countries is extremely complex. African politicians often resort to democratic procedures only during elections. After winning them, they often limit freedom of opposition, media, and civil society organizations. By deriving numerous benefits from being in power, they are not willing to give up power once (...) gained. Sometimes, in countries perceived as young democracies, authoritarian rule is restored. These and other meanders of the development of democratic structures in Africa are difficult to understand for "outside" observers. African political thinkers attempt to explain them. Disappointed with authoritarianism, which has not provided security or prosperity to post-colonial African societies, they see a chance to achieve these values in a democratic environment. In their opinion, however, democracy for Africa cannot be a simple copy of the western model of majority rule and have to be tailored, taking into account the multi-ethnic specificity of the region's countries. African authors of political thought diagnose the problems of the democratization process and propose institutional recipes for healing it. Krzysztof Trzcinski consistently analyzes the concepts they created and formulates original and essential conclusions (by Professor Michał Tymowski). (shrink)

Klasyczne teorie ekspresji, identyfikując treści uczuciowe dzieła sztuki z przeżyciami twórcy czy też odbiorcy, zdawały się wyprowadzać je poza dzieło. W konsekwencji formalizm treści takie – jako wobec dzieła zewnętrzne – uznawał za obojętne dla jego wartości i istoty. Sposobem wyjścia z dylematu okazało się dostrzeżenie i uznanie istnienia jakości psychicznych w samych zmysłowo postrzegalnych przedmiotach, a jednym z prekursorów tej idei był Henryk Elzenberg (1937). Koncepcja taka – ekspresywności jako własności – stała się, począwszy od lat pięćdziesiątych, za sprawą (...) Bouwsmy i Beardsleya, szeroko akceptowana w estetyce amerykańskiej. Jednocześnie autorzy ci postulowali całkowite usunięcie terminu „ekspresja” z języka estetyki. Jednak powszechna skłonność do wiązania sztuki z ekspresją domaga się interpretacji. Dostarcza jej koncepcja ekspresywności jako ekspresji fikcyjnego podmiotu, opracowana znowu przez Elzenberga (1950/1960). Później podobne ujęcie wykształciło się w estetyce anglosaskiej, ale dopiero w latach dziewięćdziesiątych doczekało się satysfakcjonującej wersji, stając się koncepcją szeroko dyskutowaną. (shrink)

Krzysztof Trzciński, ‘Some Remarks on the Idea of Rotational Presidency in an African State.’ The article has been published in “Afryka” 31-32, 2010, pp. 29-44. The main aim of this article is to explain and analyze in a critical way the concept of the rotational presidency, proposed for a multiethnic African state by a Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye. In his opinion, the presidency in an African state should be rotated between all ethnic groups. According to Gyekye, this system would (...) allow the sharing of power between ethnic groups, create trust in their relations and, as a consequence, improve the coherence of a multiethnic state. However, Gyekye’s concept lacks some essential details and seems very difficult to be implemented. Wielu afrykańskich badaczy polityki i innych intelektualistów niezadowolonych z realiów sprawowania, czy wręcz zawłaszczania władzy przez rządzących we współczesnym afrykańskim państwie, szuka rozwiązań ustrojowych alternatywnych wobec obecnie istniejących. Pragną oni ustanowienia w afrykańskim państwie porządku demokratycznego, ale skrojonego na potrzeby jego wieloetnicznej specyfiki. Jedną z wysuwanych propozycji jest osłabienie pozycji prezydenta, który w Afryce zwykle wywodzi się z najliczniejszej lub najsilniejszej grupy etnicznej i posiada bardzo ważne oraz rozbudowane prerogatywy. Sposobem umniejszenia roli urzędu prezydenckiego może być rotacja przywództwa, która stosowana jest w niektórych porządkach ustrojowych (zwłaszcza w Szwajcarii, Bośni i Hercegowinie, na Komorach), a jej współczesnych korzeni należy szukać w ustroju dyrektoriatu z czasów Rewolucji Francuskiej. (shrink)

The article is a reductio ad absurdum of assumptions which are shared by a large number of followers of the animal welfare movement and utilitarianism. I argue that even if we accept the main ethical arguments for a negative moral assessment of eating meat we should not promote vegetarianism but rather beefism (eating only meat from beef cattle). I also argue that some forms of vegetarianism, i.e. ichtivegetarianism, can be much more morally worse than normal meat diet. In order to (...) justify these thesis I show that there are significant moral differences in the consumption of animal products from different species. (shrink)

[PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY]. W artykule została omówiona i poddana analizie debata między dwoma współczesnymi afrykańskimi filozofami Ifeanyim A. Menkitim z Nigerii oraz Kwame Gyekyem z Ghany. Debata ta dotyczy typowych dla niektórych afrykańskich kultur sposobów myślenia o istocie człowieczeństwa, tj. o byciu człowiekiem (osobą, person). Prezentowane przez tych filozofów koncepcje nie odnoszą się do żadnych konkretnych afrykańskich ludów, lecz raczej są pewnymi wzorcami idealnymi, czy też abstrakcyjnymi. Zdaniem Menkitiego w tradycyjnym myśleniu afrykańskim jednostka (individual) stopniowo nabywa pełnię człowieczeństwa w (...) oczach swojej wspólnoty wpierw poprzez internalizację obowiązujących w niej norm, a następnie przez ich przestrzeganie w dorosłym życiu. Jak wskazuje, Afrykanin jest przy tym człowiekiem bardziej w przekonaniu i w odbiorze innych niż w swoim własnym. Ale nawet jego własne przeświadczenie o byciu człowiekiem jest kreowane przez myślenie zbiorowe. Z taką perspektywą nie zgadza się Gyekye, który uważa, że człowieczeństwo nie jest u Afrykanów czymś konstytuowanym bądź potwierdzanym przez zbiorowość. W przekonaniu Gyekyego, w myśleniu afrykańskim człowieka czynią pewne symptomatyczne dlań z natury atrybuty fizyczne i umysłowe oraz towarzyszący im instynkt społeczny (sociality), który, jak mniema, jest również przyrodzony. Choć Afrykanin jest, według Gyekyego, bytem głęboko wspólnotowym, posiada również pewien potencjał niezależności od wspólnoty (lokalnej, etnicznej, religijnej), której jest członkiem. Z opisu Menkitiego wynika zaś, że przeciętny Afrykanin nie jest aktywnym sprawcą rzeczywistości i indywidualnym interpretatorem świata, w którym żyje. Artykuł opublikowany w: "Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria", nr 3 [71]: Status człowieka. Problemy filozoficzne, naukowe i religijne, red. Jacek Hołówka, s. 259-282. (shrink)

Globalization is seen positively by those to whose societies it brings measurable benefits. Claude Ake, one of the most outstanding African thinkers of the second half of the 20th century and a great advocate for constructing democracy in Africa, primarily viewed the progress of globalization in terms of its numerous dangers. In Ake's opinion, globalization negatively affects the condition of contemporary societies, whose members place increasing importance on market values and principles. He thought that when consumer identity finally triumphs over (...) civic identity, the culture of democracy will be at an end. Democracy, after all, is connected with the common good and consumption with particularism and egoism. Consumerism kills the sense of civic duty and political engagement. Even though the members of poorer societies, including African ones, are not significant consumers, the global consumer culture has an effect on their lives as well, destroying traditional ties of solidarity and transforming local cultures. In many such societies, this state of affairs produces a rise in frustration and stress, and often a desire to return to the society's origins and a strengthening of antipathy towards outsiders or 'others'. Although Ake's works contain finely-wrought arguments, his theories raise important questions and are very debatable in their trend. In this article, I consider the main underlying assumptions of Ake's ideas and analyze selected aspects. (shrink)

THE CONGRESS The infrastructure of the colonial territories obeyed the logic of economic exploitation, territorial domain and commercial dynamics among others that left deep marks in the constructed landscape. The rationales applied to the decisions behind the construction of infrastructures varied according to the historical period, the political model of colonial administration and the international conjuncture. This congress seeks to bring to the knowledge of the scientific community the dynamics of occupation and transformation of colonial territory, especially related to and (...) resulting from the war effort, which involved not only the agency of architecture and urbanism but also of military apparatus, and its repercussions in the same territories as independent countries. Colonial infrastructures will be addressed to question, for instance, how housing production during armed conflict has conditioned future spatial models of the independent countries or what options taken by colonial administrations were abandoned or otherwise strengthened after independence. The congress is part of the ongoing research project entitled “ARCHWAR - Dominance and massviolence through Housing and Architecture during colonial wars. The Portuguese case (GuineaBissau, Angola, Mozambique): colonial documentation and post independence critical assessment” funded by ‘Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia’ (FCT - Foundation for Science and Technology), ref. PTDC/ART-DAQ/0592/2020, in which Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (FCG) is a partner. The general goal of the congress is to debate on the repercussions of the decisions taken by the colonial states in the area of territorial infrastructures – in particular through the disciplines of architecture and urbanism – in post-independence spatial and urban models and the formation of independent countries with a colonial past. (shrink)

[ON SOME PREMISES OF HUMAN CONDUCT TOWARDS ANIMALS: REMARKS ON J.M. COETZEE'S WORKS]. O relacjach między ludźmi a zwierzętami i konieczności poszerzania praw zwierząt powiedziano już tak wiele, iż trudno jest dziś przedstawić jakiś zupełnie nowy punkt widzenia. Uważam jednak, że dla jakości debaty powinno się nagłaśniać pewne mniej znane argumenty używane w literaturze traktującej o prawach zwierząt. Argumenty te wypowiadane są niekiedy nie tyle przez filozofów praw zwierząt, czy jakichś znanych aktywistów, lecz przez intelektualistów, których praca nie ogniskuje się (...) wyłącznie na problemie relacji między ludźmi a zwierzętami. Do takich postaci należy J.M. Coetzee, urodzony w 1940 południowoafrykański pisarz, zdobywca literackiej nagrody Nobla, były profesor literatury na uniwersytecie w Kapsztadzie, który obecnie mieszka w Australii i wykłada na uniwersytecie w Adelajdzie. J.M. Coetzee poświęca wspomnianemu problemowi wiele miejsca w różnych swoich książkach i pismach. J.M. Coetzee zdaje się opierać swoje poglądy dotyczące relacji między ludźmi a zwierzętami na następujących podstawowych tezach: mimo, że zwierzęta są zdolne do odczuwania strachu, bólu oraz cierpienia, ludzie zwykle nie poczuwają się do posiadania wobec nich zobowiązań moralnych, a także nie mają wystarczającej wiedzy o zwierzętach i nie rozumieją znacznej części ich zachowań; w konsekwencji często nie okazują zwierzętom szacunku jako innym istotom żywym i traktują je głównie w kategoriach przydatności, niejednokrotnie źle a nawet okrutnie, oraz zwykle roszczą sobie prawo do wykorzystywania zwierząt dla swoich celów i do decydowania o ich życiu. Noblista zdaje się uznawać taki stan rzeczy za dalece niewłaściwy. Można zatem domniemywać, że, zdaniem J.M. Coetzee’ego, ludzki stosunek wobec zwierząt powinien być całkowicie przeciwny od przedstawionego. Powyższe stwierdzenia obarczone są jednak piętnem przypuszczenia. Choć bowiem z pewnością J.M. Coetzee należy do propagatorów praw zwierząt, nie wiadomo do końca, czy wszystkie poglądy, które wkłada w usta swoich literackich bohaterów również sam wyznaje. Postacie z książek i esejów J.M. Coetzee’ego zwykle prowadzą ze sobą dyskusje na temat relacji między ludźmi a zwierzętami. Argumenty przez nich przedstawiane są – na co zwraca uwagę choćby Peter Singer – ich argumentami. Taki zabieg literacki pozwala południowoafrykańskiemu pisarzowi na ewentualne zdystansowanie się od części poglądów wypowiadanych przez bohaterów swoich prac. (shrink)

My paper is a reaction to polemic of Tomasz Sieczkowski "Discrimination nonetheless. A reply to Krzysztof Saja” [ICF "Diametros" (36) 2013] that he wrote against my paper "Discrimination against same-sex couples" [ICF “Diametros" (34) 2012]. The purpose of the paper is to refute Sieczkowski’s objections that rely on wrong interpretation of the structure of my main argument. I will describe the proper course of the reasoning that I have expressed in the first article and undermine the Sieczkowski’s proposal to (...) justify gay marriages by referring to values such as dignity, freedom and equality. (shrink)

Dans les années 1997–2002, les Comores, un des plus petits et un des plus jeunes pays d’Afrique, ont été la scène d’un processus de la désagrégation de l’État, qui consistait non seulement en la désintégration effective du pouvoir central dans une partie considérable du territoire de l’archipel, mais également en la sécession des deux îles et l’émergence sur l’une d’elles d’un quasi-État qui, suite au concours de nombreuses circonstances, parvint à mener une existence autonome durant une période de cinq ans. (...) D’après un point de vue rencontré fréquemment, c’est une situation économique précaire qui mena à la crise de l’État aux Comores ainsi qu’à l’intensification des tendances séparatistes dans ce pays. En réalité, le problème de l’effondrement de l’État comorien est bien plus complexe et des prémisses historiques, politiques, sociales et économiques, aussi bien que des facteurs liés à l’environnement y ont contribué. (shrink)

The article depicts the topic of the nomination in professional language, in the context of onimical processes based on principles known to other target groups not associated with the automotive industry. Important in this context are rules of metaphor and metonymy and pragmatic context of used expressions.

Most ethical discussions about diet are focused on the justification of specific kinds of products rather than an individual assessment of the moral footprint of eating products of certain animal species. This way of thinking is represented in the typical division of four dietary attitudes. There are vegans, vegetarians, welfarists and ordinary meat -eaters. However, the common “all or nothing” discussions between meat -eaters, vegans and vegetarians bypass very important factors in assessing dietary habits. I argue that if we want (...) to discover a properly assessed moral footprint of animal products, we should take into consideration not only life quality of animals during farming or violation of their rights—as is typically done—but, most of all, their body weight, life time in farms and time efficiency in animal products acquisition. Without these factors, an assessment of animal products is much too simplified. If we assume some easily accepted premises, we can justify a thesis that, regardless of the treatment of animals during farming and slaughtering, for example, eating chicken can be 163 times morally worse than eating beef, drinking milk can be 58 times morally better than eating eggs, and eating some types of fish can be even 501 times worse than eating beef. In order to justify such a thesis there is no need to reform common morality by, for example, criticizing its speciesism. The thesis that some animal products are much worse than others can be justified on common moral grounds. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to explain economic dualism in the history of modern Europe. The emergence of the manorial-serf economy in the Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary in the 16th and the 17th centuries was the result of a cumulative impact of various circumstantial factors. The weakness of cities in Central Europe disturbed the social balance – so characteristic for Western-European societies – between burghers and the nobility. The political dominance of the nobility hampered the development of cities and (...) limited the influence of burghers, paving the way to the rise of serfdom and manorial farms. These processes were accompanied by increased demand for agricultural products in Western Europe. (shrink)

[Democracy Building in Africa: The George Carew's Thought]. Większość współczesnych afrykańskich myślicieli politycznych uważa, że w państwach Afryki powinna zostać ustanowiona demokracja w miejsce dominujących tam obecnie różnych odmian autorytaryzmu. Jednakże niewielu z nich jest zdania, że liberalna teoria demokratyczna w kształcie, w jakim została skonceptualizowana i urzeczywistniona w praktyce politycznej na Zachodzie, daje odpowiedź na pytanie, jak wprowadzić ludowładztwo skrojone dla potrzeb Afryki. Niektórzy myśliciele afrykańscy krytykują rozmaite wady zachodniej demokracji liberalnej i szukają elementów demokratycznych w tradycyjnych rodzimych wartościach (...) i politycznych instytucjach, wyrażając opinię, że możliwe jest ich współczesne wykorzystanie w procesie budowy demokracji w Afryce. Tymczasem sierraleoński filozof George Munda Carew, autor poglądów składających się na jedną z szerszych współczesnych wizji przyszłości państwa w Afryce, twierdzi, że „treść pojęcia demokracji nie jest jeszcze stała” i proponuje Afrykanom tylko przejściowe przekształcenie niektórych rozwiązań liberalnej teorii demokratycznej. Carew uważa, że obowiązkiem myślicieli politycznych jest tworzenie teorii demokratycznej, która pasuje do specyfiki konkretnego rodzaju państwa. Na potrzeby wieloetnicznego państwa afrykańskiego należy, jego zdaniem, wypracować taką normatywną propozycję polityczną, która będzie „dawać szansę na możliwie największą integrację członków państwa, kompatybilną z możliwie największym ich zróżnicowaniem”, a zatem umożliwiać „promowanie jednocześnie pluralizmu demokratycznego i kulturowego”. Krzysztof Trzciński, Budowanie demokracji w Afryce: Wizja George’a Carewa [Democracy Building in Africa: The George Carew's Thought], “Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe” 2010, Vol. 7, No 1: J.Zdanowski (ed.), Idee i ideologie w krajach Azji i Afryki [Ideas and Ideologies in Asia and Africa], s. 249-272. (shrink)

The problem of identity of being in Buddhist philosophy: The Buddhist philosophical school of Madhyamaka is famous for its statement that things do not have their own inherent nature, essence or self‑nature (svabhāva). As a result, it is said that there is no objective foundation of the identity of things. Thus, the identity of things is not grounded in things themselves but is solely imputed and externally imposed on them. Things are what they are only for us, whereas for themselves, (...) or from their ‘own side’ they are empty (śūnya). That is why Madhyamaka philosophy is often compared to the philosophical conceptions inspired by a linguistic reflection (from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Jacques Derrida) which defines the problem of identity in terms of cognitive subjectivism and constructivism. Starting the analysis from the Abhidharma Buddhist tradition I will show that this reading of Madhyamaka view is too narrow. I will demonstrate that it is a result of an assumption, shared by Parmenides and Plato and wrongly ascribed to this Buddhist school, that the identity of being must be grounded in the self‑existing, self‑defined and (relatively) permanent ontological foundation. This tacit assumption, if rejected, makes any identity a completely subjective and relative construct. The point I am going to argue for, however, is that the Madhyamaka school sticks to an alternative understanding of objectivity; the foundation of all things is nothing but pure relation that precedes, in the ontological sense, all co‑related elements (i.e. things). Therefore, the question comes up: how being‑in‑relationship or ‘relationality’ may be the foundation of identity and what kind of identity it endows. I will try to answer these questions. (shrink)