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  1. Propositional Clothing and Belief.Neil Sinclair - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342-362.
    Moral discourse is propositionally clothed, that is, it exhibits those features – such as the ability of its sentences to intelligibly embed in conditionals and other unasserted contexts – that have been taken by some philosophers to be constitutive of discourses that express propositions. If there is nothing more to a mental state being a belief than it being characteristically expressed by sentences that are propositionally clothed then the version of expressivism which accepts that moral discourse is propositionally clothed (‘quasi-realism’) (...)
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  • VII — Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking.Amia Srinivasan - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):127-156.
    We suffer from genealogical anxiety when we worry that the contingent origins of our representations, once revealed, will somehow undermine or cast doubt on those representations. Is such anxiety ever rational? Many have apparently thought so, from pre-Socratic critics of Greek theology to contemporary evolutionary debunkers of morality. One strategy for vindicating critical genealogies is to see them as undermining the epistemic standing of our representations—the justification of our beliefs, the aptness of our concepts, and so on. I argue that (...)
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  • Might Teaching Be Judgement Dependent?Andrew Fisher & Jonathan Tallant - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):777-787.
    Our thesis in this paper is that consideration of Wright’s account of what it is to be judgement-dependent leads us to the conclusion that teaching is judgement dependent. We begin with a consideration of Wright’s account of what it is to be judgement-dependent. We then make the case that teaching satisfies the conditions on what it is to be judgement-dependent. Our intention is not to delve into the independent plausibility of such a view. Our focus is simply on showing the (...)
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  • On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
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  • A Defense of Descriptive Moral Content.Jeff Wisdom - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):285-300.
    Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently provided an updated presentation and defense of a metaethical view that they call cognitivist expressivism. Expressivists claim that moral judgments express propositional attitudes that do not represent or describe the external world. Horgan and Timmons agree with this claim, but they also deny the traditional expressivist claim that moral judgments do not express beliefs. On their view, moral judgments are genuine, truth-apt beliefs, thus making their form of expressivism a cognitivist one. In this (...)
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  • First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71.
    What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for (...)
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  • Are Expressivists Guilty of Wishful Thinking?Robert Mabrito - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1069-1081.
    Some contemporary philosophers have argued that expressivism or non-cognitivism, if suitably developed, can solve the well-known Frege–Geach problem. Of course, whether this is true is a matter of debate. Recently, Cian Dorr has advanced an argument that, if successful, would show that this debate is unimportant. For, according to Dorr, a solution to the Frege–Geach problem will not save expressivism from a new and distinct problem, namely that an expressivist theory—even assuming a solution to the Frege–Geach problem—entails that intuitively rational (...)
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  • The Immortal, the Intrinsic and the Quasi Meaning of Life.Mark Rowlands - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):379-408.
    Through the examination of the lives of several immortal beings, this paper defends a version of Moritz Schlick’s claim that the meaning of life is play. More precisely: a person’s life has meaning to the extent it there are things in it that the person values intrinsically rather than merely instrumentally and above a certain threshold of intensity. This is a subjectivist account of meaning in life. I defend subjectivism about meaning in life from common objections by understanding statements about (...)
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  • Aberrations of the Realism Debate.Michael Devitt - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):43--63.
    The issue of realism about the physical world is distinct from the semantic issue of correspondence truth. So it is an aberration to identify the two issues (Dummett), to dismiss the realism issue out of hostility to correspondence truth (Rorty, Fine), to think that that issue is one of interpretation, or to argue against realism by criticizing various claims about truth and reference (Putnam, Laudan). It is also an aberration to identify realism with nonskepticism, truth-as-the-aim-of-science, or scientific convergence. Realism is (...)
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  • How (Not) to Specify Normal Conditions for Response-Dependent Concepts.Jussi Haukioja - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):325 – 331.
    The extensions of response-dependent concepts are a priori connected with the subjective responses that competent users of that concept have in normal conditions. There are two strategies for specifying normal conditions for response-dependent concepts: topic-specific and topic-neutral. On a topic-specific specification, a characterization of normal conditions would be given separately for each response-dependent concept (or a non-trivial subset of response-dependent concepts, such as our colour concepts), whereas a topic-neutral specification would be given in a uniform way for all response-dependent concepts. (...)
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  • Farewell to States of Affairs.Julian Dodd - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):146 – 160.
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  • Meta‐Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.
    This is a paper about the problem of realism in meta-ethics (and, I hope, also in other areas, but that hope is so far pretty speculative). But it is not about the problem of whether realism is true. It is about the problem of what realism is. More specifically, it is about the question of what divides meta-ethical realists from irrealists. I start with a potted history of the Good Old Days.
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  • Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism.James Lenman - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32–57.
    Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his (...)
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  • The Perceiver's Share: Realism, Scepticism, and Response Dependence.Christopher Norris - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (4):387-424.
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  • Modal Supereminence and Modal Realism.John Divers - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):99-115.
    Colin McGinn proposes that acceptance of the supervenience of the modal on the actual is the natural form of expression of a non-objectual realism about modality. Here, some of the difficulties that arise in applying theses of supervenience to the modal-actual case are discussed. It is then argued: 1)that the truth of many such theses is determined on uncontroversial modal logical and conceptual grounds, and 2) that this and other independent considerations render it highly implausible that the affirmation of modal-actual (...)
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  • Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logics: A Reply to Beall.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):382-385.
    Mixed inferences are a problem for those who want to combine truth-assessability and antirealism with respect to allegedly nondescriptive sentences: the classical account of validity has apparently to be given up. J.C. Beall's response is that validity can be defined as the conservation of designated valued (Beall 2000). I argue that since it presupposes a truth predicate that can be applied to all sentences, this suggestion is not helpful. I also consider problems arising from mixed conjunctions and discuss the deeper (...)
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  • Why Reasons May Not Be Causes.Julia Tanney - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):103-126.
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