- Meta-epistemological Scepticism: Criticisms and a Defence.Chris Ranalli - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Was lehrt uns das Gettier-Problem über das Verhältnis zwischen Intuitionen und Begriffsanalysen?Geert Keil - 2013 - In Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren. Mentis. pp. 107-144.details
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A minimalist approach to epistemology.Christoph F. F. Kelp - unknowndetails
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The Gettier Problem.Ian M. Church - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 261-271.details
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Epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia.details
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Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.details
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Gettierovi protuprimjeri i analiza znanja.Zvonimir Culjak - 2003 - Prolegomena 2 (2):197-217.details
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"Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
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A Simple Theory of Introspection.Declan Smithies - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.details
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Achieving epistemic descent.Brett Andrew Coppenger - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2017 - In Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.details
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On Putting Knowledge 'First'.Jonathan Ichikawa & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism.Nevin Climenhaga - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge.details
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The Analysis of Knowledge.Brian C. Barnett - 2021 - In Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community. pp. Chapter 1.details
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Conocimiento y verdad.Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas - 2017 - Diccionario Interdisciplinar Austral.details
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Considering Purposeful Epistemology: On Starting Over. Review of Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. [REVIEW]Mark D. West - 2016 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (9):19-33.details
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Teoría de la virtudes: Un nuevo enfoque de la epistemología (parte II). Desafíos externos Y lucha interna.Diana Hoyos Valdes - 2006 - Discusiones Filosóficas 7 (10):89-113.details
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Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Ian M. Church (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck. London: Routledge.details
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The Problem of Truth in the Classical Analysis of Knowledge.Filip Vittorio Rossi - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):41-49.details
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Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.details
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A Probabilistic Defense of Proper De Jure Objections to Theism.Brian C. Barnett - 2019details
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Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content.Marcus McGahhey - unknowndetails
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Modals vs. Morals. Blackburn on Conceptual Supervenience. Dohrn - 2012 - GAP 8 Proceedings.details
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From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism: Theoretical and Empirical Developments.John Turri - 2015 - In Christian B. Miller, Michael R. Furr, William Fleeson & Angela Knobel (eds.), Character: new directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology. Oxford: pp. 315-330.details
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A Case for A Husserlian Willardarian Approach to Knowledge.Joseph Gibson - 2016 - Dissertation, Liberty Universitydetails
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Inference to the best explanation and the challenge of skepticism.Bryan C. Appley - unknowndetails
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Medically Valid Religious Beliefs.Gregory Bock - 2012 - Dissertation, details
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The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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