Hallucination Without Sensible Qualities

In Ori Beck & Farid Masrour (eds.), The Relational View of Perception: New Essays. Routledge (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This chapter introduces and motivates the Null View about standard causally matching hallucinations. The Null View holds that these hallucinations fail to present any objects or sensible qualities, despite being dead ringers for perceptions of ordinary objects and their qualities. Motivation for the Null View comes from a neglected observation about perception-based thought, namely that perception can permit perception-based thought about a sensible quality even while misleading a subject about that quality. The chapter's other contribution is defensive. Most reject the Null View on phenomenological or epistemic grounds. These objections to the Null View are sharpened and then undermined.

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Dominic Alford-Duguid
University of Oxford

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