Knowledge From Multiple Experiences

Philosophical Studies:1-32 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This paper models knowledge in cases where an agent has multiple experiences over time. Using this model, we introduce a series of observations that undermine the pretheoretic idea that the evidential significance of experience depends on the extent to which that experience matches the world. On the basis of these observations, we model knowledge in terms of what is likely given the agent's experience. An agent knows p when p is implied by her epistemic possibilities. A world is epistemically possible when its probability given the agent's experiences is not significantly lower than the probability of the actual world given that experience.
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First archival date: 2021-06-27
Latest version: 2 (2021-07-22)
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2021-06-27

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