Is Anyone Else Thinking My Thoughts? Aquinas’s Response to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem

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It has been recently argued by a number of metaphysicians—Trenton Merricks and Eric Olson among them—that any variety of dualism that claims that human persons have souls as proper parts (rather than simply being identical to souls) will face a too-many-thinker problem. In this paper, I examine whether this objection applies to the views of Aquinas, who famously claims that human persons are soul-body composites. I go on to argue that a straightforward readingof Aquinas’s texts might lead us to believe that he falls prey to Merricks and Olson’s objection, but that a more heterodox interpretation reveals a way to avoidthis problem
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First archival date: 2015-02-21
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