Individual Consciousness

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these consciousnesses, one's own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular consciousness. But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context to be specified. This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately be united as, or in, some single conscious entity underlying the apparent plurality of individuals.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2012-07-15
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
485 ( #9,400 of 53,590 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #28,976 of 53,590 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.