Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua‐Objects

Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):520-545 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in which they can be the same things while differing in many of their features
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-05-12
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
2,131 ( #1,636 of 2,454,824 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
322 ( #1,196 of 2,454,824 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.