Learning Matters: The Role of Learning in Concept Acquisition

Mind and Language 26 (5):507-539 (2011)
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Abstract

In LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Jerry Fodor argues that concept learning of any kind—even for complex concepts—is simply impossible. In order to avoid the conclusion that all concepts, primitive and complex, are innate, he argues that concept acquisition depends on purely noncognitive biological processes. In this paper, we show (1) that Fodor fails to establish that concept learning is impossible, (2) that his own biological account of concept acquisition is unworkable, and (3) that there are in fact many promising general models for explaining how concepts are learned.

Author Profiles

Eric Margolis
University of British Columbia
Stephen Laurence
University of Sheffield

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