Abstract
The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical
origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as
rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves
unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great
importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception
of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the
current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems
that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions
and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with
that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain
types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it
can be considered a “habit-as-learning”. The current view of habit in neuroscience, which
lacks cognitive control and we term “habit-as-routine”, is also covered by the Aristotelian
conception. He classifies habits into three categories: (1) theoretical, or the retention of
learning understood as “knowing that x is so”; (2) behavioral, through which the agent
achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior (“knowing how to behave”);
and (3) technical or learned skills (“knowing how to make or to do”). Finally, we propose
new areas of research where this “novel” conception of habit could serve as a framework
concept, from the cognitive enrichment of actions to the role of habits in pathological
conditions. In all, this contribution may shed light on the understanding of habits as an
important feature of human action. Habits, viewed as a cognitive enrichment of behavior,
are a crucial resource for understanding human learning and behavioral plasticity.