Is Understanding Reducible?
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):117-135 (2020)
Abstract
Despite playing an important role in epistemology, philosophy of science, and more recently in moral philosophy and aesthetics, the nature of understanding is still much contested. One attractive framework attempts to reduce understanding to other familiar epistemic states. This paper explores and develops a methodology for testing such reductionist theories before offering a counterexample to a recently defended variant on which understanding reduces to what an agent knows.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2020
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ROSIUR
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-12-13
View other versions
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-12-13
Total views
421 ( #13,189 of 58,450 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
70 ( #10,047 of 58,450 )
2018-12-13
Total views
421 ( #13,189 of 58,450 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
70 ( #10,047 of 58,450 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.