Recent work on the proof paradox

Philosophy Compass 15 (6) (2020)
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Abstract
Recent years have seen fresh impetus brought to debates about the proper role of statistical evidence in the law. Recent work largely centres on a set of puzzles known as the ‘proof paradox’. While these puzzles may initially seem academic, they have important ramifications for the law: raising key conceptual questions about legal proof, and practical questions about DNA evidence. This article introduces the proof paradox, why we should care about it, and new work attempting to resolve it.
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Archival date: 2020-03-30
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Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Epistemic Operators.Dretske, Fred I.

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2020-03-30

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