Results for 'Legal Proof'

956 found
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  1. Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.
    A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a considerable amount of philosophical attention: ‘Is it ever appropriate to base a legal verdict on statistical evidence alone?’ Many philosophers who have considered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even when the odds of error are extremely low. This paper develops a puzzle for the dominant theories concerning why we should eschew bare statistics. Namely, there seem to be compelling scenarios in which there are (...)
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  2. Legal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses the idea that legal proof should use variable standards rather than a single fixed threshold.
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  3. The sensitivity of legal proof.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-23.
    The proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evidence in a court of law. We accept fallible individual evidence but reject fallible statistical evidence even when the conditional probability that the defendant is guilty given the evidence is the same, a seeming inconsistency. This paper defends a solution to the proof paradox, building on a sensitivity account of checking and settling a question. The proposed sensitivity account of legal proof not only requires (...)
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  4. Should Legal Proof Be Binary?Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses the question of whether trials should just use two verdicts (e.g. guilty or not guilty) or whether they use multiple verdicts.
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  5. The Philosophy of Legal Proof.Lewis Ross - 2024 - Cambridge University Press.
    Criminal courts make decisions that can remove the liberty and even life of those accused. Civil trials can cause the bankruptcy of companies employing thousands of people, asylum seekers being deported, or children being placed into state care. Selecting the right standards when deciding legal cases is of utmost importance in giving those affected a fair deal. This Element is an introduction to the philosophy of legal proof. It is organised around five questions. First, it introduces the (...)
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  6. Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
    In order to perform certain actions – such as incarcerating a person or revoking parental rights – the state must establish certain facts to a particular standard of proof. These standards – such as preponderance of evidence and beyond reasonable doubt – are often interpreted as likelihoods or epistemic confidences. Many theorists construe them numerically; beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often construed as 90 to 95% confidence in the guilt of the defendant. -/- A family of influential cases (...)
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  7. The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.
    According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state (...)
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  8. (1 other version)Criminal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?Lewis Ross - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly (4):1-23.
    Should we use the same standard of proof to adjudicate guilt for murder and petty theft? Why not tailor the standard of proof to the crime? These relatively neglected questions cut to the heart of central issues in the philosophy of law. This paper scrutinises whether we ought to use the same standard for all criminal cases, in contrast with a flexible approach that uses different standards for different crimes. I reject consequentialist arguments for a radically flexible standard (...)
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  9. Recent work on the proof paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12667.
    Recent years have seen fresh impetus brought to debates about the proper role of statistical evidence in the law. Recent work largely centres on a set of puzzles known as the ‘proof paradox’. While these puzzles may initially seem academic, they have important ramifications for the law: raising key conceptual questions about legal proof, and practical questions about DNA evidence. This article introduces the proof paradox, why we should care about it, and new work attempting to (...)
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  10. Legal evidence and knowledge.Georgi Gardiner - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This essay is an accessible introduction to the proof paradox in legal epistemology. -/- In 1902 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine filed an influential legal verdict. The judge claimed that in order to find a defendant culpable, the plaintiff “must adduce evidence other than a majority of chances”. The judge thereby claimed that bare statistical evidence does not suffice for legal proof. -/- In this essay I first motivate the claim that bare statistical evidence (...)
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  11. Legal Probabilism and Anti-Probabilism.Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses whether legal proof is merely probabilistic, focusing on the famous proof paradox.
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  12. On Legal Interpretation and Second-order Proof Rules.Sebastián Reyes Molina - 2018 - Analisi E Diritto 1 (1):165-184.
    This paper puts forward three critiques of pardo’s second-order proof rules thesis. The first criticism states that these rules are not suitable to guide the interpretation of standards of proof rules because they confuse matters of legal interpretation with matters of epistemology. The second criticism states that second-order proof rules are affected by the same indeterminacy problems they are designed to resolve, thereby rendering them unsuitable for the task they are purposely designed for. The third criticism (...)
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  13. Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?Marcello Di Bello - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1269-1285.
    Smith argues that, unlike other forms of evidence, naked statistical evidence fails to satisfy normic support. This is his solution to the puzzles of statistical evidence in legal proof. This paper focuses on Smith’s claim that DNA evidence in cold-hit cases does not satisfy normic support. I argue that if this claim is correct, virtually no other form of evidence used at trial can satisfy normic support. This is troublesome. I discuss a few ways in which Smith can (...)
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  14. Significance Tests, Belief Calculi, and Burden of Proof in Legal and Scientific Discourse.Julio Michael Stern - 2003 - Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications 101:139-147.
    We review the definition of the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST), and summarize its main statistical and epistemological characteristics. We review also the Abstract Belief Calculus (ABC) of Darwiche and Ginsberg, and use it to analyze the FBST’s value of evidence. This analysis helps us understand the FBST properties and interpretation. The definition of value of evidence against a sharp hypothesis, in the FBST setup, was motivated by applications of Bayesian statistical reasoning to legal matters where the sharp hypotheses (...)
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  15. Standards of Proof.Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    An introduction to philosophical research on the standards of legal proof.
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  16. Legal Epistemology.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    An annotated bibliography of legal epistemology.
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  17. Against legal probabilism.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.
    Is it right to convict a person of a crime on the basis of purely statistical evidence? Many who have considered this question agree that it is not, posing a direct challenge to legal probabilism – the claim that the criminal standard of proof should be understood in terms of a high probability threshold. Some defenders of legal probabilism have, however, held their ground: Schoeman (1987) argues that there are no clear epistemic or moral problems with convictions (...)
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  18. De Re Beliefs and Evidence in Legal Cases.Samuel J. Thomas - 2021 - Dissertation, Arizona State University
    For the past half-century, both jurisprudence and epistemology have been haunted by questions about why individual evidence (i.e., evidence which picks out a specific individual) can sufficiently justify a guilty or liable verdict while bare statistical evidence (i.e., statistical evidence which does not pick out a specific individual) does not sufficiently justify such a verdict. This thesis examines three popular justifications for such a disparity in verdicts – Judith Jarvis Thomson’s causal account, Enoch et al.’s sensitivity account, and Sarah Moss’ (...)
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  19. Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333.
    This paper defends the heretical view that, at least in some cases, we ought to assign legal liability based on purely statistical evidence. The argument draws on prominent civil law litigation concerning pharmaceutical negligence and asbestos-poisoning. The overall aim is to illustrate moral pitfalls that result from supposing that it is never appropriate to rely on bare statistics when settling a legal dispute.
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  20. The “She Said, He Said” Paradox and the Proof Paradox.Georgi Gardiner - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.
    This essay introduces the ‘she said, he said’ paradox for Title IX investigations. ‘She said, he said’ cases are accusations of rape, followed by denials, with no further significant case-specific evidence available to the evaluator. In such cases, usually the accusation is true. Title IX investigations adjudicate sexual misconduct accusations in US educational institutions; I address whether they should be governed by the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard of proof or the higher ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard. -/- Orthodoxy (...)
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  21. Burden of Proof in the Autonomous Weapons Debate.Maciek Zając - 2024 - Ethics and Armed Forces 2024 (1):34-42.
    The debate on the ethical permissibility of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is deadlocked. It could therefore benefit from a differentiated assignment of the burden of proof. This is because the discussion is not purely philosophical in nature, but has a legal and security policy component and aims to avoid the most harmful outcomes of an otherwise unchecked development. Opponents of a universal AWS ban must clearly demonstrate that AWS comply with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This requires (...)
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  22. Dialectical and heuristic arguments: presumptions and burden of proof.Fabrizio Macagno - 2010 - In C. Tindale & C. Reed (eds.), Dialectics, Dialogue and Argumentation: An Examination of Douglas Walton's Theories of Reasoning and Argument. College Publications. pp. 45-57.
    Presumption is a complex concept in law, affecting the dialogue setting. However, it is not clear how presumptions work in everyday argumentation, in which the concept of “plausible argumentation” seems to encompass all kinds of inferences. By analyzing the legal notion of presumption, it appears that this type of reasoning combines argument schemes with reasoning from ignorance. Presumptive reasoning can be considered a particular form of reasoning, which needs positive or negative evidence to carry a probative weight on the (...)
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  23. Legal-Philosophical Propositions.Mathijs Notermans - unknown
    It is possible to write a Kelsenian ‘Legal-Philosophical Tractate’ – based on Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law – after the example of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The following main and sub-propositions analogous to the main and sub-propositions of the Tractatus are a proof thereof and give an initial impetus to it: “May others come and do it better”. Unlike Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, that ends with the famous proposition 7 that one should be silent about what cannot be spoken, a Kelsenian (...)
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  24. On Evidence, Medical and Legal.Donald W. Miller & Clifford Miller - 2005 - Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons 10 (3):70-75.
    Medicine, like law, is a pragmatic, probabilistic activity. Both require that decisions be made on the basis of available evidence, within a limited time. In contrast to law, medicine, particularly evidence-based medicine as it is currently practiced, aspires to a scientific standard of proof, one that is more certain than the standards of proof courts apply in civil and criminal proceedings. But medicine, as Dr. William Osler put it, is an "art of probabilities," or at best, a "science (...)
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  25. More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):943-960.
    In this paper I respond to Marcello Di Bello’s criticisms of the ‘normic account’ of the criminal standard of proof. In so doing, I further elaborate on what the normic account predicts about certain significant legal categories of evidence, including DNA and fingerprint evidence and eyewitness identifications.
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  26. Who Should Decide Legal Trials?Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses who should decide the result of legal trials, focusing on the jury system.
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  27. An alternative proof of the universal propensity to evil.Pablo Muchnik - 2009 - In Sharon Anderson-Gold & Pablo Muchnik (eds.), Kant's Anatomy of Evil. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this paper, I develop a quasi-transcendental argument to justify Kant’s infamous claim “man is evil by nature.” The cornerstone of my reconstruction lies in drawing a systematic distinction between the seemingly identical concepts of “evil disposition” (böseGesinnung) and “propensity to evil” (Hang zumBösen). The former, I argue, Kant reserves to describe the fundamental moral outlook of a single individual; the latter, the moral orientation of the whole species. Moreover, the appellative “evil” ranges over two different types of moral failure: (...)
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  28. Probability of Guilt.Mario Günther - manuscript
    In legal proceedings, a fact-finder needs to decide whether a defendant is guilty or not based on probabilistic evidence. We defend the thesis that the defendant should be found guilty just in case it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty. We draw on Leitgeb’s stability theory for an appropriate notion of rational belief and show how our thesis solves the problem of statistical evidence. Finally, we defend our account of legal proof (...)
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  29. The objective Bayesian conceptualisation of proof and reference class problems.James Franklin - 2011 - Sydney Law Review 33 (3):545-561.
    The objective Bayesian view of proof (or logical probability, or evidential support) is explained and defended: that the relation of evidence to hypothesis (in legal trials, science etc) is a strictly logical one, comparable to deductive logic. This view is distinguished from the thesis, which had some popularity in law in the 1980s, that legal evidence ought to be evaluated using numerical probabilities and formulas. While numbers are not always useful, a central role is played in uncertain (...)
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  30. Five Kinds of Perspectives on Legal Institutions.Corrado Roversi - manuscript
    There is at least one immediate sense in which legal discourse is perspectival: it qualifies acts and facts in the world on the basis of rules. Legal concepts are for the most part constituted by rules, both in the sense that rules define these concepts’ semantic content and that, in order to engage with legal practice, we must act according to those rules, not necessarily complying with them but at least having them in mind. This is the (...)
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  31. On Evidence, Medical & Legal - Letter & Authors' Reply.Clifford Miller - 2005 - Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons 10 (4):98-99..
    This exchange of correspondence with a critic provides helpful explanations of aspects of the paper "On Evidence, Medical and Legal" by the same authors.
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  32. Thinking Critically About Abortion: Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong & Why All Abortions Should Be Legal.Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob - 2019 - Atlanta, GA: Open Philosophy Press.
    This book introduces readers to the many arguments and controversies concerning abortion. While it argues for ethical and legal positions on the issues, it focuses on how to think about the issues, not just what to think about them. It is an ideal resource to improve your understanding of what people think, why they think that and whether their (and your) arguments are good or bad, and why. It's ideal for classroom use, discussion groups, organizational learning, and personal reading. (...)
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  33. The Medical Toxicologist in an Albanian Court: Ethical and Legal Issues.Sandër Simoni & Gentian Vyshka - 2013 - International Journal of Clinical Toxicology 1:27-30.
    Recent developments in the field of forensic medicine and the judicial practice are both factors influencing considerably toward an increasing role of toxicologists in court hearings and litigation processes. The role of forensic toxicologist has been until a few decennia before a prerogative of the medico-legal specialists, but meanwhile a subspecialty of the general toxicology seems to have been created. Vis-à-vis the increasing presence of toxicologists in penal procedures of poisoning and intoxications, Albanian courts have created their own precedents (...)
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  34. The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
    Legal epistemology has been an area of great philosophical growth since the turn of the century. But recently, a number of philosophers have argued the entire project is misguided, claiming that it relies on an illicit transposition of the norms of individual epistemology to the legal arena. This paper uses these objections as a foil to consider the foundations of legal epistemology, particularly as it applies to the criminal law. The aim is to clarify the fundamental commitments (...)
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  35. Just probabilities.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2024 - Noûs 58 (4):948-972.
    I defend the thesis that legal standards of proof are reducible to thresholds of probability. Many reject this thesis because it appears to permit finding defendants liable solely on the basis of statistical evidence. To the contrary, I argue – by combining Thomson's (1986) causal analysis of legal evidence with formal methods of causal inference – that legal standards of proof can be reduced to probabilities, but that deriving these probabilities involves more than just statistics.
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  36. Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.
    Recently, the practice of deciding legal cases on purely statistical evidence has been widely criticised. Many feel uncomfortable with finding someone guilty on the basis of bare probabilities, even though the chance of error might be stupendously small. This is an important issue: with the rise of DNA profiling, courts are increasingly faced with purely statistical evidence. A prominent line of argument—endorsed by Blome-Tillmann 2017; Smith 2018; and Littlejohn 2018—rejects the use of such evidence by appealing to epistemic norms (...)
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  37. 'Philosophical Dimensions of the Trial' (Special Issue) Introduction, Summary, Questions for the Future.Lewis Ross, Miguel Egler & Lisa Bastian - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2):111-116.
    Introduction and Discussion of a Special Issue in philosophy of law "Philosophical Dimensions of the Trial" -/- .
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  38. Reasonable Moral Doubt.Emad Atiq - 2022 - New York University Law Review 97:1373-1425.
    Sentencing outcomes turn on moral and evaluative determinations. For example, a finding of “irreparable corruption” is generally a precondition for juvenile life without parole. A finding that the “aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors” determines whether a defendant receives the death penalty. Should such moral determinations that expose defendants to extraordinary penalties be subject to a standard of proof? A broad range of federal and state courts have purported to decide this issue “in the abstract and without reference to (...)
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  39. What is hate speech? The case for a corpus approach.Maxime Lepoutre, Sara Vilar-Lluch, Emma Borg & Nat Hansen - 2023 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (2):397-430.
    Contemporary public discourse is saturated with speech that vilifies and incites hatred or violence against vulnerable groups. The term “hate speech” has emerged in legal circles and in ordinary language to refer to these communicative acts. But legal theorists and philosophers disagree over how to define this term. This paper makes the case for, and subsequently develops, the first corpus-based analysis of the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” We begin by demonstrating that key interpretive and moral disputes surrounding (...)
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  40. Is It Possible to Provide Evidence of Insufficient Evidence? The Precautionary Principle at the WTO.Elisa Vecchione - 2012 - Chicago Journal of International Law 13 (1).
    This Article aims to demonstrate that the WTO jurisprudence on science-related trade disputes has become imbued with a specific vision of science that has prevented any possible application of the precautionary principle. This situation is due both to the WTO’s specific dispute settlement procedures and to the substantive nature of precautionary measures. Indeed, such measures’ foundation on “insufficient scientific evidence” dramatically undermines the probative value of science in WTO adjudication and creates a seeming contradiction: The system requires defendants to provide (...)
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  41. A philosophy of evidence law: justice in the search for truth.Hock Lai Ho - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This book examines the legal and moral theory behind the law of evidence and proof, arguing that only by exploring the nature of responsibility in fact-finding can the role and purpose of much of the law be fully understood. Ho argues that the court must not only find the truth to do justice, it must do justice in finding the truth.
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  42. Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.
    Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility of (...)
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  43.  76
    Interpretable and accurate prediction models for metagenomics data.Edi Prifti, Antoine Danchin, Jean-Daniel Zucker & Eugeni Belda - 2020 - Gigascience 9 (3):giaa010.
    Background: Microbiome biomarker discovery for patient diagnosis, prognosis, and risk evaluation is attracting broad interest. Selected groups of microbial features provide signatures that characterize host disease states such as cancer or cardio-metabolic diseases. Yet, the current predictive models stemming from machine learning still behave as black boxes and seldom generalize well. Their interpretation is challenging for physicians and biologists, which makes them difficult to trust and use routinely in the physician-patient decision-making process. Novel methods that provide interpretability and biological insight (...)
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  44. When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.
    There is something puzzling about statistical evidence. One place this manifests is in the law, where courts are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts on evidence that is purely statistical, in spite of the fact that it is perfectly capable of meeting the standards of proof enshrined in legal doctrine. After surveying some proposed explanations for this, I shall outline a new approach – one that makes use of a notion of normalcy that is distinct from the idea of (...)
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  45. Justified Belief and Just Conviction.Clayton Littlejohn - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.
    Abstract: When do we meet the standard of proof in a criminal trial? Some have argued that it is when the guilt of the defendant is sufficiently probable on the evidence. Some have argued that it is a matter of normic support. While the first view provides us with a nice account of how we ought to manage risk, the second explains why we shouldn’t convict on the basis of naked statistical evidence alone. Unfortunately, this second view doesn’t help (...)
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  46. Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica.Andrés Páez (ed.) - 2015 - Bogotá, D.C., Colombia: Ediciones Uniandes.
    Aunque el derecho probatorio y el derecho procesal se han dedicado desde siempre al estudio de los problemas relacionados con las pruebas y el establecimiento de los hechos en los procesos judiciales, el énfasis ha estado siempre en el aspecto formal, doctrinal y procedimental en detrimento de los fundamentos filosóficos y teóricos. Durante los últimos años ha habido un intento sostenido de explorar estos fundamentos combinando no sólo las herramientas tradicionales proporcionadas por la lógica, la gramática y la retórica, sino (...)
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  47. Conscientious Objection in Healthcare: The Requirement of Justification, the Moral Threshold, and Military Refusals.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2023 - Journal of Religious Ethics 52 (1):133-155.
    A dogma accepted in many ethical, religious, and legal frameworks is that the reasons behind conscientious objection (CO) in healthcare cannot be evaluated or judged by any institution because conscience is individual and autonomous. This paper shows that this background view is mistaken: the requirement to reveal and explain the reasons for conscientious objection in healthcare is ethically justified and legally desirable. Referring to real healthcare cases and legal regulations, this paper argues that these reasons should be evaluated (...)
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  48. "Common Arguments about Abortion" and "Better (Philosophical) Arguments About Abortion".Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob - 2019 - Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource.
    Two chapters -- "Common Arguments about Abortion" and "Better (Philosophical) Arguments About Abortion" -- in one file, from the open access textbook "Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource" edited by Noah Levin. -/- Adults, children and babies are arguably wrong to kill, fundamentally, because we are conscious, aware and have feelings. Since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, we argue that they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are (...)
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  49. Against the Alleged Insufficiency of Statistical Evidence.Sam Fox Krauss - 2020 - Florida State University Law Review 47:801-825.
    Over almost a half-century, evidence law scholars and philosophers have contended with what have come to be called the “Proof Paradoxes.” In brief, the following sort of paradox arises: Factfinders in criminal and civil trials are charged with reaching a verdict if the evidence presented meets a particular standard of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt, in criminal cases, and preponderance of the evidence, in civil trials. It seems that purely statistical evidence can suffice for just such a level of (...)
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  50. Late scholastic probable arguments and their contrast with rhetorical and demonstrative arguments.James Franklin - 2022 - Philosophical Inquiries 10 (2).
    Aristotle divided arguments that persuade into the rhetorical (which happen to persuade), the dialectical (which are strong so ought to persuade to some degree) and the demonstrative (which must persuade if rightly understood). Dialectical arguments were long neglected, partly because Aristotle did not write a book about them. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth century late scholastic authors such as Medina, Cano and Soto developed a sound theory of probable arguments, those that have logical and not merely psychological force but (...)
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