Results for 'Legal Philosophy'

994 found
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  1. Experimental Legal Philosophy: General Jurisprudence.Raff Donelson - 2023 - In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 309-326.
    This chapter offers an overview of experimental legal philosophy with a special focus on questions in general jurisprudence, that part of legal philosophy that asks about the concept and nature of law. Much of the experimental general jurisprudence work has tended to follow the questions that have interested general jurisprudence scholars for decades, that is, questions about the relation between legal norms and moral norms. Wholesale criticism of experimental general jurisprudence is scant, but, given existing (...)
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  2. 'The Preface' Hegel's Legal Philosophy, and the Crises of His Time.William Conklin - 2017 - In Johnathan Lavery, William Sweet & Louis Groarke (eds.), Ideas Under Fire. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 161-190.
    Hegel experienced several personal, political, and professional crises during his life. These crises impacted his dense theory about the importance of rational self-reflection in the organic character and evolution of law. The article argues that Hegel’s Preface to the Philosophy of Right manifests how one philosopher came to terms with the personal, social and political crises in which he found himself. In particular, the article outlines the central themes of the Preface and then explicates the important notion of Bildung (...)
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  3. Mishpat Ivri, Halakhah and Legal Philosophy: Agunah and the Theory of “Legal Sources".Bernard S. Jackson - 2001 - JSiJ.
    In this paper, I ask whether mishpat ivri (Jewish Law) is appropriately conceived as a “legal system”. I review Menachem Elon’s use of a “Sources” Theory of Law (based on Salmond) in his account of Mishpat Ivri; the status of religious law from the viewpoint of jurisprudence itself (Bentham, Austin and Kelsen); then the use of sources (and the approach to “dogmatic error”) by halakhic authorities in discussing the problems of the agunah (“chained wife”), which I suggest points to (...)
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  4.  31
    The Philosophy of Legal Proof.Lewis Ross - 2024 - Cambridge University Press.
    Criminal courts make decisions that can remove the liberty and even life of those accused. Civil trials can cause the bankruptcy of companies employing thousands of people, asylum seekers being deported, or children being placed into state care. Selecting the right standards when deciding legal cases is of utmost importance in giving those affected a fair deal. This Element is an introduction to the philosophy of legal proof. It is organised around five questions. First, it introduces the (...)
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  5. The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach: Chapters in the Theory of Knowledge and Legal Philosophy.Lucinda Ann Vandervort Brettler - 1973 - Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
    This dissertation engages in a critical analysis of the work of Adolf Reinach in the theory of knowledge and legal philosophy. Reinach had trained as a lawyer and brought that perspective and experience to bear in his phenomenological work on problems in evidence and legal philosophy. His contributions to phenomenology in the early 20th century provide a window into the earliest phases of the development of the phenomenological movement, prior to World War I. This dissertation locates (...)
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  6. Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door... One More Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis.Helga Varden - 2010 - Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (4):403-4211.
    Kant’s example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant’s philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it’s always wrong to lie – even if necessary to prevent a murderer from reaching his victim – and that if one does lie, one becomes partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If (...)
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  7. Recent Work in African Political and Legal Philosophy.Thaddeus Metz - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (9):1-10.
    In this article I critically survey non-edited books on political and legal philosophy that have been composed by those working in the sub-Saharan African tradition and have appeared in print since 2016. These monographs principally address political, distributive, and criminal justice at the domestic level, with this article recounting the essentials of these texts as well as noting prima facie weaknesses in their positions and gaps in current research agendas. My aims are to enable readers to obtain a (...)
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  8. Contemporary legal philosophising: Schmitt, Kelsen, Lukács, Hart, & law and literature, with Marxism's dark legacy in Central Europe (on teaching legal philosophy in appendix).Csaba Varga - 2013 - Budapest: Szent István Társulat.
    Reedition of papers in English spanning from 1986 to 2009 /// Historical background -- An imposed legacy -- Twentieth century contemporaneity -- Appendix: The philosophy of teaching legal philosophy in Hungary /// HISTORICAL BACKGROUND -- PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: A SKETCH OF HISTORY [1999] 11–21 // PHILOSOPHISING ON LAW IN THE TURMOIL OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN HUNGARY (TWO PORTRAITS, INTERWAR AND POSTWAR: JULIUS MOÓR & ISTVÁN LOSONCZY) [2001–2002] 23–39: Julius Moór 23 / (...)
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  9. Legal Consciousness at the Early Stage of Personality Development from the Perspective of Russian Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Pedagogy.Maxim V. Vorobiev - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (2):46-57.
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  10. 20th-Century Bulgarian Philosophy of Law: From Critical Acceptance of Kant’s Ideas to the Logic of Legal Reasoning.Vihren Bouzov - 2016 - In Enrico Pattaro & C. Roversi (eds.), A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. V.12 (1), Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil Law World. pp. 681-690.
    My analysis here is an attempt to bring out the main through-line in the development of Bulgarian philosophy of law today. A proper account of Bulgarian philosophy of law in the 20th century requires an attempt to find, on the one hand, a solution to epistemological and methodological problems in law and, on the other, a clear-cut influence of the Kantian critical tradition. Bulgarian philosophy of law follows a complicated path, ranging from acceptance and revision of Kantian (...)
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  11. Why legal theory is political philosophy.William A. Edmundson - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (4):331-346.
    The concept of law is not a theorist's invention but one that people use every day. Thus one measure of the adequacy of a theory of law is its degree of fidelity to the concept as it is understood by those who use it. That means as far as possible. There are important truisms about the law that have an evaluative cast. The theorist has either to say what would make those evaluative truisms true or to defend her choice to (...)
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  12. Legal evidence and knowledge.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
    This essay is an accessible introduction to the proof paradox in legal epistemology. -/- In 1902 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine filed an influential legal verdict. The judge claimed that in order to find a defendant culpable, the plaintiff “must adduce evidence other than a majority of chances”. The judge thereby claimed that bare statistical evidence does not suffice for legal proof. -/- In this essay I first motivate the claim that bare statistical evidence does not (...)
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  13. Legal Metanormativity: Lessons for and from Constitutivist Accounts in the Philosophy of Law.Kathryn Lindeman - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 87-104.
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  14. Preface to a Philosophy of Legal Information.Kevin Lee - 2018 - SMU Science and Technology Law Review 20.
    This essay introduces the philosophy of legal information (PLI), which is a response to the radical changes brought about in philosophy by the information revolution. It reviews in some detail the work of Luciano Floridi, who is an influential advocate for an information turn in philosophy that he calls the philosophy of information (PI). Floridi proposes that philosophers investigate the conceptual nature of information as it currently exists across multiple disciplines. He shows how a focus (...)
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  15. Legal Positivism and the Moral Origins of Legal Systems.Emad H. Atiq - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 36 (1):37-64.
    Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s (...)
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  16.  2
    The sensitivity of legal proof.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-23.
    The proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evidence in a court of law. We accept fallible individual evidence but reject fallible statistical evidence even when the conditional probability that the defendant is guilty given the evidence is the same, a seeming inconsistency. This paper defends a solution to the proof paradox, building on a sensitivity account of checking and settling a question. The proposed sensitivity account of legal proof not only requires sensitivity simpliciter but (...)
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  17. Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas's and Kan't Philosophy of Law.Delamar José Volpato Dutra & Nythamar de Oliveira - 2017 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 16 (3):533-546.
    The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cognitivism is it consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Habermas’s Philosophy of law is confronted with both positions.
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  18. Law and philosophy: selected papers in legal theory.Csaba Varga (ed.) - 1994 - Budapest: ELTE “Comparative Legal Cultures” Project.
    Photomechanical reprint of papers from 1970 to 1992 mostly in English, some in German or French: Foreword 1–4; LAW AS PRACTICE ‘La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques’ 7–33, ‘Geltung des Rechts – Wirksamkeit des Rechts’ 35–42, ‘Macrosociological Theories of Law’ 43–76, ‘Law & its Inner Morality’ 77–89, ‘The Law & its Limits’ 91–96; LAW AS TECHNIQUE ‘Domaine »externe« & domaine »interne« en droit’ 99–117, ‘Die ministerielle Begründung’ 119–139, ‘The Preamble’ 141–167, ‘Presumption & Fiction’ 169–185, ‘Legal Technique’187–198; LAW AS (...)
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  19. Legal Probabilism and Anti-Probabilism.Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses whether legal proof is merely probabilistic, focusing on the famous proof paradox.
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  20. Legal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses the idea that legal proof should use variable standards rather than a single fixed threshold.
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  21. Legal Norms as Linguistic conventions.Boyan Bahanov - 2020 - In Annual of Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Faculty of Philosophy, Postgraduate Students Book, Volume 4. Sofia University Press. pp. 15-30.
    Law is the main regulator of public relations, and the question of the proper use and understanding of legal language is essential for law enforcement. This topic is of interest to both lawyers and philosophers, who often join efforts to study it. This article attempts precisely to take such an interdisciplinary approach when examining legal rules as specific linguistic conventions. First of all, for the sake of a better and more thorough understanding of legal language, legal (...)
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  22. Robust Normativity, Morality, and Legal Positivism.David Plunkett - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 105-136.
    This chapter discusses two different issues about the relationship between legal positivism and robust normativity (understood as the most authoritative kind of normativity to which we appeal). First, the chapter argues that, in many contexts when discussing “legal positivism” and “legal antipositivism”, the discussion should be shifted from whether legal facts are ultimately partly grounded in moral facts to whether they are ultimately partly grounded in robustly normative facts. Second, the chapter explores an important difference within (...)
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  23. Legal Metaphoric Artifacts.Corrado Roversi - manuscript
    In this paper I take it for granted that legal institutions are artifacts. In general, this can very well be considered a trivial thesis in legal philosophy. As trivial as this thesis may be, however, to my knowledge no legal philosopher has attempted an analysis of the peculiar reality of legal phenomena in terms of the reality of artifacts, and this is particularly striking because there has been much discussion about artifacts in general philosophy (...)
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  24. Fictions in legal reasoning.Manish Oza - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (3):451-463.
    A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works.
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  25. Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.
    A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a considerable amount of philosophical attention: ‘Is it ever appropriate to base a legal verdict on statistical evidence alone?’ Many philosophers who have considered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even when the odds of error are extremely low. This paper develops a puzzle for the dominant theories concerning why we should eschew bare statistics. Namely, there seem to be compelling scenarios in which there are (...)
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  26. Should Legal Proof Be Binary?Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses the question of whether trials should just use two verdicts (e.g. guilty or not guilty) or whether they use multiple verdicts.
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  27. Legal Agreements and the Capacities of Agents.Andrei Buckareff - 2014 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Law and the Philosophy of Action. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. pp. 195-219.
    Most work at the intersection of law and the philosophy of action focuses on criminal responsibility. Unfortunately, this focus has been at the expense of reflecting on how the philosophy of action might help illuminate our understanding of issues in civil law. In this essay, focusing on Anglo-American jurisprudence, we examine the conditions under which a party to a legal agreement is deemed to have the capacity required to be bound by that agreement. We refer to this (...)
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  28. Making Sense of Vicarious Responsibility: Moral Philosophy Meets Legal Theory.Daniela Glavaničová & Matteo Pascucci - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Vicarious responsibility is a notoriously puzzling notion in normative reasoning. In this article we will explore two fundamental issues, which we will call the “explication problem” and the “justification problem”. The former issue concerns how vicarious responsibility can plausibly be defined in terms of other normative concepts. The latter issue concerns how ascriptions of vicarious responsibility can be justified. We will address these two problems by combining ideas taken from legal theory and moral philosophy. Our analysis will emphasise (...)
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  29. Against Legal Punishment.Nathan Hanna - 2022 - In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 559-78.
    I argue that legal punishment is morally wrong because it’s too morally risky. I first briefly explain how my argument differs from similar ones in the philosophical literature on legal punishment. Then I explain why legal punishment is morally risky, argue that it’s too morally risky, and discuss objections. In a nutshell, my argument goes as follows. Legal punishment is wrong because we can never sufficiently reduce the risk of doing wrong when we legally punish people. (...)
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  30. Legality of Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics: A Case of “Ultra-Sinoism”.Ammar Younas - 2020 - Russian Law Journal 8 (4):53-91.
    The legal progression in China is portrayed negatively by western scholars who often argue that the state institutions in China are subordinate to the control of Chinese Communist Party’s leadership which makes these institutions politically insignificant. We consider that the legal progression in China has an instrumental role in achieving “Harmonious Socialist Society.” The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analytical literature review of scholastic work to explain the legality of rule of law in China and (...)
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  31. Legal Consultation as Language Translation.Боян Баханов - 2021 - In Proceedings of a conference for doctoral students at Sofia University, Faculty of Philosophy. pp. 33-46.
    This research examines the issue of linguistic interpretation of normative texts as a special type of language translation. For this purpose, in the first place, we will support the view that the legal language, and in particular the language in which regulations are expressed has an independent nature. It will be presented as different from the daily language of society, and lawyers as a kind of mediator between both of these diverse, albeit close, languages. After this, legal consultation (...)
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  32. Legal Luck.Ori Herstein - forthcoming - In Herstein Ori (ed.), Rutledge Companion to the Philosophy of Luck. Rutledge.
    Explaining the notion of legal luck and exploring its justification. Focusing on how legal luck relates to moral luck, legal causation and negligence, and to civil and criminal liability.
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  33. Arguments and Stories in Legal Reasoning: The Case of Evidence Law.Gianluca Andresani - 2020 - Archiv Fuer Rechts Und Sozialphilosphie 106 (1):75-90.
    We argue that legal argumentation, as the subject matter as well as a special subfield of Argumentation Studies (AS), has to be examined by making skilled use of the full panoply of tools such as argumentation and story schemes which are at the forefront of current work in AS. In reviewing the literature, we make explicit our own methodological choices (particularly regarding the place of normative deliberation in practical reasoning) and then illustrate the implications of such an approach through (...)
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  34. Comparative legal cultures: on traditions classified, their rapprochement & transfer, and the anarchy of hyper-rationalism with appendix on legal ethnography.Csaba Varga - 2012 - Budapest: Szent István Társulat.
    Disciplinary issues -- Field studies -- Appendix: Theory of law : legal ethnography, or, the theoretical fruits of the inquiries into folkways. /// Reedition of papers in English spanning from 1995 to 2008 /// DISCIPLINARY ISSUES -- LAW AS CULTURE? [2002] 9–14 // TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES [2002] 15–17 // COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES: ATTEMPTS AT CONCEPTUALISATION [1997] 19–28: 1. Legal Culture in a Cultural-anthropological Approach 19 / 2. Legal Culture in a Sociological Approach 21 (...)
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  35. African Jurisprudence as Historical Co-extension of Diffused Legal Theories.Leye Komolafe - 2022 - Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 8 (1):51-68.
    African jurisprudence, like African philosophy, continues to be hotly debated. This article contends that the debate straddles the uniqueness claim which either emphasises the existence or possibility of a peculiar legal framework on the continent, and a historical co-extensional position reiterating that African jurisprudence is a continuum of other legal traditions. The article argues that there is no uniquely African jurisprudence, and that what obtains within the structures of jurisprudence on the continent also exists within various (...) traditions elsewhere, and as such can at best be described as ‘jurisprudence in Africa’ rather than ‘African jurisprudence’. It defends this thesis through analytic and comparative explications of the content of natural law theory and legal positivism as experienced on the continent. It concedes that relics of the colonial legal experience create contestations that inform scholars’ calls for a return to traditional legal systems. It concludes that a reconstructive jurisprudence in Africa must take cognisance of the continent’s historical and evolutionary legal experiences, but that a unified or monolithic theory may not be sufficient to address the choice of functional jurisprudence. Keywords African jurisprudence, jurisprudence in Africa, African legal evolution, diffused legal theories. (shrink)
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  36. Legal Facts and Reasons for Action: Between Deflationary and Robust Conceptions of Law’s Reason-Giving Capacity.Noam Gur - 2019 - In Frederick Schauer, Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac (eds.), The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between is and Ought. Springer Verlag. pp. 151-170.
    This chapter considers whether legal requirements can constitute reasons for action independently of the merits of the requirement at hand. While jurisprudential opinion on this question is far from uniform, sceptical views are becoming increasingly dominant. Such views typically contend that, while the law can be indicative of pre-existing reasons, or can trigger pre-existing reasons into operation, it cannot constitute new reasons. This chapter offers support to a somewhat less sceptical position, according to which the fact that a (...) requirement has been issued can be a reason for action, yet one that is underpinned by bedrock values which law is apt to serve. Notions discussed here include a value-based conception of reasons as facts ; a distinction between complete and incomplete reasons ; and David Enoch’s idea of triggering reason-giving. Following a discussion of criticism against the view adopted here, the chapter concludes by considering some more ‘robust’ conceptions of law’s reason-giving capacity. (shrink)
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  37. Who Should Decide Legal Trials?Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses who should decide the result of legal trials, focusing on the jury system.
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  38. Legal Mind - from an ethical point of view.Yusuke Kaneko - 2009 - Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 1:41-55.
    Although written in Japanese, 法的思考(Legal Mind)pursues a good explanation of how we can apply the so-called practical syllogism to the legal manner of thought.
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  39. Legal validity and the infinite regress.Oliver Black - 1996 - Law and Philosophy 15 (4):339 - 368.
    The following four theses all have some intuitive appeal: (I) There are valid norms. (II) A norm is valid only if justified by a valid norm. (III) Justification, on the class of norms, has an irreflexive proper ancestral. (IV) There is no infinite sequence of valid norms each of which is justified by its successor. However, at least one must be false, for (I)--(III) together entail the denial of (IV). There is thus a conflict between intuition and logical possibility. This (...)
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  40. Does Legal Interpretation Need Paul Grice?Matczak Marcin - 2016 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):67-87.
    By significantly diminishing the role intentions play in communication, in Imagination and Convention Lepore and Stone attempt to overthrow the Gricean paradigm which prevails in the philosophy of language. The approach they propose is attractive to theorists of legal interpretations for many reasons. Primary among these is that the more general dispute in the philosophy of language between Griceans and non-Griceans mirrors the dispute between intentionalists and non-intentionalists in legal interpretation. The ideas proposed in Imagination and (...)
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  41. Book Review: Legal Thought and Philosophy: What Legal Scholarship Is About, by Bert van Roermund. [REVIEW]Thomas Fossen - 2014 - Political Theory 42 (3):363-366.
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  42. M. H. Kramer, C. Grant, B. Colburn, and A. Hatzistavrou, eds. The Legacy of H. L. A. Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy[REVIEW]Shane Ralston - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (2):111-114.
    H. L. A. Hart’s (1907-1992) influence on contemporary philosophy is not restricted to the philosophy of law. As the book’s sub-title suggests and the table of contents confirm, he wrote widely on matters social, political and moral, not just legal. Probably best known for The Concept of Law (1961), Hart also authored a collection of essays on Jeremy Bentham (Essays on Bentham,1982), two books on the morality of criminal law based on his exchange with Lord Patrick Devlin (...)
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  43. Why Legal Rules Are Not Speech Acts and What Follows from That.Marcin Matczak - manuscript
    The speech-act approach to rules is commonplace in both Anglo-American and continental traditions of legal philosophy. Despite its pervasiveness, I argue in this paper that the approach is misguided and therefore intrinsically flawed. My critique identifies how speech-act theory provides an inadequate theoretical framework for the analysis of written discourse, a case in point being legal text. Two main misconceptions resulting from this misguided approach are the fallacy of synchronicity and the fallacy of a-discursivity. The former consists (...)
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  44. Kant's Legal Metaphor and the Nature of a Deduction.Ian Proops - 2003 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2):209-229.
    This essay partly builds on and partly criticizes a striking idea of Dieter Henrich. Henrich argues that Kant's distinction in the first Critique between the question of fact (quid facti) and the question of law (quid juris) provides clues to the argumentative structure of a philosophical "Deduction". Henrich suggests that the unity of apperception plays a role analogous to a legal factum. By contrast, I argue, first, that the question of fact in the first Critique is settled by the (...)
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  45. Can business corporations be legally responsible for structural injustice? The social connection model in (legal) practice.Barbara Bziuk - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-20.
    In May 2021, Royal Dutch Shell was ordered by the Hague District Court to significantly reduce its CO2 emissions. This ruling is unprecedented in that it attributes the responsibility for mitigating climate change directly to a specific corporate emitter. Shell neither directly causes climate change alone nor can alleviate it by itself; therefore, what grounds this responsibility attribution? I maintain that this question can be answered via Young’s social connection model of responsibility for justice. I defend two claims: First, I (...)
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  46. Astral legal justice: Between law’s poetry and justice’s dance.Joshua M. Hall - 2023 - South African Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):108-116.
    In this article, I build on my recent conceptions of law as poetry and of justice as dance by articulating three new conceptions of the relationship between law and justice. In the first, “poetry-based justice”, justice consists of a rigid choreography to a kind of musical recitation of the law’s poetry. In the second, “dancing-based law”, justice consists of spontaneous, freely improvised movement patterns that the poetry of the law tries to capture in a kind of musical notation. And in (...)
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  47. What Does ‘Legal Obligation’ Mean?Daniel Wodak - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):790-816.
    What do normative terms like “obligation” mean in legal contexts? On one view, which H.L.A. Hart may have endorsed, “obligation” is ambiguous in moral and legal contexts. On another, which is dominant in jurisprudence, “obligation” has a distinctively moralized meaning in legal contexts. On a third view, which is often endorsed in philosophy of language, “obligation” has a generic meaning in moral and legal con- texts. After making the nature of and disagreements between these views (...)
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  48. Truth in legal norms.Boyan Bahanov - 2020 - Philosophy 29 (4):394-402.
    The text examines the status of the truth in the legal norms, trying to answer the questions of whether they can be subject to a truth assessment and, if such an assessment is possible, how a truth value can be attributed to legal norms. To achieve this goal, first of all, the text discusses some basic linguistic conceptions concerning the nature and truth of legal norms and subsequently, a a complex approach is being proposed for attributing truth-value (...)
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  49. An Interpretation of the Educational Process from the Perspective of Kant's Philosophy of History and Legal-Political Theory.Milica Smajevic Roljic - 2021 - In Igor Cvejić, Predrag Krstić, Nataša Lacković & Olga Nikolić (eds.), Liberating Education: What From, What For? Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade. pp. 83-100.
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  50. Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity.Brian Bix - 2018 - Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava 34:25-42.
    This article focuses on issues relating to legal normativity, emphasizing the way these matters have been elaborated in the works of Kelsen and Hart and later commentators on their theories. First, in Section 2, the author offers a view regarding the nature of law and legal normativity focusing on Kelsen's work (at least one reasonable reading of it). The argument is that the Basic Norm is presupposed when a citizen chooses to read the actions of legal officials (...)
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