Epistemic Pluralism

Logique Et Analyse 239 (60):337-353 (2017)
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Abstract
The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation and semi-negations.
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Archival date: 2019-03-08
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Belief.Hintikka, Jaakko
Logical Pluralism.Beall, Jc & Restall, Greg

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Une sémantique générale des croyances justifiées.Schang, Fabien & Costa Leite, Alexandre

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