Results for 'doxastic logic'

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  1. Doxastic Logic.Michael Caie - 2019 - In Jonathan Weisberg & Richard Pettigrew (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 499-541.
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  2. DDL Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):353-385.
    The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not logics in the proper sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change. Instead of characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-approach uses a natural language — ordinary mathematical English — to characterize the mathematical structures that are under study. Recently, however, various authors such as Johan van Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing doxastic change within a formal (...)
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  3. Extending Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Accommodating Iterated Beliefs And Ramsey Conditionals Within DDL.Sten Lindström & Wiodek Rabinowicz - 1997 - In Lars Lindahl, Paul Needham & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), For Good Measure. Uppsala, Sverige:
    In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories. One distinction is between informal and formal doxastic theories. AGM-type theories of belief change are of the former kind, while Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief is of the latter. Then we distinguish between static theories that study the unchanging beliefs of a certain agent and dynamic theories that investigate not only the constraints that can reasonably be imposed on the doxastic states of a rational (...)
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  4. The Problem of Logical Omniscience, the Preface Paradox, and Doxastic Commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.
    The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom’s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case (...)
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  5. John Bishop's Leaps of Faith: Doxastic Ventures and the Logical Equivalence of Religious Faith and Agnosticism.James Beach - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (1):101-117.
    In recent essays John Bishop proposes a model of religious faith. This author notices that a so-called doxastic venture model of theistic faith is self-defeating for the following reason: a venture suggests a process with an outcome; by definition a venture into Christian faith denies itself an outcome in virtue of the transcendent character of its claims – for what is claimed cannot be settled. Taking instruction from logical positivism, I stress the nonsensical character of religious claims while attacking (...)
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  6.  65
    "What Does Logic Have to Do with Justified Belief? Why Doxastic Justification is Fundmanetal".Hilary Kornblith - forthcoming - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Paul Silva Jr (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Routledge.
    As George Boole saw it, the laws of logic are the laws of thought, and by this he meant, not that human thought is actually governed by the laws of logic, but, rather, that it should be. Boole’s view that the laws of logic have normative implications for how we ought to think is anything but an outlier. The idea that violating the laws of logic involves epistemic impropriety has seemed to many to be just obvious. (...)
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  7.  95
    The Logic of Being Informed.Luciano Floridi - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (196):433-460.
    One of the open problems in the philosophy of information is whether there is an information logic (IL), different from epistemic (EL) and doxastic logic (DL), which formalises the relation “a is informed that p” (Iap) satisfactorily. In this paper, the problem is solved by arguing that the axiom schemata of the normal modal logic (NML) KTB (also known as B or Br or Brouwer’s system) are well suited to formalise the relation of “being informed”. After (...)
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  8. The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking.Anthia Solaki, Francesco Berto & Sonja Smets - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):733-762.
    We present a framework for epistemic logic, modeling the logical aspects of System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes, as per dual process theories of reasoning. The framework combines non-normal worlds semantics with the techniques of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. It models non-logically-omniscient, but moderately rational agents: their System 1 makes fast sense of incoming information by integrating it on the basis of their background knowledge and beliefs. Their System 2 allows them to slowly, step-wise unpack some of the (...)
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  9. Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed (...)
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  10. A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.
    The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the laws (...)
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  11. Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.
    This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism’s implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it’s okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on the interpretation (...)
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  12. Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.
    How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge principles. These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern the rationality of our beliefs and credences. To investigate these principles, we deploy a novel approach, namely, epistemic utility theory. That is, we (...)
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  13. How to Change People’s Beliefs? Doxastic Coercion Vs. Evidential Persuasion.Gheorghe-Ilie Farte - 2016 - Argumentum. Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric 14 (2):47-76.
    The very existence of society depends on the ability of its members to influence formatively the beliefs, desires, and actions of their fellows. In every sphere of social life, powerful human agents (whether individuals or institutions) tend to use coercion as a favorite shortcut to achieving their aims without taking into consideration the non-violent alternatives or the negative (unintended) consequences of their actions. This propensity for coercion is manifested in the doxastic sphere by attempts to shape people’s beliefs (and (...)
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  14.  34
    Logic of Faith and Dead. The Idea and Outline of the Theoretical Conception.Wybraniec-Skardowska Urszula - 2019 - Philosophia Christine 55 (2):125-149.
    This paper discusses the theoretical assumptions behind the conception of the logic of faith and deed (LF&D) and outlines its formal-axiomatic frame and its method of construction, which enable us to understand it as a kind of deductive science. The paper is divided into several sections, starting with the logical analysis of the ambiguous terms of 'faith’ and 'action', and focusing in particular on the concepts of religious faith and deed as a type of conscious activity relating to a (...)
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  15. Logical Omniscience and Acknowledged Vs. Consequential Commitments.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Questions, Discourse and Dialogue: 20 Years After Making It Explicit, Proceedings of AISB50.
    The purpose of this paper is to consider the explanatory resources that Robert Brandom‟s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. 12.
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  16. Disbelief Logic Complements Belief Logic.John Corcoran & Wagner Sanz - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):436.
    JOHN CORCORAN AND WAGNER SANZ, Disbelief Logic Complements Belief Logic. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150 USA E-mail: [email protected] Filosofia, Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiás, GO 74001-970 Brazil E-mail: [email protected] -/- Consider two doxastic states belief and disbelief. Belief is taking a proposition to be true and disbelief taking it to be false. Judging also dichotomizes: accepting a proposition results in belief and rejecting in disbelief. Stating follows suit: asserting a proposition conveys belief and denying conveys (...)
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  17. Moore’s Paradox and the Logic of Belief.Andrés Páez - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (2):1-15.
    Moore’s Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikka’s interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more (...)
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  18. Dynamic Tableaux for Dynamic Modal Logics.Jonas De Vuyst - 2013 - Dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Brussel
    In this dissertation we present proof systems for several modal logics. These proof systems are based on analytic (or semantic) tableaux. -/- Modal logics are logics for reasoning about possibility, knowledge, beliefs, preferences, and other modalities. Their semantics are almost always based on Saul Kripke’s possible world semantics. In Kripke semantics, models are represented by relational structures or, equivalently, labeled graphs. Syntactic formulas that express statements about knowledge and other modalities are evaluated in terms of such models. -/- This dissertation (...)
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  19.  78
    Higher-Order Evidence and the Normativity of Logic.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    Many theories of rational belief give a special place to logic. They say that an ideally rational agent would never be uncertain about logical facts. In short: they say that ideal rationality requires "logical omniscience." Here I argue against the view that ideal rationality requires logical omniscience on the grounds that the requirement of logical omniscience can come into conflict with the requirement to proportion one’s beliefs to the evidence. I proceed in two steps. First, I rehearse an influential (...)
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  20. Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting (...)
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  21.  98
    Belief Change for Introspective Agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday.
    We discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) for introspective agents: agents who have the ability to form higher-order beliefs. Such agents can reflect upon and change their minds about their own beliefs. The project of constructing such a logic, full DDL or DDL unlimited, is ridden with difficulties due to the fact that the agent's own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality he is trying to explore. When an introspective (...)
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  22.  98
    Epistemic Pluralism.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239 (60):337-353.
    The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation (...)
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  23.  94
    Une sémantique générale des croyances justifiées.Fabien Schang & Alexandre Costa Leite - 2016 - CLE-Prints 16 (3):1-24.
    Nous proposons une logique épistémique quadrivalente AR4.
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  24. The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.) - 2019 - PhilPapers Foundation.
    In formal epistemology, we use mathematical methods to explore the questions of epistemology and rational choice. What can we know? What should we believe and how strongly? How should we act based on our beliefs and values? We begin by modelling phenomena like knowledge, belief, and desire using mathematical machinery, just as a biologist might model the fluctuations of a pair of competing populations, or a physicist might model the turbulence of a fluid passing through a small aperture. Then, we (...)
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  25.  52
    Belief Modalities Defined by Nuclei.Thomas Mormann - manuscript
    Abstract. The aim of this paper is to show that the topological interpretation of knowledge as an interior kernel operator K of a topological space (X, OX) comes along with a partially ordered family of belief modalities B that fit K in the sense that the pairs (K, B) satisfy all axioms of Stalnaker’s KB logic of knowledge and belief with the exception of the contentious axiom of negative introspection (NI). The new belief modalities B introduced in this paper (...)
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  26. Modal Science.Timothy Williamson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):453-492.
    This paper explains and defends the idea that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of objective necessity. Plausible closure conditions on the family of objective modalities are shown to entail that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Evidence is provided that some objective modalities are studied in the natural sciences. In particular, the modal assumptions implicit in physical applications of dynamical systems theory are made explicit by using such systems to define models of a modal temporal logic. (...)
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  27. A Problem For The Ideal Worlds Account of Desire.Kyle H. Blumberg - forthcoming - Analysis.
    The Ideal Worlds Account of Desire says that S wants p just in case all of S's most highly preferred doxastic possibilities make p true. The account predicts that a desire report 'S wants p' should be true so long as there is some doxastic p-possibility that is most preferred (by S). But we present a novel argument showing that this prediction is incorrect. More positively, we take our examples to support alternative analyses of desire, and close by (...)
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  28. Rational Credence Through Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Whereas Bayesians have proposed norms such as probabilism, which requires immediate and permanent certainty in all logical truths, I propose a framework on which credences, including credences in logical truths, are rational because they are based on reasoning that follows plausible rules for the adoption of credences. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience.
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  29. Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision.Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-46.
    We propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies are such that logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on dynamic belief revision. The (...)
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  30. Deductive Cogency, Understanding, and Acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.
    Deductive Cogency holds that the set of propositions towards which one has, or is prepared to have, a given type of propositional attitude should be consistent and closed under logical consequence. While there are many propositional attitudes that are not subject to this requirement, e.g. hoping and imagining, it is at least prima facie plausible that Deductive Cogency applies to the doxastic attitude involved in propositional knowledge, viz. belief. However, this thought is undermined by the well-known preface paradox, leading (...)
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  31. Rational Illogicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):127-141.
    Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the problem case of clear-eyed logical uncertainty. An account of rational norms on belief that does not give a special role to logic is developed: doxastic probabilism.
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  32. New Foundations for Counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.
    Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a deterministic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence. The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of disbelief in a proposition \(A\) , given that (...)
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  33.  19
    On Beliefs.Frode Bjørdal - 1996 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1:79-94.
    The paper provides some observations that support the view, such as with Nathan Salmon, that we have full substitutivity of coextensional names in belief contexts. Further, the paper notes some consequences for doxastic modalites in an induced Millian logic of belief.
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  34. Pushing the Bounds of Rationality: Argumentation and Extended Cognition.David Godden - 2016 - In Fabio Paglieri, Laura Bonelli & Silvia Felletti (eds.), The psychology of argument: Cognitive approaches to argumentation and persuasion. London: College Publications. pp. 67-83.
    One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a theory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understood as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by according the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons (...)
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  35. How We Can Agree to Disagree.John Collins - unknown
    Knowledge entails the truth of the proposition known; that which is merely believed may be false. If I have beliefs about your beliefs, then I may believe that some of your beliefs are false. I may believe, for example, that you mistakenly believe that it is now raining outside. This is a coherent belief for me, though not for you. You cannot coherently believe that you believe falsely that it is raining, and this despite the fact that your having that (...)
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  36. Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.
    In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we think. The idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what think or what we believe, is a natural one. It is the kind of wrong we feel (...)
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  37. Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
    William Alston has argued that the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification, on which epistemic justification is to be spelled out in terms of blame, responsibility, and obligations, is untenable. The basic idea of the argument is that this conception is untenable because we lack voluntary control over our beliefs and, therefore, cannot have any obligations to hold certain beliefs. If this is convincing, however, the argument threatens the very idea of doxastic responsibility. For, how can we ever be (...)
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  38. Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...)
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  39. Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude.Joshua Smart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11797-11813.
    While epistemologists routinely employ disbelief talk, it is not clear that they really mean it, given that they often equate disbelieving p with believing ¬p. I argue that this is a mistake—disbelief is a doxastic attitude of rejection and is distinct from belief. I first clarify this claim and its opposition, then show that we must distinguish disbelieving p from believing ¬p in order to account for the fact that we continue to hold doxastic attitudes toward propositions that (...)
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  40. The Doxastic Account of Intellectual Humility.Ian M. Church - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):413-433.
    This paper will be broken down into four sections. In §1, I try to assuage a worry that intellectual humility is not really an intellectual virtue. In §2, we will consider the two dominant accounts of intellectual humility in the philosophical literature—the low concern for status account the limitations-owing account—and I will argue that both accounts face serious worries. Then in §3, I will unpack my own view, the doxastic account of intellectual humility, as a viable alternative and potentially (...)
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  41. No More This Than That: Skeptical Impression or Pyrrhonian Dogma?Necip Fikri Alican - 2017 - Schole 11 (1):7–60.
    This is a defense of Pyrrhonian skepticism against the charge that the suspension of judgment based on equipollence is vitiated by the assent given to the equipollence in question. The apparent conflict has a conceptual side as well as a practical side, examined here as separate challenges with a section devoted to each. The conceptual challenge is that the skeptical transition from an equipollence of arguments to a suspension of judgment is undermined either by a logical contradiction or by an (...)
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  42. Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.
    The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e., the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one’s belief is based on an epistemically (...)
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  43. Doxastic Permissiveness and the Promise of Truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the “Uniqueness” thesis. According to this thesis, given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. It is sensible for defenders of Uniqueness to commit to an accompanying principle that: when some agent A has equal epistemic reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the unique epistemically rational doxastic attitude for A to (...)
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  44. Boghossian's Template and Transmission Failure.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - 2018 - Al Mukhatabat 26:71-90.
    Within his overarching program aiming to defend an epistemic conception of analyticity, Boghossian (1996 and 1997) has offered a clear-cut explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical truths and logical rules through implicit definition. The explanation is based on a special template or general form of argument. Ebert (2005) has argued that an enhanced version of this template is flawed because a segment of it is unable to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion. This (...)
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  45. Ebert on Boghossian’s Template and Transmission Failure.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Boghossian (1996) has put forward an interesting explanation of how we can acquire logical knowledge via implicit definitions that makes use of a special template. Ebert (2005) has argued that the template is unserviceable, as it doesn't transmit warrant. In this paper, we defend the template. We first suggest that Jenkins (2008)’s response to Ebert fails because it focuses on doxastic rather than propositional warrant. We then reject Ebert’s objection by showing that it depends on an implausible and incoherent (...)
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  46. Impossible Worlds.David Vander Laan - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    The theory of possible worlds has permeated analytic philosophy in recent decades, and its best versions have a consequence which has gone largely unnoticed: in addition to the panoply of possible worlds, there are a great many impossible worlds. A uniform ontological method alone should bring the friends of possible worlds to adopt impossible worlds, I argue, but the theory's applications also provide strong incentives. In particular, the theory facilitates an account of counterfactuals which avoids several of the implausible results (...)
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  47. Transparency, Doxastic Norms, and the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32.
    Many philosophers have sought to account for doxastic and epistemic norms by supposing that belief ‘aims at truth.’ A central challenge for this approach is to articulate a version of the truth-aim that is at once weak enough to be compatible with the many truth-independent influences on belief formation, and strong enough to explain the relevant norms in the desired way. One phenomenon in particular has seemed to require a relatively strong construal of the truth-aim thesis, namely ‘transparency’ in (...)
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  48.  75
    Problems of Religious Luck, Ch. 4: "We Are All of the Common Herd: Montaigne and the Psychology of Our 'Importunate Presumptions'".Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    As we have seen in the transition form Part I to Part II of this book, the inductive riskiness of doxastic methods applied in testimonial uptake or prescribed as exemplary of religious faith, helpfully operationalizes the broader social scientific, philosophical, moral, and theological interest that people may have with problems of religious luck. Accordingly, we will now speak less about luck, but more about the manner in which highly risky cognitive strategies are correlated with psychological studies of bias studies (...)
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  49. In Defense of Doxastic Blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.
    In this paper I articulate a view of doxastic control that helps defend the legitimacy of our practice of blaming people for their beliefs. I distinguish between three types of doxastic control: intention-based, reason-based, and influence-based. First I argue that, although we lack direct intention-based control over our beliefs, such control is not necessary for legitimate doxastic blame. Second, I suggest that we distinguish two types of reason-responsiveness: sensitivity to reasons and appreciation of reasons. I argue that (...)
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  50. Doxastic Responsibility, Guidance Control, and Ownership of Belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):82-98.
    ABSTRACTThe contemporary debate over responsibility for belief is divided over the issue of whether such responsibility requires doxastic control, and whether this control must be voluntary in nature. It has recently become popular to hold that responsibility for belief does not require voluntary doxastic control, or perhaps even any form of doxastic ‘control’ at all. However, Miriam McCormick has recently argued that doxastic responsibility does in fact require quasi-voluntary doxastic control: “guidance control,” a complex, compatibilist (...)
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