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  1. Frege, Hankel, and Formalism in the Foundations.Richard Lawrence - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (11).
    Frege says, at the end of a discussion of formalism in the Foundations of Arithmetic, that his own foundational program “could be called formal” but is “completely different” from the view he has just criticized. This essay examines Frege’s relationship to Hermann Hankel, his main formalist interlocutor in the Foundations, in order to make sense of these claims. The investigation reveals a surprising result: Frege’s foundational program actually has quite a lot in common with Hankel’s. This undercuts Frege’s claim that (...)
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  2. Kant, Frege, and the normativity of logic: MacFarlane 's argument for common ground.Tyke Nunez - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):988-1009.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 988-1009, December 2021.
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  3. Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis.Nicholas Stang - 2018 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. New York: Routledge. pp. 138–159.
    In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that this (...)
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  4. Hilbert on Consistency as a Guide to Mathematical Reality.Fiona T. Doherty - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 237:107-128.
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  5. Frege, Dedekind, and the Modern Epistemology of Arithmetic.Markus Pantsar - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):297-318.
    In early analytic philosophy, one of the most central questions concerned the status of arithmetical objects. Frege argued against the popular conception that we arrive at natural numbers with a psychological process of abstraction. Instead, he wanted to show that arithmetical truths can be derived from the truths of logic, thus eliminating all psychological components. Meanwhile, Dedekind and Peano developed axiomatic systems of arithmetic. The differences between the logicist and axiomatic approaches turned out to be philosophical as well as mathematical. (...)
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  6. Frege and German Philosophical Idealism.Nikolay Milkov - 2015 - In Dieter Schott (ed.), Frege: Freund(e) und Feind(e): Proceedings of the International Conference 2013. Berlin: Logos. pp. 88-104.
    The received view has it that analytic philosophy emerged as a rebellion against the German Idealists (above all Hegel) and their British epigones (the British neo-Hegelians). This at least was Russell’s story: the German Idealism failed to achieve solid results in philosophy. Of course, Frege too sought after solid results. He, however, had a different story to tell. Frege never spoke against Hegel, or Fichte. Similarly to the German Idealists, his sworn enemy was the empiricism (in his case, John Stuart (...)
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  7. Frege and Peano on definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2015 - In Dieter Schott (ed.), Frege: Freund(e) und Feind(e): Proceedings of the International Conference 2013. Berlin: Logos.
    Frege and Peano started in 1896 a debate where they contrasted the respective conceptions on the theory and practice of mathematical definitions. Which was (if any) the influence of the Frege-Peano debate on the conceptions by the two authors on the theme of defining in mathematics and which was the role played by this debate in the broader context of their scientific interaction?
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  8. Three Kantian Strands in Frege’s View of Arithmetic.Gilead Bar-Elli - 2014 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2 (7).
    On the background of explaining their different notions of analyticity, their different views on definitions, and some aspects of Frege’s notion of sense, three important Kantian strands that interweave into Frege’s view are exposed. First, Frege’s remarkable view that arithmetic, though analytic, contains truths that “extend our knowledge”, and by Kant’s use of the term, should be regarded synthetic. Secondly, that our arithmetical (and logical) knowledge depends on a sort of a capacity to recognize and identify objects, which are given (...)
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  9. Problem syntetyczności sądów a priori w ujęciu Hermanna Lotzego.Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz - 2012 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 2 (2):363-376.
    English title: The Problem of the Synthetic a priori Judgements According to Hermann Lotze. The present article compares Kant’s and Lotze’s concepts of synthetic judgements. Lotze’s aim is a renewing of the Kant’s solutions, what he achieves thanks to introduction of the distinction between analytic (identical) content and synthetic form of these judgements which Kant recognised as synthetic. This distinction makes possible to lay down the concept of intentional sense which has influence over Frege and Husserl.
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  10. Frege, Kant e le Vorstellungen.Gabriele Tomasi & Alberto Vanzo - 2006 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 61 (supplement):227-238.
    Gottlob Frege criticized Kant's use of the term "representation" in a footnote in the Foundations of Arithmetics. According to Frege, Kant used the term "representation" for mental images, which are private and incommunicable, and also for objects and concepts. Kant thereby gave "a strongly subjectivistic and idealistic coloring" to his thought. The paper argues that Kant avoided the kind of subjectivism and idealism which Frege hints in his remark. For Kant, having "Vorstellungen" requires the capacity of synthesis, by virtue of (...)
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  11. Frege's influence on Wittgenstein: Reversing metaphysics via the context principle.Erich Reck - 2005 - In Michael Beaney & Erich Reck (eds.), Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Vol. I. London: Routledge. pp. 241-289.
    Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein (the later Wittgenstein) are often seen as polar opposites with respect to their fundamental philosophical outlooks: Frege as a paradigmatic "realist", Wittgenstein as a paradigmatic "anti-realist". This opposition is supposed to find its clearest expression with respect to mathematics: Frege is seen as the "arch-platonist", Wittgenstein as some sort of "radical anti-platonist". Furthermore, seeing them as such fits nicely with a widely shared view about their relation: the later Wittgenstein is supposed to have developed his (...)
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  12. Frege's attack on Husserl and Cantor.Claire Ortiz Hill - 1994 - The Monist 77 (3):345 - 357.
    By drawing attention to these facts and to the relationship between Cantor’s and Husserl's ideas, I have tried to contribute to putting Frege's attack on Husserl "in the proper light" by providing some insight into some of the issues underling criticisms which Frege himself suggested were not purely aimed at Husserl's book. I have tried to undermine the popular idea that Frege's review of the Philosophy of Arithmetic is a straightforward, objective assessment of Husserl’s book, and to give some specific (...)
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