Dans cet ouvrage publié en 1942, complété en 1945 par la Phénoménologie de la perception, « s’affirme pour la première fois une philosophie existentielle où le mode d’être ultime du pour-soi ne s’avère pas être, en dépit des intentions et des descriptions contraires, celui d’une conscience-témoin » (A. de Waelhens, préface). La structure du comportement se place au niveau de l’expérience non pas naturelle mais scientifique et s’efforce de prouver que cette expérience, c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des faits qui constituent le comportement, (...) n’est pas compréhensible dans les perspectives ontologiques que la science adopte spontanément. (shrink)

In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism.

In tracing the formation of Husserl's concept of constitution, we hope to further the understanding of what he considers a philosophical explanation. ...

As a teaching text, The Idea of Phenomenology is ideal: it is brief, it is unencumbered by the technical terminology of Husserl's later work, it bears a clear ...

Edition de 150 pages manuscrites laissées par Merleau-Ponty à sa mort et devant constituer les premiers chapitres d'un grand ouvrage intitulé "Le visible et l'invisible". Elles devaient introduire à un nouveau départ pour la pensée philosophique, les concepts fondamentaux de la philosophie moderne étant considérés comme des postulats résultant eux-mêmes déjà d'une interprétation singulière du monde. Le dernier tiers du volume rassemble des notes de travail, éparses, rédigées en vue de l'oeuvre, et qui peuvent en éclairer le sens. Une substantielle (...) postface de Claude Lefort cherche à dégager le sens qu'aurait eu "Le visible et l'invisible" dans le parcours, interrompu. (shrink)

"Le problème de la passivité: le sommeil, l'inconscient, la mémoire", éd. scientifique et transcription Stéphanie Ménasé, p.155-297; "L'Institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique" éd. scientifique et transcription Dominique Darmaillacq, p. 31-122; Préface Claude Lefort.

This article clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s enigmatic, later concept of reversibility by showing how it is connected to the theme of the genesis of sense. The article first traces reversibility through “Eye and Mind” and The Visible and the Invisible , in ways that link reversibility to a theme of the earlier philosophy, namely an interrelation in which activity and passivity reverse to one another. This linkage is deepened through a detailed study of a passage on touch in the Phenomenology ’s chapter (...) on “Sensing,” which shows how reversibility is important to the genesis of sense, not from some already given origin, but through a creative operation within being, beyond the perceiver, wherein the field of perception internally diverges into active and passive moments. The article connects this point about the genesis of sense to themes in Merleau-Ponty’s lectures on institution and passivity. Altogether the article shows how reversibility is a sign of a divergence and thence of a sort of gap or excess in being that allows for a genesis of sense within being itself. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of ‘passivity’ is a key to his account of perception. For Merleau-Ponty, perception is the way in which we are involved in the world, and it is on perception that the functions of understanding, reason, and reflection ultimately rest. While in his Phenomenology of Perception it is already clear that passive and active are intertwined, from a series of lectures he gave in 1954–5 we learn that inauguration or ‘institution’ arises out of a passivity that is not merely (...) an absence of activity. I show how the thoroughly temporal status of the subject as ‘instituting’ distinguishes it from a certain model of the ‘constituting’ subject. Next, I argue that, to grasp the sense in which Merleau-Ponty intends ‘passivity’, we must recognize its mediating or transitional status. Specifically, I examine terms that arise repeatedly in his analysis of the Freudian account of the unconscious — namely, ‘pivot’ and ‘enjambment’ — to show how they reveal the peculiar status of a passivity that operates through a dialectic focused on its transitional terms rather than on opposing poles. Finally, I suggest the exchange between passivity and institution that Merleau-Ponty has in mind can be illuminated through consideration of late Palaeolithic cave paintings, where the rock itself seems to begin an expression that the artist completes. (shrink)

This paper problematizes the analogy that Hubert Dreyfus has presented between phenomenology and cognitive science. It argues that Dreyfus presents Merleau-Ponty''s modification of Husserl''s phenomenology in a misleading way. He ignores the idea of philosophy as a radical interrogation and self-responsibility that stems from Husserl''s work and recurs in Merleau-Ponty''s Phenomenology of Perception. The paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty''s understanding of the phenomenological reduction. It shows that his critical idea was not to restrict the scope of Husserl''s reductions but to study (...) the conditions of possibility for the thetic acts. Merleau-Ponty argued, following Husserl''s texts, that the thetic acts rest on the basis of primordial pre-thetic experience. This layer of experience cannot, by its nature, be explicated or clarified, but it can be questioned and unveiled. This is the recurrent task of phenomenological philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty understands it. (shrink)

Several commentators have argued that with his concept of anonymity Merleau-Ponty breaks away from classical Husserlian phenomenology that is methodologically tied to the first person perspective. Many contemporary commentators see Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on anonymity as a break away from Husserl’s framework that is seen as hopelessly subjectivistic and solipsistic. Some judge and reproach it as a disastrous misunderstanding that leads to a confusion of philosophical and empirical concerns. Both parties agree that Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of anonymity mark a divergence from classical (...) Husserlian phenomenology. I will question this view and demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on anonymity remains Husserlian in two important senses: it analyses senses in terms of constituting selves and communities of such selves, and it accounts for the formation of experience by the temporal sedimentation of intentional activity. The argument proceeds in four steps. The first section argues against the widely spread notion according to which Merleau-Ponty’s anonymous subject is collective. In the second section, I offer an alternative reading by demonstrating that Merleau-Ponty uses the term “anonymous” primarily to characterize the lived body of a personal subject. In section three, I introduce Merleau-Ponty’s idea of trace and show that for him both the perceived thing and the perceiving body are traces and as such refer to earlier constitutive acts of alien subjects. I then argue that Husserl’s concepts of sedimentation are crucial for the understanding of this idea. Finally, in section four, I show how Husserl’s theory of depresentation informs Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on anonymity. (shrink)

Darstellung des Noema in 12 Thesen.\nverwendete Textstellen: Ideen 1: S. 203, 22-23; S. 204, 20-21; S. 357, 19-20: Handlungen sind zielgerichtet. Dabei bedarf eines keines physischen Objekts. Husserl setzt and diese Stelle das Noema. Somit wird auch zielgerichtetes Handeln aufgrund einer Halluzination m{ö}glich, Zielgerichtet zu sein bedeutet ein Noema zu haben.\n1. Follesdal´sche These: Noema ist eine intensionale Entit{ä}t, eine Generalisierung des Begriffs Sinn/Bedeutung.\n2. These: Das Noema hat zwei Bestandteile, a) der noematische Sinn, der allen thetischen Handlungen (erinnern, sich vorstellen usw.) (...) gem{ä}{ß} desselben Objekts mit denselben Eigenschaften in derselben Gerichtetheit gemeinsam ist und b) die Gegebenheitsweise (hat auch Sinncharakter), die sich unterscheidet in Handlungen mit verschiedenem thetischen Charakter.\n3. These: Der noematische Sinn ergibt sich aus der Art und Weise, wie Bewu{ß}tsein zum Objekt in Relation steht.\n!! 4. These: Das Noema einer Handlung ist nicht das Objekt dieser Handlung\n5. These: Das Objekt einer Handlung ist eine Funktion des noematischen Sinns, d.h. mit einem bestimmten Noema kann nur ein Objekt korrespondieren.\n6. These: Jedoch k{ö}nnen mit einem bestimmten Objekt verschiedene Noemata korrespondieren. (z.B. kann ein Objekt das Ziel verschiedener thetischer Handlunge sein, etwa erinnern, wahrnehmen, daher:)\n6. These a): Mit einem bestimmten Objekt korrespondieren verschiedene noematische Sinne.\n7. These: Jede Handlung besteht aus nur einem Noema. Sie wird durch dieses Noema charakterisiert. (Umgekehrt trifft dies nicht zu.)\n8. These: Noemata sind abstrakte Entit{ä}ten. (Sinne sind nicht real. Sie sind bezogen auf Handlungen in tempor{ä}ren Intervallen.)\n9. These: Noemata werden nicht durch unsere Sinnesorgane wahrgenommen.\n10. These: Noemata gelangen durch ph{ä}nomenologische Reflektion ins Bewu{ß}tsein.\n11. These: Eine ph{ä}nomenologische Reflektion kann iterativ geschehen (ann{ä}herungsweise; in Schritte gegliedert). Dies ist so, weil schon die Korrespondenz zwischen Sinn und Objekt wieder ein Objekt ergibt. Es folgt ein unendlicher Regress.\nPhysische Objekte sind transzendent in dem Sinne, dass sie unendlich viele Noemata haben. Sinn kann sie nie ersch{ö}pfend erfassen.\nNoemata k{ö}nnen andererseits ein physisches Objekt repr{ä}sentieren in der Form, dass mehr intendiert wird als gesehen wird. So denkt man sich etwa bei einem Stuhl, von dem man nur zwei Beine sieht, die beiden {ü}brigen hinzu.\n12. These: Diese Muster der Vorherbestimmung bilden zusammen mit den Gegebenheitsweisen das Noema (s. These 2). (shrink)

Signes, pour Maurice Merleau-Ponty, n'était pas un alphabet complet, mais plutôt ces signaux soudains comme un regard que nous recevons des événements, des livres et des choses. Ou qu'il nous semble recevoir d'eux : il faut croire que nous y mettons du nôtre, puisqu'il y a des constantes dans ces messages. En philosophie, l'idée d'une vision, d'une parole opérante, d'une opération métaphysique de la chair, d'un échange où le visible et l'invisible sont rigoureusement simultanés. En politique, le sentiment que les (...) mécanismes d'étouffement, de paralysie ou de terreur ne sont pas irréversibles. Si l'auteur a bien lu, ces signes, donc, ne seraient pas de si mauvais augure. En sorte que Signes, loin d'être une traversée des apparences, devient pour le lecteur d'aujourd'hui une traversée de l'œuvre même, dans ses grandes interrogations, de Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

Dans Folioplus philosophie, le texte philosophique, associé une oeuvre d'art qui l'éclaire et le questionne, est suivi d'un dossier organisé en six points :Les mots du texte : Corps, entrelacs (chiasme), chair ; L'œuvre dans l'histoire des idées ; La figure du philosophe ; Trois questions posées au texte : Y a-t-il une chair de l'image? L'accès à l'être implique-t-il la neutralisation du sensible? Y a-t-il une chair de l'histoire? ; Groupement de textes : L'écriture et l'image: l'existence, la mort (...) ; Prolongements. (shrink)

Originally published in 1988, M. C. Dillon's classic study of Merleau-Ponty is now available in a revised second edition containing a new preface and a new ...

In his last work, "Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", Edmund Husserl formulated a radical new approach to phenomenological philosophy. Unlike his previous works, in the "Crisis" Husserl embedded this formulation in an ambitious reflection on the essence and value of the idea of rational thought and culture, a reflection that he considered to be an urgent necessity in light of the political, social, and intellectual crisis of the interwar period. In this book, James Dodd pursues an interpretation (...) of Husserl's text that emphasizes the importance of the problem of the origin of philosophy, as well as advances the thesis that, for Husserl, the "crisis of reason" is not a contingent historical event, but a permanent feature of a life in reason generally. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. It had a decisive impact on twentieth century philosophy and is one of few works to have influenced both continental and analytic philosophy. This is the first time both volumes have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Investigations in historical context and bringing out their contemporary philosophical importance. These editions include a new preface by Sir Michael (...) Dummett. (shrink)

Présente le parcours philosophique de Merleau-Ponty tant dans sa formation que dans ses objectifs. Ses références : Descartes, Leibniz, Gabriel Marcel. Ses concepts opératoires : le concret, l'incarnation, l'intentionnalité, les chiasmes.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) has been hailed by many as the greatest French thinker of the twentieth century. As one of the founding members of the existentialist movement in the 1940s, he played a key role in introducing the work of Husserl and Heidegger into French thought and collaborated with Jean-Paul Sartre in the founding of Les Temps Modernes. His later work laid the foundation for the development of French thought in the direction of post-structuralism and post-modernism.

Merleau-Ponty: Critical (...) Assessments of Leading Philosophers gathers together the best critical writing on Merleau-Ponty’s work from the last half century. The collection includes early reviews of his work and the reactions of his contemporaries both during and after his life. Also covered are examinations of his relationship with Husserl, Sartre and the phenomenological tradition, investigations of key themes from his work on ontology, expression and politics, and the ongoing application of his thinking to such contemporary areas of interest as feminist theory, psychology and child development, environmental philosophy and cognitive science.

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Institution in personal and public history. Introduction -- Institution and life -- Institution of a feeling -- The institution of a work of art -- Institution of a domain of knowledge -- The field of culture -- Historical institution: particularity and universality -- Summary for Thursday's course: Institution in personal and public history -- The problem of passivity: sleep, the unconscious, memory. The philosophy and the phenomenon of passivity -- For an ontology of the perceived world -- Sleep -- Perceptual (...) consciousness and imagining consciousness -- Symbolism -- Dreams -- The Freudian unconscious -- Delusions: gradiva -- The case of Dora -- The problem of memory -- Appendix: three notes on the Freudian unconscious -- Summary for Monday's course: the problem of passivity: sleep, the unconscious, memory. (shrink)

__Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity __analyzes the transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity and argues that an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity was a _conditio sine qua non_ for a phenomenological philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts, Dan Zahavi examines Husserl's reasons for this conviction and delivers a detailed analysis of his radical and complex concept of intersubjectivity, showing that precisely his (...) reflections on transcendental intersubjectivity are capable of clarifying the core-concepts of phenomenology, thus making possible a new understanding of Husserl’s philosophy. Against this background the book compares his view with the approaches to intersubjectivity found in Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, and it then attempts to establish to what extent the phenomenological approach can contribute to the current discussion of intersubjectivity. This is achieved through a systematic confrontation with the language-pragmatical positions of Apel and Habermas. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty is one of the most important philosophers of the Twentieth century. His theories of perception and the role of the body have had an enormous impact on the humanities and social sciences, yet the full scope of his contribution not only to phenomenology but philosophy generally is only now becoming clear. In this lucid and comprehensive introduction, Taylor Carman explains and assesses the full range of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Beginning with an overview of Merleau-Ponty’s life and work, subsequent chapters (...) cover fundamental aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, including his philosophy of perception and intentionality; the role of the body in relation to perception; philosophy of history and culture; and his writings on art and aesthetics, particularly the work of Cezanne. A final chapter considers Merleau-Ponty’s importance today, examining his philosophy in light of recent developments in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Merleau-Ponty is essential reading for students of phenomenology, existentialism and Twentieth century philosophy. It is also ideal for anyone in the humanities and social sciences seeking an introduction to his work. (shrink)