Em Le Philosophe et son Ombre, Merleau-Ponty agencia uma lapidar metáfora no intuito de circunscrever certo domínio de experiência, em rigor, pré-reflexiva, que estaria presente, particularmente, nos últimos trabalhos de Husserl: a sombra. Afinal, o que, mais propriamente, teria permanecido à “sombra” do filósofo? Ora, o pathos corolário do saber ocidental: “a tradição como esquecimento das origens”. Husserl então entrevê outra tarefa cara à fenomenologia, aquém e além de seu idealismo transcendentalmente professo: o retorno à Lebenswelt como horizonte pré-teorético. Trata-se, (...) arqueologicamente, de escavar uma camada de evidência originária, isto é, um mundo bruto, em estado barroco ou selvagem como ainda não pensado. É essa zona de sombra como emblema concreto do Eu puro que não pode mais ser “posta entre parênteses”. (shrink)

The arguments advanced in this paper are the following. Firstly, that just as Trevarthen’s three subjective/intersubjective levels, primary, secondary, and tertiary, mapped out different modes of access, so too response is similarly structured, from direct primordial responsiveness, to that informed by shared pragmatic concerns and narrative contexts, to that which demands the distantiation afforded by representation. Secondly, I propose that empathy is an essential mode of intentionality, integral to the primary level of subjectivity/intersubjectivity, which is crucial to our survival as (...) individuals and as a species. Further to this last point, I argue that empathy is not derived on the basis of intersubjectivity, nor does it merely disclose intersubjectivity, rather it is constitutive of intersubjectivity at the primary level. Empathy is a direct, irreducible intentionality separable in thought from the other primary intentional modes of perception, rationality, memory and imagination, but co-arising with these. In regard to the inter-personal level, the concrete relations with others, primary empathy is both the ground for the possibility of the secondary manifestations—pity, sympathy, perspective taking, etc., and motivates them. Thirdly, it is the movement in the core of subjectivity initially generated by shifting attention between the ‘I’ and ‘we’ perspectives and later ‘solidified’ through affect to become shifting identification, which opens up the intersubjective domain. So we can affirm that we are not only born into sociality but our sociality goes to the roots of our being as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have claimed. (shrink)

This paper aims to articulate the way in which Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jan Patočka revisit the figure of Socrates as a way of overcoming what they view as the “crisis of philosophy”, discussing both their points of convergence and divergence. To this end, the paper unfolds in three sections. The first section will address the general sense of historical crisis in which the said crisis of philosophy arises. The second section turns around Merleau-Ponty’s proposal of a return to Socrates as (...) a way out of this crisis, a solution based on the understanding that philosophy is actually fulfilled in a living relationship with men, and far from its reduction into a comprehensive system of thought. The third section will revolve around the Patočkian characterization of Socrates as a model of “spiritual man” and such characterization will be worked out through the existential dialectic that constitutes the “movement of life”. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on the problem of body as it is developed in Heidegger’s Zollikon Seminars, in contrast with its enigmatic concealment in Being and Time. In the first part, I emphasize the implicit connection of Heidegger’s approach of body with Husserl’s problematic of Leib and Körper, and with his phenomenological analyses of tactility. In the second part, I focus on Heidegger’s distinction between the limits of the lived body and the limits of the corresponding corporeal thing, opening (...) to an ontological understanding of the ecstatic bodying forth of the body. In the third part, I analyse this ecstatic bodiliness in relation to the problem of spatiality, exploring the tension between the here and the over there in the experience of the embodiment. Heidegger not only refuses to understand the space starting from the here of the body, but he also refuses to understand the body starting from the here of the space. Thus, there are two interconnected inversions that Heidegger operates in relation to Husserl: In the topic of spatiality, he rejects the pre-eminence of the here; in relation to the body, he contests the primacy of tactility. Finally, the conclusion stresses that, even if the bodying forth penetrates almost all behaviour of Dasein in the world, there is however a limit of embodiment, an unreachable frontier beyond any possibility of the bodying forth, namely the understanding of being. This also implies that the problem of body needs be understood in the context of the ontological difference. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss the philosophical premises of Whitehead's definition of time in _The Concept of Nature and other works of the same period. Whitehead probably introduced this definition, which depends on what he calls the "method of extensive abstraction," in 1913, just after the publication of the _Principia Mathematica with Russell. He only published his results in 1919. However, Russell takes up the method, with slight modifications, after personal communication with Whitehead, as soon as 1914, (...) in _Our Knowledge of the External World. It is also carefully studied by G. Mead, in particular in _Philosophy of the Present, and by Merleau-Ponty, in his lectures at the Collège de France. (edited). (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo produzir um estudo sobre a empatia a partir da perspectiva fenomenológica. Para tanto, será feita uma distinção entre os vários sentidos e usos da palavra “empatia” na contemporaneidade. Logo após, serão analisadas as várias teorias e modelos explicativos da empatia a partir da investigação de “como” a consciência humana acessa o mundo externo. Dentre os modelos explicativos explorados, destacam-se o modelo Theory – Theory, o Simulation Theory, o Integrated Theory, o Graded Empathy Hypothesis e (...) o Reintegrated Theory. Feito isso, será explorada, mais detidamente, a proposta fenomenológica para a questão da empatia. Por fim, se buscará, à luz da perspectiva fenomenológica, avançar na reflexão sobre a empatia a partir de três ideias: a de ressonância, a de afetação e a de interimplicação, buscando desenvolver os primeiros passos para uma interintencionalidade imanente. Como limites e possibilidades, pode-se notar que é preciso explorar mais os processos de modalização da empatia no processo de constituição do ego, principalmente da vida pré-egótica. (shrink)

Purpose. The article is aimed to analyse the phenomenon of bodily memory in the context of commemorative practices. The commemorative practices are a social instrument known since archaic times, which had different ways of use in different epochs. In totalitarian societies, officially organized commemorative practices are frequently used for propaganda and manipulation. For most people, their mechanism remains unconscious, as bodily memory plays a leading role there. The density of a modern social world actualises the ability to observe own changes (...) and regulate the processes of their flow. This updates an exploration of the bodily memory phenomenon. Theoretical basis. The classification of forms of bodily memory is carried out in the article: genetic, psychophysical, psychoenergetic, mental. It has been revealed that the systemic openness of bodily memory is the fundamental basis of commemorative practices. Originality. The term "conscious commemoration" is proposed to denote the anthropological process associated with self-knowledge, self-construction and co-creation, which requires a distinction between forms of bodily memory, understanding of its structural features and functional capabilities. Conclusions. The phenomenon of bodily memory reveals the anthropological potential of commemorative practices. It can manifest itself as an independently organized body-spiritual practice of self-construction on the basis of self-knowledge and self-observation. The latter is the foundation of conscious co-creation. The phenomenon of bodily memory reveals the secret of spiritualization in the process of approaching a person to his body. (shrink)

Several contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics use the concept of information as a tool for addressing and explaining the quantum world. In the article, I focus on Zeilinger-Brukner's informational foundations of quantum theory. I propose that with a phenomenological approach—which, unlike most of the contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics, exceeds the mere dichotomy between realism and anti-realism—we can address the epistemological questions re-opened by IFQT and the parts of the interpretation that are recognized as problematic by its critics. After the (...) phenomenological supplementation IFQT can provide both, ontic and epistemic answer to the question "Why quantum?" As we apply Husserl's concept of the world as our common objective ground to the IFQT explanation, we can make a justifiable step away from the solipsism/subjectivism, which is, according to the critics, the main problem of IFQT. Thus, I propose in conclusion, a phenomenological approach to quantum physics can offer a background for the much needed dialog between realists and anti-realists as well as for a comprehensive contemporary interpretation of the quantum world. (shrink)

Hyppolite stresses his proximity to Merleau-Ponty, but the received interpretation of his “anti-humanist” reading of Hegel suggests a greater distance between their projects. This paper focuses on an under-explored dimension of their philosophical relationship. I argue that Merleau-Ponty and Hyppolite are both committed to formulating a mode of philosophical expression that can avoid the pitfalls of purely formal or literal and purely aesthetic or creative modes of expression. Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to navigate this dichotomy, I suggest, closely resembles Hyppolite’s interpretation of (...) Hegel’s “speculative” mode of expression. In particular, his emphasis on the “mediating” character of philosophical language, which moves between descriptive and creative expression, suggests a debt to Hyppolite. This reading provides more evidence to think that Hyppolite cannot be straightforwardly understood as an anti-humanist or post-phenomenological thinker, and paves the way for a _rapprochement_ between his work and the broader phenomenological tradition. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s later work by tracing a hitherto overlooked set of concerns that were of key consequence for the formulation of his ontological research. I argue that his ontology can be understood as a response to a set of problems originating in reflections on the intersubjective use of language in dialogue, undertaken in the early 1950s. His study of dialogue disclosed a structure of meaning-formation and pointed towards a theory of truth (both recurring ontological topics) that (...) post-Phenomenology premises could not account for. A study of dialogue shows that speakers’ positions are interchangeable, that speaking subjects are active and passive in varying degrees, and that the intentional roles of subjects and objects are liable to shift or ‘transgress’ themselves. These observations anticipate the concepts of ‘reversibility’ and ‘narcissism’, his later view of activity and passivity, and his later view of intentionality, and sharpened the need to adopt an intersubjective focus in ontological research. (shrink)

Since Husserl, the task of developing an account of intentionality and constitution has been central to the phenomenological enterprise. Some of Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of ‘the flesh’ suggest that he gives up on this task, or, more strongly, that the flesh is in principle incompatible with intentionality or constitution. I show that these remarks, as in Merleau-Ponty's earlier writings, refer to the classical, early Husserlian interpretations of these concepts, and argue that the concept of the flesh can plausibly be understood to (...) advance a refined account of intentionality and constitution. Instead of a first-personal, unidirectional act or embodied motor project, intentionality is a latent openness to things, where the roles of subject and object are reversible. Whereas the view of constitution as meaning-bestowal is untenable, the flesh has a constitutive role, which is supported by a ‘constitutional passivity’ from the subject. On this reading, Merleau-Ponty's later work aims to develop basic tenets of his earlier thought, albeit at a critical distance, an attempt he thought was continuous with the central problems that Husserl claimed a phenomenological philosophy must grapple with, even if Merleau-Ponty's answers to these problems are not Husserl's. (shrink)

Antoine Altieri Nous nous proposons dans cet article d’interroger, à la lumière de la conception henryenne de l’art telle qu’elle s’expose dans Voir l’invisible, le rapport que cette modalité particulière de l’expression entretient avec la « vie », qui est toujours vie de l’artiste. Il s’agira pour ce faire d’interroger l’antique notion de « Mimèsis », et de proposer le sens véritable qu’il faut accorder à l’« imitation » dans l’art : le propre de l’imitation étant de ne pas faire (...) oublier qu’elle est une imitation. Mais nous nous proposerons ainsi de déterminer ce qu’il en est de la « naissance » de l’artiste : l’artiste est celui qui « naît » véritablement, tel qu’en lui-même dans sa singularité, du fait de communier avec la vie de cela même qu’il représente. (shrink)

A história intelectual do século XX tem sido escrita ao longo de um cenário que vê, na morte de Merleau-Ponty em 1961, a linha de divisória entre uma geração existencial e fenomenológica e o evento do estruturalismo imediatamente subsequente. A publicação das notas de leitura de Merleau-Ponty sobre o texto A origem da geometria, de Edmund Husserl, tem mostrado quão frágeis são os alicerces desta leitura simplificadora. Na verdade, enquanto a tradução e introdução de Derrida ao texto de Husserl, de (...) 1962, tornavam-se um texto fundamentador para a geração estruturalista, introduzindo uma reflexão sobre a historicidade e a materialidade da idealidade, foi apenas em 1998, com a publicação das notas da conferência de Merleau-Ponty no Collège de France, em 1959, sobre o mesmo tópico, que se tornou claro quão próximo está o primeiro Derrida do último Merleau-Ponty. Assim como Derrida, Merleau-Ponty identificou, na tensão husserliana entre arqueologia e teleologia, o problema básico da fenomenologia, introduzindo a questão da história e a do meio de transmissão cultural. Comparar tais leituras em seu contexto específico não apenas permite um retrato mais complexo dos debates intelectuais da época, mas também mostra como, com a interpretação de Merleau-Ponty sobre A origem da geometria, a "diferença" de Derrida antecede-se e admite outra genealogia.Idealidade. História. Mediador. Escritura. Origem. Diferença.The intellectual history of the 20th century has been written along a scenario which sees in Merleau-Ponty’s death in 1961 the partition line between an existential and phenomenological generation and the immediately subsequent event of structuralism. The publication of Merleau-Pontys lecture notes on Edmund Husserl’s Origin of geometry has shown how shaky the grounds of such a simplifying reading are. Indeed, while Derrida’s translation of and introduction to Husserl’s text from 1962 became a founding text for the structuralist generation, introducing a reflection about the historicity and the materiality of ideality, it was only in 1998, with the publication of Merleau-Ponty’s notes from the Collège de France lecture in 1959 on the same topic, that it became clear how close the early Derrida is to the late Merleau-Ponty. Just as Derrida, Merleau-Ponty had identified in Husserl’s tension between archaeology and teleology the basic problem of phenomenology, introducing the question of history and that of media of cultural transmission. Comparing both readings in their specific context not only brings about a more complex picture of the intellectual debates of the time, but also shows how, with Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the Origin of geometry, Derrida’s “différance” predates itself and receives another genealogy.Ideality. History. Medium. Writing. Origin. Difference. (shrink)

Monstrosity has its recognized place in cultural narratives but in philosophical discourse it remains mostly untouched. In my paper I make an attempt at phenomenological inquiry into the experience of the Other’s monstrous body. I am beginning with some remarks concerning Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, the philosophers who devoted some attention to the problem of monstrosity and the monstrous, but my analysis is mainly based on the works of Bernhard Waldenfels, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Waldenfels emphasizes that the (...) corporeal self is somehow perceived as alien, always somewhat distanced and not totally graspable. He also argues that the closer the Other, the stronger activation of the boundary between the spheres of the ownness and the alienness is caused. A promising framework for the analysis of the ambivalent reaction brought about by the encounter with a monstrous human body can be provided by Husserl’s phenomenological inquiry into the process of pairing, developed in his Cartesian meditations. It seems that in this experience the pairing process is frustrating and deranged because the process of apperception is disturbed by a cluster of untypical or quite unique characteristics of the monstrous body. In result, its sense remains unclear, puzzling and challenging. Interesting light on the experience of the Other’s monstrous body could shed Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, especially the ideas of flesh and chiasm outlined in his last work. The radical character of the monster, while does not render it something totally different from the own, elucidates, however, the contingency of the order under which the human corporeality is subsumed. (shrink)

Our environment is changing rapidly, as is the spectrum of possible relationships we can entertain with it. Against this background, one important task emerging in contemporary philosophical discussion concerns defining the status of contemporary images and the "iconic spaces" we encounter with ever-increasing frequency in their various forms. Within this context, the dimension of perception seems to be losing its primacy over the image, making a philosophical description of the relationships between image and reality all the more necessary. Among images, (...) the classical distinction between documentary and fiction has been drastically called into question, and along with it the nature of the emotions and values we experience in these two domains. Rozzoni promotes a phenomenology of the image, that is, a return to a description of images that starts from their essential features while avoiding simplistic dichotomies. By elucidating images’ intimate relationship with phantasy and aesthetic experience and their role in shaping our experience of "reality," this book develops a perspectival notion of "truth" intended to shed light on our contemporary interactions with images and the events, emotions, and values we experience through them. (shrink)

_Essays on Beauvoir’s influences, contemporary engagements, and legacy in the philosophical tradition._.

_Explores the continuities and discontinuities in the work of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze._.

Explores the continuities and discontinuities in the work of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze.

Few researchers of the past made sense of the collapse of representations in the quantum domain, and looked for a new process of sense-making below the level of representations: the level of the phenomenology of perception and action; the level of the elaboration of knowledge out of experience. But some recent philosophical readings of quantum physics all point in this direction. They all recognize the fact that the quantum revolution is a revolution in our conception of knowledge. In these recent (...) readings of quantum physics, quantum states are primarily generators of probabilistic valuations. Accordingly, they should not be seen as statements about what is the case, but as statements about what each agent can reasonably expect to be the case. Three features of such non-interpretational, non-committal approaches to quantum physics strongly evoke the phenomenological epistemology. These are: their deliberately first-person stance; their suspension of judgment about a presumably external domain of objects, and subsequent redirection of attention towards the activity of constituting these objects; their perception-like conception of quantum knowledge. But beyond phenomenological epistemology, these new approaches of quantum physics also make implicit use of a phenomenological ontology. Chris Fuch’s participatory realism thus formulates a non-external variety of realism for one who is deeply immersed in reality. But participatory realism strongly resembles Merleau-Ponty’s endo-ontology, which is a phenomenological ontology for one who deeply participates in Being. This remarkable analogy is supported by Merleau-Ponty himself. Indeed, 50 years before QBism, Merleau-Ponty acknowledged the strong kinship between the status of quantum mechanics and his phenomenology of embodiment. He did so in two texts that remained unpublished until after his death: Visible and invisible, and the Lectures on Nature. The final part of this article is then devoted to a study of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of quantum physics. (shrink)

Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...) IT is a deeply iconic-dependent process. We exemplify our approach by means of literature to dance IT and we explore some implications for the development of a general model of IT. (shrink)

This paper argues that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy attempts to reopen the question of human transcendence in contemporary terms. While his conception of language as self-transcending is deeply Husserlian, Ricoeur also responds to the analytical challenge when he deploys a basic distinction in Fregean logic in order to clarify Heidegger’s phenomenology of world. Ricoeur’s commitment to a transcendental view is evident in his conception of narrative, which enables him to emphasize the role of the performative in literary reading. The meaning (...) of the self in time provides Ricoeur with a discursive basis for distinguishing his own position from that of Kant and other philosophers in the transcendental tradition. (shrink)

Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative (...) constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to. (shrink)

The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.

To address the theological turn in phenomenology, this paper sets out critical arguments opposing the theist phenomenology of Michel Henry and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of the event. Henry’s phenomenology has been overlooked in recent commentaries compared with, for example, Jean-Luc Marion’s work. It will be shown here that Henry’s philosophy presents a detailed novel turn in phenomenology structured according to critical moves against positions developed from Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. This demonstration is done through a strong contrast with Deleuze and (...) a short engagement with Quentin Meillassoux. The paper presents an argument against the theological turn on the grounds that it misunderstands the form of affectivity when compared to Deleuze’s work on affect and event. It will be argued that Henry’s search for a free-standing affect deduced as a condition for any appearance underplays the way any affect is included in many causal and transcendentally determined series such that any notion of the pure affect independent of other processes is a fiction. The loss of this pure affect entails the questioning of the theological turn in Henry. (shrink)

While Merleau-Ponty’sPhenomenology of Perceptionrelies on the descriptive register of the body proper, his Sorbonne lectures on child psychology investigate the genesis of the experience of a body as one’s own. I demonstrate the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the narcissistic affect and sociality involved in this developmental process, distinguishing his account vis-à-vis Wallon’s and Lacan’s studies of the mirror stage. I conclude that in Merleau-Ponty’s account, (1) the experience of the body proper is not singular, but encompasses a range of (...) phenomenological variation; and (2) the genesis of the body proper is not confined to the mirror stage. The production of bodily boundaries is an ongoing process identified not only with its advent in childhood, but also with adult emotional life. The boundaries between inner and outer domains of perception are not merely discovered, but must be negotiated and cultivated in the intercorporeal affective dramas of adult life. (shrink)

La pregunta por el tiempo, junto a la pregunta por el cuerpo y el lenguaje, ocupa un lugar central en la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty. La restitución ontológica de la vida sensible, corporal -proyecto en el que se podría enmarcar toda su obra- lleva consigo una revisión de la idea del tiempo. El tiempo, sostiene Merleau-Ponty, se forma en nuestra experiencia corporal. Este tiempo en 'gestación', en 'estado naciente', es lo que el autor llama tiempo salvaje. Este trabajo se centra en (...) mostrar que la concepción del sentido en la obra de Merleau-Ponty -particularmente sus reflexiones sobre el sentido de la experiencia sensible y del lenguaje- se encuentra atravesada por la idea de un tiempo salvaje. Esta idea la desarrollamos en tres apartados: 1. introducción, 2. El ser salvaje del tiempo y la formación del sentido y 3. Tiempo y lenguaje. The question of the time, along with the question of the body and language, is central to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. The ontological restitution of the sensible, corporal life -project in which all his work- could be framed, and carries itself a review of the idea of time. "Time" says Merleau-Ponty, is formed in our body experience. This time in 'period of gestation' in 'nascent state', is what the author will call wild time. This work focuses on showing how the conception of the sense in the work of Merleau-Ponty, particularly his reflections on the sense of the sensible experience and the language, which is crossed by the idea of a wild time. We develop this idea into three sections: 1. introduction, 2. The wild being of the time and the formation of the sense and 3. Time and language. (shrink)

Nuestro punto de partida es la concepción de Merleau-Ponty del lenguaje como "habla". Sostenemos que esta, como experiencia corporal del lenguaje -como lenguaje "en" nosotros-, permite comprender el fenómeno de la /nter-culturalidad como un fenómeno esencialmente /ntra-cultural, en el sentido de una experiencia de la cultura "desde dentro", es decir, desde la experiencia que cada quien hace del lenguaje. Este carácter endógeno e individual de pensar la cultura pone en evidencia, sin embargo, un "entre-lazamiento" recíproco originario entre lo propio y (...) lo extraño que impide de entrada privilegiar ya sea una visión universalista o totalizante o bien individualista o regionalista de la cultura. En dos momentos doy cuenta de este planteamiento: 1. Mundo de la vida y diversidad cultural y 2. El habla como lugar de acceso a las culturas. Our starting point is the conception in Merleau Ponty of language as "speech". We support this concept as corporal experience of language -as language "in" us - allows to understand the phenomenon of ¿nter-culturality as an essentially ¿ntra-cultural phenomenon, in the sense of an experience of culture "from within", that is to say; from the experience that everyone does with the language. This endogenous and individual character of thinking about culture highlights, however, a reciprocal "entanglement" originated among one's own and the strange that initially prevents to privilege, even a universal or totalizing or either an individualistic or regionalist vision of culture. Two moments I take on this approach: 1. World of life and cultural diversity. 2. Speech as an access place to the cultures. (shrink)

Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical (...) or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors’ view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker’s diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical–anthropological foundation. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the idea of ‘visualization’ of legal rules as part of an account of rule following in action. Presenting an alternative to Van Schooten’s (Jurisprudence and communication. Deborah Charles, Liverpool, 2012) account of interpretation, I first distinguish between two modes of interpretation: rehearsing and discursive. I argue that the former is the more basic one, relating to our respecting sources, rather than noticing signs, in action. In other (Wittgensteinian) words, we have to understand how we take guidance (...) from rules. This account can profit from an analysis of what ‘seeing’ amounts to. Taking my cue from Merleau-Ponty, I point to the intertwinement between agent and world in seeing, in rule-following, and eventually in legal rule-following. The proof of the pudding is an alternative account of the time-honoured paradigm of legal interpretation: Hart’s ‘no vehicles in the park’. I show how this example is predicated on detecting ‘depth-clues’ in a rule, which allow an agent to correlate his vantage point to a vanishing point of a rule. The example illustrates a key-feature of rule following: reflexivity. I cannot follow a rule unless I project myself into its picture. (shrink)

Paul ThagardCambridge, MA: MIT press, 2006313 pages, ISBN: 026220164X (hbk); $36.00Can human beliefs and inferences be understood as a form of coherence maximization? This question underlies much o...

This paper explores the question concerning the relationship between basic and higher layers of experience and self-experience. The latter distinction implicitly presupposes the idea of a univocal foundation. After explaining the formal ontological law of foundation, an attempt is made to clarify how the idea of foundation may be suitable to understand the relationship among moments, or layers, of self-experience. To this aim, the phenomenological descriptions of self- and world-experience in dementia and schizophrenia are compared. The comparison between these two, (...) in many ways radically different, pathologies allows us to highlight both the potentialities and the limits of resorting to the foundational relationship for the description of lived experience. Taking the challenges coming from the description of dementia and schizophrenia into serious consideration, the meaning of the “stratified” account of self-experience will be eventually reassessed, and a way to complement the idea of foundation among layers will be proposed. (shrink)

The term “social cognition” can be construed in different ways. On the one hand, it can refer to the cognitive faculties involved in social activities, defined simply as situations where two or more individuals interact. On this view, social systems would consist of interactions between autonomous individuals; these interactions form higher-level autonomous domains not reducible to individual actions. A contrasting, alternative view is based on a much stronger theoretical definition of a truly social domain, which is always defined by a (...) set of structural norms; moreover, these social structures are not only a set of constraints, but actually constitute the possibility of enacting worlds that would just not exist without them. This view emphasises the heteronomy of individuals who abide by norms that are impersonal, culturally inherited and to a large extent independent of the individuals. Human beings are socialised through and through; consequently, all human cognition is social cognition. The article argues for this second position. Finally, it appears that fully blown autonomy actually requires heteronomy. It is the acceptance of the constraints of social structures that enables individuals to enter new realms of common meaningfulness. The emergence of social life marks a crucial step in the evolution of cognition; so that at some evolutionary point human cognition cannot but be social cognition. (shrink)

I examine the phenomenological philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre as possible responses to contemporary studies of interpersonal relatedness in cognitive science, especially the experimental studies of infant's imitating simple facial gestures of adults. I discuss the implications and the challenges raised by the experimental studies to the dominant phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, but also envision how phenomenology may help to interpret the findings about infantile imitation in ways that favor the embodied perceptual connectedness between the self and the other, without (...) recourse to the inner private mind postulate endorsed by the theory of mind and shared by the experimental researchers of imitation. (shrink)

A new framework for phenomenological psychology is proposed based on Husserl’s static and genetic methods. Static phenomenology holds a eidetic psychology centred on the processes of noetic-noematic constitution and elaborates typologies and general notions about human beings in connection with the world. Genetic analysis is research into facticity, it focus on the personal history of a subject, which is constantly in the process of becoming. When the temporal dimension of consciousness is considered, the phenomenological method becomes ‘static’, as it excludes (...) the factitious dimension of self, its personal and individual history, sedimented in layers of meaning, which are in part pre-reflective, non-thematic and anonymous to the self, but which nevertheless continue to influence the experience of itself with the other and with the world. This paper aims to present some of the fundamental principals of genetic phenomenology and it’s application to existential-phenomenological psychotherapy. There are three main aspects underlying genetic-phenomenological analysis as it is being proposed: inner time-consciousness theory, the experiential self and the theory of passive geneses. (shrink)

A arquitetura fenomenológica não possui talvez a solidez e a homogeneidade de uma escola ou de um movimento em sentido estrito, mas representa, no entanto, um vetor notável do pensamento arquitetônico contemporâneo. Juntamente com as obras de Heidegger, as obras de Merleau-Ponty são utilizadas com frequência por aqueles que se reconhecem como representantes de uma arquitetura de inspiração fenomenológica. Neste artigo será analisado o papel que o pensamento de Merleau-Ponty desenrola nas obras e no pensamento de Juhani Pallasmaa e Steven (...) Holl, autores que se destacam pela força de seus trabalhos e pela determinação de suas posições teóricas. Particular atenção se prestará à dupla oposição que caracteriza a arquitetura fenomenológica, que se distancia com igual firmeza tanto do modernismo como do pós-modernismo. Estes autores, na reivindicação da primazia do corpo vivido e da experiência perceptiva, consideram ter encontrado um “antídoto” à ossificação produzida pela racionalidade moderna, com seus espaços funcionais e inabitáveis, como também à celebração da autorreferencialidade de um certo pós-modernismo, com seus edifícios destinados essencialmente a serem contemplados pelos apreciadores. A partir dessa dupla oposição, a arquitetura fenomenológica parece procurar um plano mais sólido numa forte acentuação da positividade da experiência corpórea e perceptiva, quando Merleau-Ponty parece empenhado, pelo contrário, em uma progressiva revisão destes aspetos. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex has been mistakenly interpreted as a theory of gender, because interpreters have failed adequately to understand Beauvoir's aims. Beauvoir is not trying to explain facts, events, or states of affairs, but to reveal, unveil, or uncover (découvrir) meanings. She explicates the meanings of woman, female, and feminine. Instead of a theory, Beauvoir's book presents a phenomenological description of the sexual difference.

Ao longo de décadas, a filósofa brasileira Marilena Chaui produziu uma das mais vigorosas e importantes interpretações da filosofia espinosana. Nossa intenção é propor uma introdução a essa leitura. Queremos mostrar como, ao mesmo tempo em que seus passos iniciais vinham na esteira da redescoberta francesa de Espinosa nos anos 60, essa interpretação, segundo relato da própria autora, foi elaborada nos anos 70 “sob o signo da crítica da ditadura”, de tal forma que, ali, a história da filosofia fosse praticada (...) como “crítica do instituído”, ou ainda mais precisamente, como esforço compreensivo e crítico do autoritarismo brasileiro. Quais as circunstâncias dessa operação? É o que pretendemos investigar. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia la razón de Zambrano desde sus albores como razón mediadora. Su rechazo del sistema va unido a su comienzo en la intuición y a su decurso temporal, que analizamos en relación con Bergson y Husserl. La razón poética va más allá de ese núcleo intuitivo para revelar re-flexivamente incluso lo invisible. Su inmersión en las profundidades, en la pasividad actuante, en las entrañas, en la multiplicidad de los tiempos es paralela a la fenomenología de la génesis merleau-pontiana, (...) a su poiesis carnal e incluso al telos de una razón ampliada al sentir. Ambos filósofos ejercitan su nueva concepción de la filosofía en la existencia. (shrink)

Trata-se de discutir a maneira com que as representações do corpo no cinema de David Cronenberg indicam uma dissociação importante entre gozo e prazer. Tal dissociação deve ser avaliada em sua dimensão propriamente política, abrindo com isso outra dimensão para aquilo que normalmente entendemos por “crítica do fetichismo”.