Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Picture, Image and Experience. [REVIEW]Sonia Sedivy - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):472-475.
    Robert Hopkins’s Picture, Image and Experience aims to provide an account of pictorial representation that vindicates the intuitions of the many, namely that pictorial representation is a deeply visual phenomenon, that an explanation of pictorial representation needs to be based on an explanation of our experience of pictures, and that there must be some sense in the idea that pictures resemble their objects. Hopkins proposes that we can show what is correct in these intuitions by explaining pictures as representations that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • Morality and Action by Warren Quinn. [REVIEW]Michael Thompson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (2):270.
    This volume collects the principal works of the late Warren Quinn. The papers cover a broad range of topics and may, for present purposes, be divided three ways, as variously concerning problems of metaethics, of the rationality of morality, and of substantive or practical ethics. I will not discuss Quinn’s great papers on abortion, punishment, double effect, and the distinction between killing and letting die—except to remark that they are united by an underlying anticonsequentialist program. They are, I think, his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures.Dominic McIver Lopes - 2005 - Clarendon Press.
    Images have power - for good or ill. They may challenge us to see things anew and, in widening our experience, profoundly change who we are. The change can be ugly, as with propaganda, or enriching, as with many works of art. Sight and Sensibility explores the impact of images on what we know, how we see, and the moral assessments we make. Dominic Lopes shows how these are part of, not separate from, the aesthetic appeal of images. His book (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • The Guise of the Good.J. D. Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
    The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations  
  • Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Emotions shape the landscape of our mental and social lives. Like geological upheavals in a landscape, they mark our lives as uneven, uncertain and prone to reversal. Are they simply, as some have claimed, animal energies or impulses with no connection to our thoughts? Or are they rather suffused with intelligence and discernment, and thus a source of deep awareness and understanding? In this compelling book, Martha C. Nussbaum presents a powerful argument for treating emotions not as alien forces but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   283 citations  
  • Understanding Pictures.Daniel Herwitz - 1999 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57 (3):385-388.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Morality and Action.Warren Quinn - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    Warren Quinn was widely regarded as a moral philosopher of remarkable talent. This collection of his most important contributions to moral philosophy and the philosophy of action has been edited for publication by Philippa Foot. Quinn laid out the foundations for an anti-utilitarian moral philosophy that was critical of much contemporary work in ethics, such as the anti-realism of Gilbert Harman and the neo-subjectivism of Bernard Williams. Quinn's own distinctive moral theory is developed in the discussion of substantial, practical moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • The Authority of Affect.Mark Johnston - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):181-214.
    A while ago I pulled the short straw, and became chair of my department. One nice part of the job is to praise people I work with, which I can do sincerely because they are very praiseworthy. I also have to read a lot of praise by others; the familiar things—project evaluations, letters of recommendation, promotion dossiers, and so on and so forth. As a result, I have learnt to attend to praise a little more closely.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  • Understanding Pictures.Dominic Lopes - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    There is not one but many ways to picture the world--Australian "x-ray" pictures, cubish collages, Amerindian split-style figures, and pictures in two-point perspective each draw attention to different features of what they represent. Understanding Pictures argues that this diversity is the central fact with which a theory of figurative pictures must reckon. Lopes advances the theory that identifying pictures' subjects is akin to recognizing objects whose appearances have changed over time. He develops a schema for categorizing the different ways pictures (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Picture, Image and Experience: A Philosophical Inquiry.Robert Hopkins - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    How do pictures represent? In this book Robert Hopkins casts new light on an ancient question by connecting it to issues in the philosophies of mind and perception. He starts by describing several striking features of picturing that demand explanation. These features strongly suggest that our experience of pictures is central to the way they represent, and Hopkins characterizes that experience as one of resemblance in a particular respect. He deals convincingly with the objections traditionally assumed to be fatal to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    'We desire all and only those things we conceive to be good; we avoid what we conceive to be bad.' This slogan was once the standard view of the relationship between desire or motivation and rational evaluation. Many critics have rejected this scholastic formula as either trivial or wrong. It appears to be trivial if we just define the good as 'what we want', and wrong if we consider apparent conflicts between what we seem to want and what we seem (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics.Gilbert Harman - 1977 - Oxford University Press.
    Contains an overall account of morality in its philosophical format particularly with regard to problems of observation, evidence, and truth.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   188 citations  
  • The Authority of Desire.Dennis W. Stampe - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.
    The Aristotelian dictum that desire is the starting point of practical reasoning that ends in action can of course be denied. Its denial is a commonplace of moral theory in the tradition of Kant. But in this essay I am concerned with that issue only indirectly. I shall not contend that rational action always or necessarily does involve desire as its starting point; nor shall I deny it. My question concerns instead the possibility of its ever beginning in desire. For (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   110 citations  
  • Desiring the Bad Under the Guise of the Good.Jennifer Hawkins - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):244–264.
    Desire is commonly spoken of as a state in which the desired object seems good, which apparently ascribes an evaluative element to desire. I offer a new defence of this old idea. As traditionally conceived, this view faces serious objections related to its way of characterizing desire's evaluative content. I develop an alternative conception of evaluative mental content which is plausible in its own right, allows the evaluative desire theorist to avoid the standard objections, and sheds interesting new light on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • The Nature of Morality.D. Z. Phillips & Gilbert Harman - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (110):89.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   197 citations  
  • Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.
    Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   105 citations  
  • What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1674 citations  
  • Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception.Daniel Jacobson - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387-409.
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Perception and the Rational Force of Desire.Karl Schafer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (5):258-281.
    [A]ny theory of practical rationality must explain— or explain away—the following: Rational: In many cases, what it is rational (in some sense) for one to do or intend to do depends on what one desires. [...] I argue that in order to capture the rational significance of desire, we need to consider both its content and its force, on analogy to the rational significance of both the force and content of beliefs and perceptual experiences. This will open up a new (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • On the Category of Moral Perception.Charles Starkey - 2006 - Social Theory and Practice 32 (1):75-96.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Touching the Weights.Margaret G. Holland - 1998 - International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (3):299-312.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Touching the Weights: Moral Perception and Attention.Margaret G. Holland - 1998 - International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (3):299-312.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Good and Good For.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2010 - In Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Moral Perception and Particularity.Lawrence A. Blum - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    Most contemporary moral philosophy is concerned with issues of rationality, universality, impartiality, and principle. By contrast Laurence Blum is concerned with the psychology of moral agency. The essays in this collection examine the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgment, perception, and group identifications, and explore how all these psychic capacities contribute to a morally good life. Blum takes up the challenge of Iris Murdoch to articulate a vision of moral excellence that provides a worthy aspiration for human beings. Drawing on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
    In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   203 citations  
  • Sympathy for the Devil.Kieran Setiya - 2010 - In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press. pp. 82--110.
    Argues that, while human beings may act "under the guise of the good," this is not true of rational agents, as such. Themes discussed along the way – extending the argument of "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton, 2007) – include: desires as appearances of the good, the intelligibility of vice, and the kind of essentialist claim that permits exceptions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Upheavals of Thought.Martha Nussbaum - 2001 - Journal of Religious Ethics 31 (2):325-341.
    In "Upheavals of Thought", Martha Nussbaum offers a theory of the emotions. She argues that emotions are best conceived as thoughts, and she argues that emotion-thoughts can make valuable contributions to the moral life. She develops extensive accounts of compassion and erotic love as thoughts that are of great moral import. This paper seeks to elucidate what it means, for Nussbaum, to say that emotions are forms of thought. It raises critical questions about her conception of the structure of emotion, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   269 citations  
  • Value, Reality, and Desire.Graham Oddie - 2005 - Clarendon Press.
    Value, Reality, and Desire is an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false--there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent - they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are not particularly fashionable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   101 citations  
  • Wanting as Believing.I. L. Humberstone - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (March):49-62.
    An account of desire as a species of belief may owe its appeal to the details of its proposal as to precisely what sort of beliefs desires are to be identified with, and its downfall may be due to those details it does provide. For example, it may be proposed that the desire that α is in fact the belief that it ought to be that α, or is morally good or desirable that it should be the case that α. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
    1. Presumably the point of, say, inculcating a moral outlook lies in a concern with how people live. It may seem that the very idea of a moral outlook makes room for, and requires, the existence of moral theory, conceived as a discipline which seeks to formulate acceptable principles of conduct. It is then natural to think of ethics as a branch of philosophy related to moral theory, so conceived, rather as the philosophy of science is related to science. On (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   376 citations  
  • Intending.Donald Davidson - 1978 - Philosophy of History and Action 11:41-60.
    Someone may intend to build a squirrel house without having decided to do it, deliberated about it, formed an intention to do it, or reasoned about it. And despite his intention, he may never build a squirrel house, try to build one, or do anything whatever with the intention of getting a squirrel house built. Pure intending of this kind, intending that may occur without practical reasoning, action, or consequence, poses a problem if we want to give an account of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  • The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   148 citations  
  • Morality and Action.Warren Quinn - 1993 - Philosophy 69 (270):513-515.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):509-510.
    Reasons without Rationalism has two related parts, devoted to action theory and ethics, respectively. In the second part, I argue for a close connection between reasons for action and virtues of character. This connection is mediated by the idea of good practical thought and the disposition to engage in it. The argument relies on the following principle, which is intended as common ground: " Reasons: The fact that p is a reason for A to ϕ just in case A has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   134 citations  
  • Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action?Ruth Chang - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. pp. 56--90.
    What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role are evaluative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge. pp. 110-129.
    J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth about what the experience of value is like, or (in a familiar surrogate for phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought or discourse. The idea is, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   271 citations  
  • Seeing What Is Not There: Pictorial Experience, Imagination, and Non-Localization.Mikael Pettersson - 2011 - British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (3):279–294.
    Pictures let us see what is not there. Or rather, since what pictures depict is not really there, we do not really see the things they are pictures of. Ever since Richard Wollheim introduced the notion of seeing-in into philosophical aesthetics, as part of his theory of depiction, there has been a lively debate about how, precisely, to understand this experience. However, one (alleged) feature of seeing-in that Wollheim pointed to has been almost completely absent in the subsequent discussion, namely (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Moral Perception and Particularity.Lawrence Blum - 1991 - Ethics 101 (4):701-725.
    Most contemporary moral philosophy is concerned with issues of rationality, universality, impartiality, and principle. By contrast Laurence Blum is concerned with the psychology of moral agency. The essays in this collection examine the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgment, perception, and group identifications, and explore how all these psychic capacities contribute to a morally good life. Blum takes up the challenge of Iris Murdoch to articulate a vision of moral excellence that provides a worthy aspiration for human beings. Drawing on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, depending on their inclinations. One way to frame such a conception is to name some features that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for someone whether or not he is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   219 citations  
  • Aristotle.William W. Fortenbaugh - 1980 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 18 (4):466-467.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Rational Desires.R. B. Brandt - 1969 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 43:43 - 64.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Defending Desire-as-Belief.Huw Price - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):119-27.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Understanding Pictures.Domenic Lopes - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):158-162.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Understanding Pictures.Dominic Lopes - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):398-400.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good.Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis - the view that desire (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations