- Unreliable Emotions and Ethical Knowledge.James Hutton - manuscriptdetails
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Habit-Formation: What's in a Perspective?William Hornett - 2022 - In Jeremy Dunham & Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (eds.), Habit and the History of Philosophy. New York, NY: Rewriting the History of Philosophy.details
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Philosophy of Perception and Liberal Naturalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 299-319.details
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The structure of semantic norms.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (4):373-391.details
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Reasons, normativity, and value in aesthetics.Alex King - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):1-17.details
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The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy.Stephen Boulter - 2007 - Basingstoke, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Emotion and Language in Philosophy.Constant Bonard - 2023 - In Gesine Lenore Schiewer, Jeanette Altarriba & Bee Chin Ng (eds.), Emotion and Language. An International Handbook.details
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Attitude and Social Rules, or Why It's Okay to Slurp Your Soup.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (28).details
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Ideal Conceivers, the Nature of Modality and the Response-Dependent Account of Modal Concepts.Alexandru Dragomir - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (2):659-674.details
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Style Appropriation, Intimacy, and Expressiveness.Julian Dodd - 2021 - British Journal of Aesthetics 61 (3):373-386.details
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Affective justification: how emotional experience can epistemically justify evaluative belief.Eilidh Harrison - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Glasgowdetails
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A Defense of Modest Ideal Observer Theory: The Case of Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):489-510.details
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Cast in a Bad Light or Reflected in a Dark Mirror? Cognitive Science and the Projecting Mind.Daniel Kelly - 2018 - In N. Strohminger and V. Kumar (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Disgust. pp. 171-194.details
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Emotion as High-level Perception.Brandon Yip - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7181-7201.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience.Brian Scott Ballard - 2021 - Emotion Review 13 (2):113-124.details
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Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1135-1152.details
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Classical Emotivism: Charles L. Stevenson.Alberto Oya - 2019 - Bajo Palabra 22:309-326.details
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The Myth of the Common Sense Conception of Color.Zed Adams & Nat Hansen - 2020 - In Teresa Marques & Åsa Wikforss (eds.), Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 106-127.details
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Either/Or: Subjectivity, Objectivity and Value.Katalin Balog - 2020 - In John Schwenkler & Enoch Lambert (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. Oxford University Press.details
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Velleman on Reacting and Valuing.Justin D'Arms - 2014 - Abstracta 8 (S7):23-29.details
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The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics eds. by Lorraine Besser-Jones and Michael Slote. [REVIEW]Karyn Lai - 2018 - Philosophy East and West 68 (2):639-645.details
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How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.details
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The uses of aesthetic testimony.C. Thi Nguyen - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1):19-36.details
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(2 other versions)VI. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:105-111.details
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Color, Relativism, and Realism.John Spackman - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (3):251-288.details
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(1 other version)The rationality of faith and the benefits of religion.Brian Ballard - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):213-227.details
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Reason and Emotion, Not Reason or Emotion in Moral Judgment.Leland F. Saunders - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations (3):1-16.details
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Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.details
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Do desires provide reasons? An argument against the cognitivist strategy.Avery Archer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2011-2027.details
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An Ecological Theory of Rational Interpretation.Saku Hara - 2005 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (2):87-104.details
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The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons.Fabian Dorsch - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Seeing Color, Seeing Emotion, Seeing Moral Value.Benjamin De Mesel - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):539-555.details
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Epistemic Injustice in the space of reasons.Matthew Congdon - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):75-93.details
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Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences.Mauro Rossi - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):82-98.details
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Are moral properties impossible?Wouter F. Kalf - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.details
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O Lugar das Emoções na Ética e na Metaética.Flavio Williges, Marcelo Fischborn & David Copp (eds.) - 2018 - Pelotas: NEPFil online/Editora da UFPel.details
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Meat made us moral: a hypothesis on the nature and evolution of moral judgment.Matteo Mameli - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (6):903-931.details
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(1 other version)Prematurely Depotentialized? Ethical Nonnaturalism and the Absurdest-Extension Objection.Sebastian Muders & Markus Ruether - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (1):34-36.details
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Shapelessness in Context.Pekka Väyrynen - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):573-593.details
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Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics).Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.details
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Empirical Ethics and the Special Status of Practitioners' Judgements.Albert W. Musschenga - 2010 - Ethical Perspectives 17 (2):203-230.details
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A limited defense of moral perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.details
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Normative Wahrheiten ohne Ontologie? Derek Parfit und der „neue“ Non-Naturalismus.Markus Rüther - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):187-220.details
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(1 other version)Color relationalism and color phenomenology.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 13.details
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Salience, supervenience, and layer cakes in Sellars's scientific realism, McDowell's moral realism, and the philosophy of mind.Marc Lange - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):213-251.details
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Darwinian ethics and error.Richard Joyce - 2000 - Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):713-732.details
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(1 other version)Fitting attitudes and welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.details
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Two conceptions of response-dependence.Rafael De Clercq - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159-177.details
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