- What are we?: a study in personal ontology.Eric T. Olson - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
An argument for animalism.Eric T. Olson - unknowndetails
|
|
The ontological status of persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.details
|
|
When does a person begin?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.details
|
|
An argument for animalism.Eric T. Olson - 2009 - In John P. Lizza (ed.), Defining the beginning and end of life: readings on personal identity and bioethics. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press.details
|
|
Hylomorphism reconditioned.Michael C. Rea - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):341-358.details
|
|
Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem.Eric T. Olson - 2015 - In João Fonseca & Jorge Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self. New York: Peter Lang. pp. 21-40.details
|
|
St. Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too Many Thinkers.Patrick Toner - 2012 - Modern Schoolman 89 (3-4):209-222.details
|
|
On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity.Patrick Toner - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):454-473.details
|
|
Soulless Organisms?David B. Hershenov - 2011 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):465-482.details
|
|
Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects.Jeffrey E. Brower - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119-150.details
|
|
The Emergent Self.William Hasker - 2001 - London: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?David Hershenov - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):31 - 59.details
|
|
Things and Their Parts.Kit Fine - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):61-74.details
|
|
Why I have no hands.Eric T. Olson - 1995 - Theoria 61 (2):182-197.details
|
|
You Needn't Be Simple.Andrew M. Bailey - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):145-160.details
|
|
I do not exist.Peter K. Unger - 1979 - In Graham Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity. Cornell University Press.details
|
|
A Deflationary Theory Of Diachronic Identity.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):19 - 37.details
|
|
A compound of two substances.Eric T. Olson - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
Identity, composition, and the simplicity of the self.E. J. Lowe - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self.E. J. Lowe - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
How to live forever without saving your soul: Physicalism and immortality.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 183-201.details
|
|
What Do We Refer to When We Say “I”?Peter van Inwagen - 2002 - In Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 175–189.details
|
|
What Do We Refer to When We Say “I”?Peter van Inwagen - 2002 - In Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 175-189.details
|
|
The place of the self in contemporary metaphysics.Rory Madden - 2015 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Mind, Self and Person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
On Parfit's view that we are not human beings.Eric T. Olson - 2015 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Mind, Self and Person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Against the brainstem view of the persistence of human animals.Rina Tzinman - 2016 - In Andreas Blank (ed.), Animals: New Essays. Munich: Philosophia.details
|
|
The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2016 - In Andreas Blank (ed.), Animals: New Essays. Munich: Philosophia.details
|
|
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.details
|
|
The Human Person: Animal and Spirit.David Braine - 1994 - University of Notre Dame Press.details
|
|
Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.Sydney Shoemaker (ed.) - 1963 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Hud Hudson - 2001 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
The unimportance of identity.Derek Parfit - 1995 - In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 13-45.details
|
|
The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival.Dean W. Zimmerman - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):194-212.details
|
|
Unrestricted animalism and the too many candidates problem.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.details
|
|
Thinking animals, disagreement, and skepticism.Eric Yang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):109-121.details
|
|
The Survival of the Sentient.Peter Unger - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:325-348.details
|
|
Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1988 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Personal Identity and Individuation.Bernard Williams - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:229-252.details
|
|
Sameness, substance and the human animal.David Wiggins - 2000 - The Philosophers' Magazine 12 (12):50-53.details
|
|
Précis of sameness and substance renewed. [REVIEW]David Wiggins - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):442–448.details
|
|
Précis of Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):442-448.details
|
|
Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):456-461.details
|
|
The End of (Human) Life as We Know It.Christina Van Dyke - 2012 - Modern Schoolman 89 (3-4):243-257.details
|
|
The End of (Human) Life as We Know It.Christina Van Dyke - 2012 - Modern Schoolman 89 (3-4):243-257.details
|
|
Not Properly a Person.Christina Van Dyke - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (2):186-204.details
|
|
Merricks’s Soulless Savior.Luke Van Horn - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):330-341.details
|
|
Merricks’s Soulless Savior.Luke Van Horn - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):330-341.details
|
|