- Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.details
|
|
Imperatives, phantom pains, and hallucination by presupposition.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.details
|
|
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Wanting, getting, having.I. L. Humberstone - 1990 - Philosophical Papers 99 (August):99-118.details
|
|
.Peter Railton - 1985 - Rowman & Littlefield.details
|
|
Skepticism about weakness of will.Gary Watson - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.details
|
|
Three conceptions of rational agency.R. Jay Wallace - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):217-242.details
|
|
Addiction as defect of the will: Some philosophical reflections. [REVIEW]R. Jay Wallace - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (6):621–654.details
|
|
The Possibility of Practical Reason.Thomas Pink - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):812-816.details
|
|
The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.details
|
|
The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.details
|
|
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.details
|
|
A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character.Michael Tye - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.details
|
|
Appearing Good.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):131-138.details
|
|
The authority of desire.Dennis W. Stampe - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.details
|
|
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
|
|
The Humean theory of motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.details
|
|
Internal reasons.Michael Smith - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131.details
|
|
The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended.Neil Sinhababu - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (4):465-500.details
|
|
The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.Neil Sinhababu - 2012 - Noûs 47 (4):680-696.details
|
|
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Reasons without rationalism * by Kieran Setiya * princeton university press, 2007. IX + 131 pp. 22.50: Summary.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):509-510.details
|
|
Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Slaves of the passions * by mark Schroeder.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.details
|
|
Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):463-474.details
|
|
Perception and the Rational Force of Desire.Karl Schafer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (5):258-281.details
|
|
How Does the Good Appear To Us?Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):119-130.details
|
|
Explaining normativity: On rationality and the justification of reason.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):354–379.details
|
|
An Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (10):517-532.details
|
|
Synchronic self-control is always non-actional.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123–131.details
|
|
Synchronic Self-control is Always Non-actional.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123-131.details
|
|
Frog and Toad lose control.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.details
|
|
Frog and toad lose control.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63–73.details
|
|
The authority of affect.Mark Johnston - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):181-214.details
|
|
Direction of fit.I. Lloyd Humberstone - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):59-83.details
|
|
The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality.Donald C. Hubin - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):445.details
|
|
Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.details
|
|
If it itches, scratch!Richard J. Hall - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535.details
|
|
Rational preference: Decision theory as a theory of practical rationality.James Dreier - 1996 - Theory and Decision 40 (3):249-276.details
|
|
Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
|
|
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
|
|
Reflection, planning, and temporally extended agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):35-61.details
|
|
Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):35.details
|
|
Slaves of the Passions (review). [REVIEW]Melissa Barry - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (2):225-228.details
|
|
Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason.Derek Baker - 2015 - Ratio 28 (1):65-80.details
|
|
Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - New York, US: Oup Usa.details
|
|
Value, reality, and desire.Graham Oddie - 2005 - New York: Clarendon Press.details
|
|
Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|