- Implementational Considerations for Digital Consciousness.Derek Shiller - manuscriptdetails
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Pains and holes: comments on (Casser and Schiller 2021).Nathan William Davies - manuscriptdetails
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Illusions of Affection: A Hyper-Illusory Account of Normative Valence.Mihailis Diamantis - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (5-6):6-29.details
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Can a Bodily Theorist of Pain Speak Mandarin?Chenwei Nie - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (1):261-272.details
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A Hole in the Box and a Pain in the Mouth.Laurenz C. Casser & Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa091.details
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The Dispositional Nature of Phenomenal Properties.Simone Gozzano - 2018 - Topoi 39 (5):1045-1055.details
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Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):210-232.details
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The intuitive invalidity of the pain-in-mouth argument.Michelle Liu - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):463-474.details
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Loopy regulations: The motivational profile of affective phenomenology.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Philosophical Topics 47 (2):233-261.details
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Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization.Matthias Michel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2411-2428.details
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Locating and Representing Pain.Simone Gozzano - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (4):313-332.details
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Is the experience of pain transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):677-708.details
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Introspection without Judgment.Anna Giustina - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86:407-427.details
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No Pain, No Gain (in Darwinian Fitness): A Representational Account of Affective Experience.Benjamin Kozuch - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):693-714.details
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Putting pain in its proper place.Kevin Reuter, Michael Sienhold & Justin Sytsma - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):72-82.details
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The elements of emotion.Chad Brockman - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):163-186.details
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Pain (Oxford Bibliographies Online).David Bain - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact.Christopher A. Young - unknowndetails
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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Pain: Perception or Introspection?Murat Aydede - 2017 - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. New York: Routledge.details
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Perception and Representation in Leibniz.Stephen Puryear - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburghdetails
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The Abductive Case for Humeanism over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire.Derek Clayton Baker - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2):1-29.details
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Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.details
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What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.details
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"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknowndetails
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The representational theory of consciousness.David Bourget - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Color, Externalism, and Switch Cases.David Bain - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):335-362.details
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Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain and its integration with third-person methodologies: The experiential-phenomenological approach.Murat Aydede & Donald D. Price - 2005 - In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. pp. 243--273.details
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Integrating experimental-phenomenological methods and neuroscience to study neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness.D. Barrell Price & Rainville J. - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):593-608.details
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Is feeling pain the perception of something?Murat Aydede - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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The Bodily Theory of Pain.Erlend Winderen Finke Owesen - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1329-1347.details
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Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2017 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.details
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Introspective disputes deflated: The case for phenomenal variation.Sascha Benjamin Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3165-3194.details
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Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality?Davide Bordini - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1105-1126.details
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The biological function of consciousness.Brian Earl - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:69428.details
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Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.details
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Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe.Wolfgang Barz - 2014 - Theoria 80 (4):350-367.details
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Imperatives, phantom pains, and hallucination by presupposition.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.details
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The Imperative View of Pain.David Bain - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.details
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Philosophy of mind: critical concepts in philosophy.Sean Crawford (ed.) - 2011 - New York: Routledge.details
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A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.details
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The location of pains.David Bain - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.details
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The double content of perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):225-243.details
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Colour inversion problems for representationalism.Fiona Macpherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.details
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What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness.Neil Campbell Manson - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238.details
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Pain, philosophical aspects of.Murat Aydede - 2009 - In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 495-498.details
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Some foundational problems in the scientific study of pain.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2002 - Philosophy of Science Supplement 69 (3):265-83.details
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Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory.Richard Gray - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):87-101.details
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