- (1 other version)Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto & Mark Jago - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark Jago.details
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On counterpossibles.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):327-353.details
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(2 other versions)The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence.Adam Elga - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):313-324.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.details
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(1 other version)Time Travel and Modern Physics.Frank Arntzenius & Tim Maudlin - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:169-200.details
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Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument.Jenann Ismael - 2003 - Synthese 136 (3):305-320.details
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A problem for a logic of 'because'.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2015 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25 (1):46-49.details
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Modality and Explanatory Reasoning.Boris Christian Kment - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Omission impossible.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2575-2589.details
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Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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A logic for 'because'.Benjamin Schnieder - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):445-465.details
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Impossible Worlds.Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):713-728.details
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A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.details
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(2 other versions)The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David K. Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.details
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Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions.David Ripley - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):97 - 118.details
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Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.details
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Context, conditionals, fatalism, time travel, and freedom.John Carroll - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Bradford. pp. 79.details
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Causal explanation.David Lewis - 1986 - In David K. Lewis (ed.), Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press. pp. 214-240.details
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Remarks on counterpossibles.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):639-660.details
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Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.details
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Ways Things Can't Be.Greg Restall - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.details
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On what we can ensure.Benjamin Schnieder - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):101 - 115.details
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(4 other versions)Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.details
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Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.details
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Impossible Worlds.Franz Berto & Mark Jago - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Williamson on Counterpossibles.Berto Francesco, David Ripley, Graham Priest & Rohan French - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713.details
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How Mathematics Can Make a Difference.Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan & David Ripley - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.details
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In defence of a logic for ‘because’.B. Schnieder - 2016 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 26 (2):160-171.details
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Logical non-apriorism and the law of non-contradiction.Otavio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2004 - In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The law of non-contradiction : new philosophical essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 156--175.details
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Hyperintensional metaphysics.Daniel Nolan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):149-160.details
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The Ontology of Impossible Worlds.David A. Vander Laan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):597-620.details
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On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals.Sarah Moss - 2010 - Noûs 46 (3):561-586.details
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Explanatory generalizations, part I: A counterfactual account.James Woodward & Christopher Hitchcock - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):1–24.details
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The principal paradox of time travel.Peter J. Riggs - 1997 - Ratio 10 (1):48–64.details
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Bananas enough for time travel.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):363-389.details
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The End of Mystery.Sam Baron & Mark Colyvan - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):247-264.details
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I’d Do Anything to Change the Past (But I Can’t Do ‘That').Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):153-168.details
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(2 other versions)Beyond the Limits of Thought.Graham Priest - 1995 - Philosophy 71 (276):308-310.details
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(2 other versions)Beyond the Limits of Thought.Graham Priest - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):121-125.details
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Beyond the Limits of Thought.Graham Priest - 1995 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.details
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Time Enough for Explanation.Sam Baron & Mark Colyvan - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (2):61-88.details
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Asymmetries in Time.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Noûs 24 (5):804-806.details
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(1 other version)Events.David Lewis - 1986 - In David K. Lewis (ed.), Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press. pp. 241-269.details
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The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories.Mark Colyvan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):115 - 123.details
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(4 other versions)Causation.David Lewis - 1986 - In David K. Lewis (ed.), Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.details
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(1 other version)Causes and counterfactuals.Jaegwon Kim - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):570-572.details
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(1 other version)``Causes and Counterfactuals".Jaegwon Kim - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):570-572.details
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