Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
    How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   605 citations  
  • (1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
    How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment, then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle---a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   592 citations  
  • The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 167-196.
    Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   332 citations  
  • Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
    My conclusion will be that, more often than we might have thought, suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper attitude. It follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief and so, at least on standard conceptions, knowledge. This is a kind of contingent real-world skepticism that has not received the attention it deserves. I hope that this paper will help to bring this issue to life.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   291 citations  
  • (1 other version)Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge.William Alston - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):197–201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   355 citations  
  • (1 other version)Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of the Mind.Linda Zagzebski - unknown
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   347 citations  
  • Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others.Richard Foley - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defence of the reliability of one's faculties, methods and opinions that does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   98 citations  
  • The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   128 citations  
  • Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others.Richard Foley - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):482-484.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology.Linda Zagzebski - 1997 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 71:1-17.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • (1 other version)Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 1996 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 253-270.
    Comprehensive and packed, Alvin Plantinga's two-volume treatise defies sum- mary. The first volume, Warrant: Current Views, is a meticulous critical survey of epistemology today. Many current approaches are presented and exhaustively discussed, and a negative verdict is passed on each in turn. This prepares the way for volume two, Warrant and Proper Function, where a positive view is advanced and developed in satisfying detail. The cumulative result is most impressive, and should command attention for years to come. Here I cannot (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations