- Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Mona Simion & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
|
|
The epistemology of evolutionary debunking.Justis Koon - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12155-12176.details
|
|
Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account.Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11249-11278.details
|
|
Replies.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1577-1597.details
|
|
How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
|
|
Elgin’s community-oriented steadfastness.Klaas J. Kraay - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):4985-5008.details
|
|
Kuhn’s two accounts of rational disagreement in science: an interpretation and critique.Markus Seidel - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6023-6051.details
|
|
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
|
|
Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
|
|
Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
|
|
Teaching drunk: Work, the online economy, and uncertainty in action.Max F. Kramer - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (3):387-408.details
|
|
Moral Relativism, Metalinguistic Negotiation, and the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Katharina Anna Sodoma - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1621-1641.details
|
|
Why the Method of Cases Doesn’t Work.Christopher Suhler - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):825-847.details
|
|
Accentuate the Negative.Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.details
|
|
Affective Reason.Jason McMartin & Timothy Pickavance - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.details
|
|
Disagreement and Dispute.Delia Belleri - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):289-307.details
|
|
The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma.Clinton Castro & Casey Hart - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1623-1640.details
|
|
Do great minds really think alike?Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
|
|
Moral intuitionism and disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.details
|
|
Trust and the value of overconfidence: a Bayesian perspective on social network communication.Aron Vallinder & Erik J. Olsson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):1991-2007.details
|
|
The epistemic significance of political disagreement.Bjørn G. Hallsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2187-2202.details
|
|
Framing how we think about disagreement.Joshua Alexander, Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2539-2566.details
|
|
Scientific Facts and Methods in Public Reason.Karin Jønch-Clausen & Klemens Kappel - 2016 - Res Publica 22 (2):117-133.details
|
|
Naturalistic Moral Realism and Moral Disagreement: David Copp’s Account.Mark Hanin - 2012 - Res Publica 18 (4):283-301.details
|
|
Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.details
|
|
A defense of intuitions.S. Matthew Liao - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.details
|
|
Asymmetry arguments.Berislav Marušić - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1081-1102.details
|
|
Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
|
|
Mentalist evidentialism vindicated (and a super-blooper epistemic design problem for proper function justification).Todd R. Long - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.details
|
|
Disagreement and a Functional Equal Weight View.Christopher A. Vogel - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (65):157-194.details
|
|
Expert Trespassing Testimony and the Ethics of Science Communication.Mikkel Gerken - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):299-318.details
|
|
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
|
|
Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.details
|
|
A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
|
|
How irrelevant influences bias belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.details
|
|
The Epistemic Norm of Blame.D. Justin Coates - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):457-473.details
|
|
Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.details
|
|
Fact-Dependent Policy Disagreements and Political Legitimacy.Klemens Kappel - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):313-331.details
|
|
Conciliation and Self-incrimination.Jason Decker - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1099-1134.details
|
|
Why Only Externalists Can Be Steadfast.Jeroen de Ridder - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):185-199.details
|
|
Disagreements.Daniel Cohnitz & Teresa Marques - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):1-10.details
|
|
Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
|
|
Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - unknown - Erkenntnis (2):271-283.details
|
|
Social epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Response to commentators.Neil Levy - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
|
|
How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise.Klemens Kappel - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):75-96.details
|
|
Resolutions Against Uniqueness.Kenji Lota & Ulf Hlobil - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1013-1033.details
|
|
Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
|
|
Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.details
|
|
Epistemic Collaborativeness as an Intellectual Virtue.Alkis Kotsonis - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):869-884.details
|
|