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Disagreeing with Confidence

Theoria 83 (4):419-439 (2017)

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  1. Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.
    How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps ‘epistemic peers’ who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions (...)
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  • Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
    How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions (...)
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  • Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.
    The recently offered, Purported counter-Examples to justified, True belief analyses of knowledge are looked at with some care and all found to be either incoherent or inconclusive. It is argued that justified, True belief analyses are based on sound insight into the concept of knowledge. The distinction between having been justified in claiming to know something and actually having known it is used in an effort to get the discussion of knowledge back on the right track.
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  • Religious Disagreement and Rational Demotion.Michael Bergmann - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 6:21-57.
    This paper defends the view that, in certain actual circumstances that aren’t uncommon for educated westerners, an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs: it discusses the two main possible outcomes of disagreement (i.e., defeat of one’s disputed belief and demotion of one’s disputant), the main kinds of evidence that are relevant to demoting (...)
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  • What Should We Do When We Disagree?J. Lackey - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
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  • Epistemological Egoism and Agent-Centered Norms.Michael Huemer - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 17.
    Agent-centered epistemic norms direct thinkers to attach different significance to their own epistemically relevant states than they attach to the similar states of others. Thus, if S and T both know, for certain, that S has the intuition that P, this might justify S in believing that P, yet fail to justify T in believing that P. I defend agent-centeredness and explain how an agent-centered theory can accommodate intuitions that seem to favor agent-neutrality.
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  • An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):221-222.
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  • The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
    Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.
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  • Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.
    The question I consider is this: -/- The Question: Can two people–who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree–both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? -/- I distinguish two kinds of rationality–internal and external–and argue in section 1 that, whichever kind we have in (...)
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  • The Logic of Decision.Henry E. Kyberg - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (2):250.
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  • What’s the Rational Response to Everyday Disagreements?Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59):101-106.
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  • Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):234-237.
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  • Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):433-454.
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  • Enthusiasm, A Chapter in the History of Religion.R. A. Knox - 1951 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 13 (1):138-139.
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