- Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
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Wisdom, Action, and Knowledge.Oushinar Nath - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry.details
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Stable acceptance for mighty knowledge.Peter Hawke - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6):1627-1653.details
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Reflective Naturalism.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 203 (13):1-21.details
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The Receptive Theory: A New Theory of Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (6):117.details
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How Infallibilists Can Have It All.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):363-380.details
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A Defense of Explanationism against Recent Objections.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.details
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The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:284-308.details
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Luck and Reasons.Spencer Paulson - forthcoming - Episteme:1-15.details
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Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge.Mylan Engel - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):33-56.details
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Getting a little closure for closure.James Simpson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12331-12361.details
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The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.details
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On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.details
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Closed without boundaries.Elia Zardini - 2020 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):641-679.details
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Entkräftung und Widerruf: Fügsame Überzeugungen im Zeitverlauf.Benjamin McMyler - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (6):992-1007.details
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Logics for Belief as Maximally Plausible Possibility.Giacomo Bonanno - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (5):1019-1061.details
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The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking.Anthia Solaki, Francesco Berto & Sonja Smets - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):733-762.details
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Some fallibilist knowledge: Questioning knowledge-attributions and open knowledge.Stephen Hetherington - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2083-2099.details
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El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico.María Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 36 (1):243-259.details
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Philosophie des modalités épistémiques (la logique assertorique revisitée).Fabien Schang - 2007 - Dissertation, Nancy Universitédetails
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Fake Barns and Our Epistemological Theorizing.Ángel García Rodríguez - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):29-53.details
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An externalist decision theory for a pragmatic epistemology.Brian Kim - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Defeaters and Disqualifiers.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):887-906.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.details
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(1 other version)Definite Descriptions and the Gettier Example.Christoph Schmidt-Petri & London School of Economics and Political Science - 2002 - CPNSS Discussion Papers.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-41.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism.Justin Morton - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):233-253.details
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No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
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Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder.Claudio de Almeida & J. R. Fett - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):152-169.details
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Skepticism and Epistemic Agency.Jill Claudia Rusin - 2002 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
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The maturation of the Gettier problem.Allan Hazlett - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):1-6.details
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Gettier and the method of explication: a 60 year old solution to a 50 year old problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):57-72.details
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Memories of the Fourth Condition and Lessons to be Learned from Suspicious Externalism.Murat Baç - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (2):127-145.details
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Negative Reason Existentials.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):108-116.details
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The skeptic's dogmatism: a constructive response to the skeptical problem.Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu - 2011 - Dissertation, details
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The method of reflective equilibrium and intuitions.Julia Langkau - 2013 - In .details
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What You Don't Know Won't Hurt You?John A. Barker - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4):303 - 308.details
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(2 other versions)Précis of Tracking Truth.Sherrilyn Roush - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):213-222.details
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Experience and Defeat.Nicholas Silins - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Skeptical Success.Troy Cross - 2005 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:35-62.details
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Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.details
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What does it take to "have" a reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.details
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A minimal expression of non–reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):706–723.details
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(2 other versions)Learning from words.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77–101.details
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Weighting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):110–132.details
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The scope of instrumental reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.details
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