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Knowledge Closure and Knowledge Openness: A Study of Epistemic Closure Principles.Levi Spectre - 2009 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.details
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Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable.David Enoch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1689-1699.details
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The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):417-432.details
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Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.details
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Stealing Harman’s Thought: knowledge saboteurs and dogmatists.Roy Sorensen - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1787-1799.details
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Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):1-33.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence&quest.Michael Veber - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):557-569.details
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At the threshold of knowledge.Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):449-460.details
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Non-Pickwickian Belief and 'the Gettier Problem'.John Biro - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):47-69.details
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Kripke and the dogmatism paradox.Kaave Lajevardi - manuscriptdetails
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Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.details
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Indoctrination Anxiety and the Etiology of Belief.Joshua DiPaolo & Robert Mark Simpson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10):3079-3098.details
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Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary.Errol Lord - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-13.details
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The indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma: Reply to Becker and Cudd.John W. Carroll - 1993 - Theory and Decision 34 (1):63-72.details
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Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):368-387.details
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Following the argument where it leads.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):105-124.details
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The Backward Induction Argument.John W. Carroll - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (1):61-84.details
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Non-cognitivism and rational inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.details
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Dogmatism repuzzled.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):307 - 321.details
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The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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What's Wrong with McKinsey-style Reasoning?James Pryor - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200.details
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Fallibility and Dogmatism.Bernhard Salow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Kowtowing to a Non-natural Realm.Matthew S. Bedke - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (6):559-576.details
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(1 other version)Sorry if! On Conditional Apologies.Peter Baumann - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (5):1079-1090.details
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Replies to Comesaña and Yablo.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1073-1090.details
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Reducing Responsibility: An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Blame.Trent Dougherty - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):534-547.details
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Dogmatism and Inquiry.Sam Carter & John Hawthorne - 2024 - Mind 133 (531):651-676.details
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Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed! Or: Why Care about Morality, Robustly Realistically Understood.David Enoch & Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 434-462.details
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Moore′s paradox generalized.Claudio de Almeida - 2022 - Theoria 88 (6):1111-1127.details
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“Dogmatism” and Dogmatism.John Biro - forthcoming - Episteme:1-5.details
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Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism.Claudio de Almeida - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):113-131.details
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Saul Kripke e o paradoxo do dogmatismo.João Rizzio Vicent Fett - 2017 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 21 (1):227-243.details
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Contagious Blindspots: Formal Ignorance Spreads to Peers.Roy Sorensen - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):335-344.details
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Disagreeing with Confidence.Brian Besong - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):419-439.details
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Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities.Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.details
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Fallibility and Trust.Sven Rosenkranz - 2013 - Noûs 49 (3):616-641.details
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What do you do with misleading evidence?By Michael Veber - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):557–569.details
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Heeding misleading evidence.Earl Conee - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):99-120.details
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Bringing moral responsibility down to earth.Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.details
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(1 other version)Sorry if! On Conditional Apologies.Peter Baumann - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (5):1079-1090.details
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Sorensen sobre a vaguidade e o sorites.Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi - 2023 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 68 (1):e44897.details
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