Bd. 1. Abhandlungen zur Psychologie, bearb. von R. Kindinger und R. Haller.--Bd. 2. Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie, bearb. von R. Haller.--Bd. 3. Abhandlungen zur Werttheorie, bearb. von R. Kindinger.--Bd. 4. über Annahmen.--Bd. 5. Über philosophische Wissenschaft und ihre Propädeutik. Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften. Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens. Zum Erweise des allgemeinen Kausalgesetzes, bearb. von R.M. Chisholm.--Bd. 6. Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, bearb. von R.M. Chisholm.--7. Selbstdarstellung. Vermischte Schriften, bearb. von R. Haller.

Brentanos Reflexionen über das Verhältnis von Wahrheit und Evidenz wurden erst 1930 herausgegeben. Ihre Kenntnis ist unentbehrlich für das Verständnis seines Verhältnisses zu den an ihn anknüpfenden Denkern, insbesondere zu Husserl.

∗ Apologies to Mark Hinchliff for stealing the title of his dissertation. (See Hinchliff, A Defense of Presentism. As it turns out, however, the version of Presentism defended here is different from the version defended by Hinchliff. See Section 3.1 below.).

In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski developed a new theory of judgement with two types of judgement: existential and relational judgements. In Zur Lehre he tried to stay within a Brentanian framework, although he introduced the distinction between content and object in the theory of judgement. The introduction of this distinction forced Twardowski to revise further Brentano'stheory.His changes concerned judgements about relations and about non-present objects. The latter are considered special cases of relational judgements. The existential judgements (...) are analysed in a Brentanian way; whereas relational judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way only as far as the act is concerned, but not when it comes to the object: the object of a relational judgement is a relationship. With this notion of relationship Twardowski comes close to introducing a concept of state of affairs for the object of (relational) judgements. (shrink)

A realist theory of truth for a class of sentences holds that there are entities in virtue of which these sentences are true or false. We call such entities ‘truthmakers’ and contend that those for a wide range of sentences about the real world are moments (dependent particulars). Since moments are unfamiliar, we provide a definition and a brief philosophical history, anchoring them in our ontology by showing that they are objects of perception. The core of our theory is the (...) account of truthmaking for atomic sentences, in which we expose a pervasive ‘dogma of logical form’, which says that atomic sentences cannot have more than one truthmaker. In contrast to this, we uphold the mutual independence of logical and ontological complexity, and the authors outline formal principles of truthmaking taking account of both kinds of complexity. (shrink)

My aim is to lay down some constraints on a correspondence theory of truth for empirical sentences of a natural language on the basis of a theory according to which that to which a true empirical sentence of such a language corresponds is a part of the natural world. The problem is to find some means of delineating those portions of the world which serve as correspondents, portions of reality otherwise called ‘truthmakers’.

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...) rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

“Arthur Prior’s Formal logic has been familiar to students for twenty years, but the historical section that was originally meant to accompany it was never published. In this book P. T. Geach and A. J. P. Kenny have selected from those parts of the material that were not superseded by Prior’s later publications a self-contained study of the philosophical prehistory of contemporary logic. Like Prior’s early work Logic and the Basis of Ethics the material here presented is both historical and (...) critical: Prior was not concerned to decide for us the controverted questions of logical doctrine which he discusses. He may be compared to an experienced judge summing up in a complicated civil action: the case for each side is clearly and fairly presented, and although on some issues the summing-up amounts to a pretty clear direction of the jury, the jurymen themselves are left to decide the issues. The value of such an historical survey is to be measured by the ill effects of ignoring our predecessors’ labours. The course of the philosophy of logic in the decades since Prior wrote these pages has continued to illustrate the saying that those who will not learn the history of philosophy are compelled to relive it.” - Publisher. (shrink)

Reprint of paper first published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 1984.

Despite heroic efforts, philosophers have found it increasingly difficult to evade discussion of metaphysical topics. Take the philosophy of mind. Take, in particular, the mind-body problem in its latest guise: the problem of causal relevance. If mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, how can we reconcile the role such properties seem to have in producing bodily motions that constitute actions with the apparent fact that the very same motions are entirely explicable on the basis of purely physical properties (...) of purely physical events in the nervous system? Familiar approaches to the problem include appeals to “supervenient causation,” to “higher-level” laws governing putatively higher-level entities and events, and to “realizing” relations that make room in objects for overlapping properties. (shrink)

L'idée d'une origine commune de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique commence à être bien admise. On essaie ici de lui donner quelque consistance en la mettant à l'épreuve d'une question, qui fut décisive pour les auteurs à la source de ces deux traditions, à la fin du XIXème siècle et au début du XXème : celle de la référence manquante ou des " objets inexistants ". On montre comment ce problème a pu orienter d'un côté les débats internes (...) à l'école brentanienne (Brentano lui-même, Twardowski, Meinong, le jeune Husserl), et de l'autre les réflexions des auteurs sources de la tradition dite analytique (Bolzano, Frege, Russell). Par opposition à d'autres études plus " syncrétiques ", il s'agit avant tout, dans la démarche adoptée, de mettre en avant des différences. D'abord au sein de l'école intentionaliste, beaucoup plus diversifiée et traversée de tensions qu'on ne le croit souvent. Puis, aussi et surtout, entre cette école et les auteurs qui ont choisi délibérément une autre voie : Frege et Russell, bien sûr, mais aussi déjà Bolzano. Il s'agit par là même de mesurer un écart qui devait s'avérer déterminant pour toute la philosophie du XXème siècle et de mieux définir le champ propre de cette philosophie. (shrink)

Cette enquête sur la théorie de la signification de Husserl conduit à revisiter tous les lieux classiques de la philosophie du langage et de la logique contemporaine, mis en vedette depuis par la philosophie analytique.

This paper is a part of a series of lectures on logic delivered by Kazimierz Twardowski in the John Casimir University in Lvov during the first semester of the academic year 1902-1903. This publication of the paper is a hommage to the founder of Lvov-Warsaw School in the centenary of his first lecture in Lvov University.