There are many good reasons for seeing Aristotelian hylemorphism and atomism as diametrically opposed theories of matter. Aristotle himself had forcefully combatted the physical model of Leucippus and Democritus, whose ontology consisted of indivisible material bodies moving in an immaterial void, presenting his own model as an alternative. This alternative excluded both indivisibles and the void and postulated instead a plenist world made up of substances all of which were infinitely divisible continua composed of universal matter and specific substantial forms. (...) Unlike elementary atoms, Aristotle’s elementary substances could transmute into one another: water, when evaporating, was said to turn into air. (shrink)

In spite of vigorous opposition by a number of historians it has now become a commonplace that the rapid development of the ‘new philosophy’ sprang from the ideology of Puritanism. What began its career as the ‘Merton thesis’ has now been refined, developed, and so often repeated that it seems to be almost unassailable. However, the two foremost historians in the entrenchment of this new orthodoxy are willing, in principle, to concede that ‘in reality things were very mixed up’, and (...) that non-Puritan natural philosophers at the time were operating ‘in a precisely similar manner’ to their Puritan contemporaries. Indeed, it would be impossible not to concede this in the face of the many critiques launched against the Merton thesis. (shrink)

This book offers a major reassessment of Leibniz's metaphysics. Christia Mercer has exposed the underlying doctrines of Leibniz's philosophy. By analysing Leibniz's early works she demonstrates that the metaphysics of pre-established harmony developed many years earlier than previously believed and for reasons which have not been understood. As a result of this analysis she has unearthed a philosophical school that Leibniz scholars have not recognized. A much deeper understanding of some of Leibniz's key doctrines emerges. Moreover, since the Leibniz that (...) is revealed here does not fit neatly into the standard accounts of the history of philosophy and science, Christia Mercer's study will prompt scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)