- (1 other version)What is Consciousness?D. M. Armstrong - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.details
|
|
(1 other version)Mental content.Colin McGinn - 1989 - New York, NY, USA:details
|
|
Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte.F. Brentano - 1876 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 1:209-213.details
|
|
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.details
|
|
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
|
|
Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Possible knowledge of unknown truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):41 - 52.details
|
|
(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
|
|
Comparing the major theories of consciousness.Ned Block - 2009 - In Michael Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences IV. pp. 1111-1123.details
|
|
Knowability and the capacity to know.Michael Fara - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.details
|
|
Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.details
|
|
(1 other version)The paradox of knowability.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94 (376):557-568.details
|
|
(1 other version)On the failure to detect changes in scenes across saccades.John A. Grimes - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co.details
|
|
Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
|
|
Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):595-639.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.details
|
|
Quining qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
|
|
(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
|
|
The structure of (self-) consciousness.David Woodruff Smith - 1986 - Topoi 5 (September):149-156.details
|
|
(3 other versions)The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.details
|
|
(1 other version)Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.) - 2006 - MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)A theory of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.details
|
|
Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.details
|
|
Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.details
|
|
Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.details
|
|
(1 other version)What is consciousness?David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In The nature of mind. New York,: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1993 - In Alvin I. Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 231.details
|
|
Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
|
|
Two kinds of consciousness.Tyler Burge - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.details
|
|
Role, not content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments".Georges Rey - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):224-230.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Explaining Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 109-131.details
|
|
Higher-order global states : An alternative higher-order model of consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.details
|
|
Aristotle on consciousness.Victor Caston - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):751-815.details
|
|
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.details
|
|
(1 other version)What phenomenal consciousness is like.Alex Byrne - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.details
|
|
The superiority of Hop to HOT.William G. Lycan - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. pp. 93â114.details
|
|
Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Consciousness.Ned Block - 2009 - In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.details
|
|
(1 other version)Some Like It Hot: Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts.Alex Byrne - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (2):103-129.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Actually.Scott Soames - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):251-277.details
|
|
(4 other versions)Higher-order theories of consciousness.David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Scholarpedia 3 (5):4407.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awareness.Robert Van Gulick - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.details
|
|