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Experience and representation.Joseph Levine - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Art, Mind and Religion.Hilary Putnam, W. H. Captain & D. D. Merrill - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Art, mind, and religion. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press.details
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精神状态的性质.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Art, mind, and religion. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 1--223.details
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Spectrum inversion.Michael Thau - 2002 - In Consciousness and Cognition. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Molecular genetics and the biological basis of color vision.Maureen Neitz & Jay Neitz - 1998 - In Werner Backhaus, Reinhold Kliegl & John Simon Werner (eds.), Color Vision: Perspectives from Different Disciplines. De Gruyter. pp. 101--119.details
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The foundations of arithmetic.Gottlob Frege - 1884/1950 - Evanston, Ill.,: Northwestern University Press.details
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A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
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Notes for lectures on private experience and sense data.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (July):275-320.details
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Curse of the qualia.Stephen L. White - 1986 - Synthese 68 (August):333-68.details
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Representationalism and the transparency of experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.details
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Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
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Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
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The Philosopher’s Projective Error.Bernard W. Kobes - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):581-593.details
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Consciousness and Cognition.Michael Thau - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The incommunicability of content.Daniel M. Taylor - 1966 - Mind 75 (October):527-41.details
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Comparing qualia across persons.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):385-406.details
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The inverted spectrum.Sydney Shoemaker - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.details
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Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture I: The object perception model.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.details
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Phenomenal character.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):21-38.details
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Identity, Cause, and Mind by Sydney Shoemaker. [REVIEW]Colin McGinn - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):227-232.details
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Functionalism and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.details
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Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.details
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Pseudonormal vision.Martine Nida -Rümelin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):145-157.details
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I: Note on the text.Rush Rhees - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (3):271-275.details
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Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.details
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A narrow representationalist account of qualitative experience.Georges Rey - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:435-58.details
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A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience.Georges Rey - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):435-457.details
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The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. [REVIEW]Katalin Farkas - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):786-789.details
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The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World.Hilary Putnam - 1999 - Columbia University Press.details
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Reason, Truth and History.Kathleen Okruhlik - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.details
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Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Imagery Debate. Michael Tye. [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (4):675-677.details
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Review of T he Imagery Debate. [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (4):675-677.details
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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.details
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Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint.Stephen E. Palmer - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.details
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Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion?Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):145 - 157.details
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Intrinsic phenomenal properties in color science: A reply to Peter Ross.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.details
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Against intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279-304.details
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Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.details
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How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.details
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How to Define Theoretical Terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (2):321-321.details
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Cool red.Joseph Levine - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.details
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Phenomenal content.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198.details
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III*—Goodbye to Transposed Qualia.Robert Kirk - 1982 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82 (1):33-44.details
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Goodbye to transposed qualia.Robert Kirk - 1982 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:33-44.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Color, Content, and Fred.Cohen Jonathan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):121-144.details
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Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. [REVIEW]Frank Jackson - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):614.details
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Conceivability and Possibility.J. Divers - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):347-351.details
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