- Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Origins of Qualia.Tim Crane - 2000 - In Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.details
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Content and Consciousness.D. C. Dennett - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (18):604-604.details
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Matter and Consciousness.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
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Identity, Cause, and Mind by Sydney Shoemaker. [REVIEW]Colin McGinn - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):227-232.details
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Molecular genetics and the biological basis of color vision.Maureen Neitz & Jay Neitz - 1998 - In Werner Backhaus, Reinhold Kliegl & John Simon Werner (eds.), Color Vision: Perspectives from Different Disciplines. De Gruyter. pp. 101--119.details
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Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion?Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):145 - 157.details
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(2 other versions)Sexism, racism, ageism and the nature of consciousness.Ned Block - 2000 - In Richard Moran, Alan Sidelle & Jennifer E. Whiting (eds.), The Philosophy of Sydney Shoemaker. University of Arkansas Press. pp. 71--88.details
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(1 other version)Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality.Paul M. Churchland & Patricia Smith Churchland - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):121-145.details
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Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.details
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(1 other version)Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture I: The object perception model.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.details
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(1 other version)How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.details
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Theory change and the indeterminacy of reference.Hartry Field - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.details
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Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy.Patricia Smith Churchland - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Paul M. Churchland (ed.) - 1984 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
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Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Tim Crane - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Summary of "Elements of Mind" and Replies to Critics.Tim Crane - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.details
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Experience.B. A. Farrell - 1950 - Mind 59 (April):170-98.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Color as a secondary quality.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):81-103.details
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Physicalist theories of color.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (January):67-106.details
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(1 other version)Colors and reflectances.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Functionalism and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.details
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The Frege-Schlick view.Sydney Shoemaker - 2006 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and modality: themes from the philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 18-33.details
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Are absent qualia impossible?Ned Block - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.details
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What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.details
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Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint.Stephen E. Palmer - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.details
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Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.details
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(2 other versions)Comparing qualia across persons.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):385-406.details
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Black and white and the inverted spectrum.Justin Broackes - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):161-175.details
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(2 other versions)Color and the inverted spectrum.David R. Hilbert & Mark Eli Kalderon - 2000 - In Steven Davis (ed.), Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-214.details
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Quining qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal character.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):21-38.details
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Qualia.Ned Block - 1987 - In Richard Langton Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Origins of Qualia.Tim Crane - 2000 - In Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.details
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Qualia and intentional content: Reply to Block.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 405--415.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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Inverted earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.details
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(1 other version)Mental paint.Ned Block - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 165--200.details
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(1 other version)The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.details
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Conceivability and Possibility.Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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