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Defaulting on Reasons

Noûs:229-259 (2018)

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  1. A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
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  • "Introduction".David Sobel - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Introduction.David Sobel & Steven Wall - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining (...)
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  • State or process requirements?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):371-385.
    rational requirements are narrow scope. The source of our disagreement, I suspect, is that Broome believes that the relevant rational requirements govern states, whereas I believe that they govern processes. If they govern states, then the debate over scope is sterile. The difference between narrow- and wide-scope state requirements is only as important as the difference between not violating a requirement and satisfying one. Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements only corroborate this. Why, then, have we thought that there (...)
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  • Reasons as Defaults.John Horty - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-28.
    The goal of this paper is to frame a theory of reasons--what they are, how they support actions or conclusions--using the tools of default logic. After sketching the basic account of reasons as provided by defaults, I show how it can be elaborated to deal with two more complicated issues: first, situations in which the priority relation among defaults, and so reasons as well, is itself established through default reasoning; second, the treatment of undercutting defeat and exclusionary reasons. Finally, and (...)
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  • Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.
    This paper is a response to ‘Why Be Rational?’ by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for ‘requirement’. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of ‘requirement’. Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.
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  • Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
    Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing (...)
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  • Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.
    There was a long tradition in philosophy according to which good reasoning had to be deductively valid. However, that tradition began to be questioned in the 1960’s, and is now thoroughly discredited. What caused its downfall was the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but clearly confer justification on their conclusions. Here are some simple examples.
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  • What Some Generic Sentences Mean.Nicholas Asher & Michael Morreau - 1995 - In Greg N. Carlson & Francis Jeffry Pelletier (eds.), The Generic Book. University of Chicago Press. pp. 300--339.
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  • (1 other version)Practical reasoning and inference.John Broome - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 286–309.
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  • Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.
    What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are (...)
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  • A Solution for Buridan’s Ass.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):283-310.
    Buridan’s Ass faced a choice between two identical bales of hay; governed only by reason, the donkey starved, unable to choose. It seems clear that we face many such cases, and resolve them successfully. Our success seems to tell against any view on which action and intention require evaluative preference. I argue that these views can account for intention and intentional action in cases like that of Buridan’s Ass. A decision to act nonintentionally allows us to resolve these cases without (...)
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  • (1 other version)Enticing Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 91-118.
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  • (1 other version)Practical Reasoning and Inference.John Broome - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 286.
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  • Reasons.John Broome - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 2004--28.
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  • Normative Practical Reasoning.Christian Piller - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...)
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  • Authority and reasons: Exclusionary and second‐personal.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Ethics 120 (2):257-278.
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  • Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
    We consider a paradox involving indicative conditionals (‘ifs’) and deontic modals (‘oughts’). After considering and rejecting several standard options for resolv- ing the paradox—including rejecting various premises, positing an ambiguity or hidden contextual sensitivity, and positing a non-obvious logical form—we offer a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that resolves the paradox by making modus ponens invalid. We argue that this is a result to be welcomed on independent grounds, and we show that rejecting the general validity of modus (...)
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  • Normative practical reasoning: John Broome.John Broome - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...)
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  • An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):544-545.
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  • Practical Reason and Norms.C. H. Whiteley - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):287-288.
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  • Negated defaults in commonsense entailment.Nicholas Asher & Yi Mao - 2001 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 30 (1):41-60.
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  • Law and Exclusionary Reasons.Larry Alexander - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (1):5-22.
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  • (1 other version)Skepticism and floating conclusions.John F. Horty - 2002 - Artificial Intelligence 135 (1-2):55-72.
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  • Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Philosophy 69 (267):114-116.
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  • What are the Options?Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - In Ethics without principles. New York: Oxford University Press.
    An introductory chapter that maps the possible views about the relation between moral thought and moral principles, showing how extreme the particularist position is. Particularism is contrasted with Rossian intuitionism and its use of prima facie principles; and the particularist account of moral reasoning is contrasted with non-monotonic theories, and with the views of Kagan and Scanlon.
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  • What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
    Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, "ought," and evidence.
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  • Against conditional obligation.Daniel Bonevac - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):37-53.
    The crucial feature of obligation sentences to which the puzzles point is that such sentences, and evaluative sentences more generally, are defeasible. They may be warranted, given some information, only to be defeated by further information. A theory that recognizes this no longer needs to see conditional obligation as anything more than a simple combination of unary obligation and the conditional.
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  • Reasons for action, decisions and norms.J. Raz - 1975 - Mind 84 (336):481-499.
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  • What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
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  • Floating conclusions and zombie paths: Two deep difficulties in the “directly skeptical” approach to defeasible inheritance nets.David Makinson & Karl Schlechta - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 48 (2):199-209.
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  • Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Law and Philosophy 12 (3):329-343.
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  • (1 other version)Practical Reasons and Moral "Ought".Patricia Greenspan - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:172-199.
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  • Bridges from Classical to Nonmonotonic Logic.David Makinson - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (3):437-439.
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  • (1 other version)Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Critica 18 (52):3-39.
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  • Prima facie obligation.Nicholas Asher & Daniel Bonevac - 1996 - Studia Logica 57 (1):19-45.
    This paper presents a nonmonotonic deontic logic based on commonsense entailment. It establishes criteria a successful account of obligation should satisfy, and develops a theory that satisfies them. The theory includes two conditional notions of prima facie obligation. One is constitutive; the other is epistemic, and follows nonmonotonically from the constitutive notion. The paper defines unconditional notions of prima facie obligation in terms of the conditional notions.
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  • Fainthearted Conditionals.Michael Morreau - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):187.
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  • Alternative approaches to default logic.James P. Delgrande, Torsten Schaub & W. Ken Jackson - 1994 - Artificial Intelligence 70 (1-2):167-237.
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  • The Limits of Morality.Michael Slote - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):915-917.
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  • (1 other version)Review of Jonathan Dancy: Moral Reasons[REVIEW]Donald C. Hubin - 1995 - Ethics 106 (1):187-189.
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