- Shapelessness and predication supervenience: a limited defense of shapeless moral particularism.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):51-67.details
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Another Particularism: Reasons, Status and Defaults.Alan Thomas - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):151-167.details
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The Standard-Relational Theory of 'Ought' and the Oughtistic Theory of Reasons.Daan Evers - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):131-147.details
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Moral Particularism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - In Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum. pp. 247-260.details
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Jonathan Dancy. Ethics Without Principles (Oxford University Press, 2004) Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge. Principled Ethics. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):568-580.details
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Reasons and Precedent.John Horty - unknowndetails
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Defeasible reasoning.Robert C. Koons - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.details
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The Particularist Challenge to Kantian Ethics.Irina Schumski - 2024 - Ethics 135 (1):88-121.details
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Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Logic 21 (2):47-63.details
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Putting Oughts Together.David Boylan - 2023 - Semantics and Pragmatics 16.details
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Beyond reasons and obligations: A dual-role approach to reasons and supererogation.Knoks Aleks & Streit David - 2023 - In Juliano Maranhão, Clayton Peterson, Christian Straßer & van der Torre Leendert (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 16th International Conference (DEON2023, Trois-Rivières). College Publications. pp. 119-137.details
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Belief: What is it Good for?John MacFarlane - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Interpretation, Argumentation, and the Determinacy of Law.Giovanni Sartor - 2023 - Ratio Juris 36 (3):214-241.details
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The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.details
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A semantics of face emoji in discourse.Patrick Georg Grosz, Gabriel Greenberg, Christian De Leon & Elsi Kaiser - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (4):905-957.details
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Moral Principles as Generics.Ravi Thakral - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (2):205-224.details
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Two factor-based models of precedential constraint: a comparison and proposal.Robert Mullins - 2023 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 31 (4):703-738.details
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(1 other version)From Pluralistic Normative Principles to Autonomous-Agent Rules.Beverley Townsend, Colin Paterson, T. T. Arvind, Gabriel Nemirovsky, Radu Calinescu, Ana Cavalcanti, Ibrahim Habli & Alan Thomas - 2022 - Minds and Machines 1:1-33.details
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Nudges, Nudging, and Self-Guidance Under the Influence.W. Jared Parmer - 2023 - Ergo 9 (44):1199-1232.details
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Outline of a Theory of Reasons.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):117-142.details
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Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing.John Brunero - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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A Holist Balance Scale.Chris Tucker - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (3):533-553.details
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A dilemma for reasons additivity.Geoff Keeling - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):20-42.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements.Robert Mullins - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:568-599.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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Particularism for Generalists: A Rossian Business Ethic.J. Drake - 2021 - Business Ethics Quarterly 31 (4):600-622.details
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Salience reasoning in coordination games.Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6601-6620.details
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How AI can AID bioethics.Walter Sinnott Armstrong & Joshua August Skorburg - forthcoming - Journal of Practical Ethics.details
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Mīmāṃsā deontic reasoning using specificity: a proof theoretic approach.Björn Lellmann, Francesca Gulisano & Agata Ciabattoni - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 29 (3):351-394.details
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Is reasoning responding to reasons?Franziska Poprawe - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (2):146-159.details
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Normative metaphysics for accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):363-384.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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Morality, Uncertainty.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):334-358.details
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Grounding nonexistence.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):209-229.details
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Is, Ought, and the Regress Argument.Jacob Sparks - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):528-543.details
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(1 other version)Towards a Model of Argument Strength for Bipolar Argumentation Graphs.Erich Rast - 2018 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 55 (1):31-62.details
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):63-73.details
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Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):459-484.details
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Moral perception, inference, and intuition.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1495-1512.details
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The Guise of the Guise of the Bad.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):5-20.details
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Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Rationality and Moral Risk: A Moderate Defense of Hedging.Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Marylanddetails
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Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - 2017 - In Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.details
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Trading one kind of dogmatism for another: Comments on Williams' Criticism of Agrippan Scepticism.Cíntora Armando - 2013 - Tópicos 44:9-34.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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