- The Particularist Challenge to Kantian Ethics.Irina Schumski - 2024 - Ethics 135 (1):88-121.details
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Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Logic 21 (2):47-63.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Logical norms as defeasible obligations: disentangling sound and feasible inferences.Matteo De Benedetto & Alessandra Marra - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Embeddedness and the Psychological Nature of Default Reason: On How Particularists Should Address the Flattening Objection.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Beyond reasons and obligations: A dual-role approach to reasons and supererogation.Knoks Aleks & Streit David - 2023 - In Juliano Maranhão, Clayton Peterson, Christian Straßer & van der Torre Leendert (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 16th International Conference (DEON2023, Trois-Rivières). College Publications. pp. 119-137.details
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Reasons, Weight, and Hybrid Approaches to the Metaphysics of Practical Normativity.Cory Davia - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):221-236.details
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Interpretation, Argumentation, and the Determinacy of Law.Giovanni Sartor - 2023 - Ratio Juris 36 (3):214-241.details
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The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.details
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Provisional Universality.Daniel Bonevac - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (7):2571-2590.details
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Moral Principles as Generics.Ravi Thakral - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (2):205-224.details
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Comparative Value and the Weight of Reasons.Itai Sher - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (1):103-158.details
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Two factor-based models of precedential constraint: a comparison and proposal.Robert Mullins - 2023 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 31 (4):703-738.details
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Reasons First, by Mark Schroeder.Stephen Kearns - 2024 - Mind 133 (531):884-891.details
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Outline of a Theory of Reasons.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):117-142.details
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Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing.John Brunero - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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A dilemma for reasons additivity.Geoff Keeling - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):20-42.details
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From Responsibility to Reason-Giving Explainable Artificial Intelligence.Kevin Baum, Susanne Mantel, Timo Speith & Eva Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (1):1-30.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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Particularism for Generalists: A Rossian Business Ethic.J. Drake - 2021 - Business Ethics Quarterly 31 (4):600-622.details
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Inference and the structure of concepts.Matías Osta Vélez - 2020 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Münchendetails
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Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning.John Brunero - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):41-64.details
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Defending The Importance of Being Rational: Replies to Bedke and Guindon, Hazlett, and Way.Errol Lord - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):168-183.details
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How AI can AID bioethics.Walter Sinnott Armstrong & Joshua August Skorburg - forthcoming - Journal of Practical Ethics.details
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Ought, Agents and Ambiguity that Matters.Joanna Klimczyk - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne 31 (2):113-138.details
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Normative metaphysics for accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):363-384.details
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Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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Morality, Uncertainty.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):334-358.details
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The Content and Logic of Imperatives.Nicolas Fillion & Matthew Lynn - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):419-436.details
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Toward a Reasons-First View of Normative Background Conditions.Andrés G. Garcia & Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):981-992.details
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Formalizing GDPR Provisions in Reified I/O Logic: The DAPRECO Knowledge Base.Livio Robaldo, Cesare Bartolini, Monica Palmirani, Arianna Rossi, Michele Martoni & Gabriele Lenzini - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4):401-449.details
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Grounding nonexistence.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):209-229.details
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(1 other version)Towards a Model of Argument Strength for Bipolar Argumentation Graphs.Erich Rast - 2018 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 55 (1):31-62.details
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Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives.Justin Snedegar - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):682-702.details
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):63-73.details
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Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):459-484.details
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Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Representing dimensions within the reason model of precedent.Adam Rigoni - 2018 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 26 (1):1-22.details
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Fallibility and Normativity.DiPaolo Joshua - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherstdetails
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Rationality and Moral Risk: A Moderate Defense of Hedging.Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Marylanddetails
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Defeasibility and Inferential Particularism.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):80-98.details
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Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality.Jens Gillessen - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):29-64.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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New foundations for imperative logic III: A general definition of argument validity.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1703-1753.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Defaults with Priorities.John Horty - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (4):367-413.details
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Reasons and Promotion.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):98-122.details
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Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.details
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