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Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):1-23.details
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The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry.Dale Dorsey - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):747-773.details
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Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Ethics 97 (4):821-833.details
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Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.details
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The Meaning of 'Ought': Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics.Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The Fragility of Goodness.Martha Nussbaum - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):376-383.details
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Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Deflationary normative pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 231-262.details
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Toward a pluralist and teleological theory of normativity.David Copp - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):21-37.details
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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Morality and partiality.Susan Wolf - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:243-259.details
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Just plain "ought''.Owen McLeod - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (4):269-291.details
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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.details
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Toward a pluralist and teleological theory of normativity.David Copp - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Boston: Wiley Periodicals.details
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The Modesty of the Moral Point of View.Karl Schafer - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.details
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There is No Moral Ought_ and No Prudential _Ought.Elizabeth Harman - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 438-456.details
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Conceptual Role Expressivism and Defective Concepts.James L. D. Brown - 2022 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17. pp. 225-53.details
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Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:253-277.details
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Infinitism about cross-domain conflict.David Killoren - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.details
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Moral Vagueness as Semantic Vagueness.Rohan Sud - 2019 - Ethics 129 (4):684-705.details
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IV—The Dualism of Practical Reason.Roger Crisp - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):53-74.details
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The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason.David Copp - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):86-106.details
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Deflationary Normative Pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33 (sup1):231-262.details
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Friendship and Moral Danger.Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (5):278.details
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Two Dualisms of Practical Reason1.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:114.details
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Moral overridingness and moral theory.Sarah Stroud - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):170–189.details
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