- The Argument from Nominal–Notable Comparisons, ‘Ought All Things Considered’, and Normative Pluralism.Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (4):405-425.details
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Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.details
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On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter.James L. D. Brown - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):541-565.details
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Conceptual Ethics and The Methodology of Normative Inquiry.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 274-303.details
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Are epistemic reasons normative?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):670-695.details
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The Collective Archives of Mind : An Exploration of Reasons from Metaethics to Social Ontology.Gloria Mähringer - unknowndetails
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Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.James Fritz - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):98-116.details
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Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - 2021 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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The Normative Error Theorist Cannot Avoid Self-Defeat.Spencer Case - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):92-104.details
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All Reasons Are Moral.Daniel Muñoz - manuscriptdetails
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Expression and Guidance in Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics.Derek Baker - 2017 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):829-852.details
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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(1 other version)Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14. Oxford University Press. pp. 70-94.details
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Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):1-23.details
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The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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(1 other version)Explaining Practical Normativity.Tristram McPherson - 2016 - Topoi:1-10.details
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Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name is False.Spencer Case - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (1):1-20.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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The Varieties of Normativity.Derek Clayton Baker - 2016 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 567-581.details
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Rationality has its reasons, of which reason knows not: A vindication of the normativity of rationality.Bruno Guindon - unknowndetails
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A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.details
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(1 other version)Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Coherence as Joint Satisfiability.Samuel Fullhart & Camilo Martinez - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Robust Normativity, Morality, and Legal Positivism.David Plunkett - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 105-136.details
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Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.details
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Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry.David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):37-68.details
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Infinitism about cross-domain conflict.David Killoren - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.details
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(1 other version)The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.details
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Unifying Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:517-544.details
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(1 other version)On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity.David Faraci - 2017 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. Oxford University Press. pp. 244-264.details
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