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Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):20-25.details
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Theoretical Motivation of “Ought Implies Can”.Wesley Buckwalter - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):83-94.details
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Ability, Responsibility, and Global Justice.Wesley Buckwalter - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):577-590.details
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Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):765-786.details
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The Kantian versus Frankfurt.Alex Blum - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):287–288.details
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The Kantian versus Frankfurt.A. Blum - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):287-288.details
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The core of the consequence argument.Alex Blum - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.details
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The Core of the Consequence Argument.Alex Blum - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.details
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Why is belief involuntary?O. Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87-107.details
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Why is belief involuntary?Jonathan Bennett & Alonso Church - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87-107.details
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Why Is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.details
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Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.details
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Book Review: Unprincipled Virtue by Nomy Arpaly. [REVIEW]Manuel Vargas - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):201-204.details
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Review Essay: Doing the Best We Can. [REVIEW]Lennart Åqvist - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):215.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):21-40.details
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The nature of moral philosophy.G. E. Moore - 1961 - In John Langshaw Austin (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.details
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Who’s Responsible for This? Moral Responsibility, Externalism, and Knowledge about Implicit Bias.Natalia Washington & Daniel Kelly - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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Freedom and reason.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.details
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Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
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A model of dual attitudes.Timothy D. Wilson, Samuel Lindsey & Tonya Y. Schooler - 2000 - Psychological Review 107 (1):101-126.details
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On an argument for incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):37-41.details
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On an argument for incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1987 - Analysis 47 (January):37-41.details
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Frankfurt on 'Ought implies Can' and alternative possibilities.David Widerker - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):222.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Values and the heart's command.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):5-19.details
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Some Thoughts on An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2015 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22:16-30.details
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An Essay on Free Will by Peter van Inwagen. [REVIEW]Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.details
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An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.details
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Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.details
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The Best Argument for 'Ought Implies Can' Is a Better Argument Against 'Ought Implies Can'.Brian Talbot - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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'Ought' and 'can'.Michael Stocker - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):303 – 316.details
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What time travelers cannot not do (but are responsible for anyway).Joshua Spencer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):149-162.details
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The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.details
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`Ought' conversationally implies `can'.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Scepticism and Implicit Bias.Jennifer Saul - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):243-263.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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Moral dilemmas and consistency.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136.details
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Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.details
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Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements.Neil Levy - 2014 - Noûs 49 (4):800-823.details
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Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing the Data.Neil Levy - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):3-26.details
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Moral Responsibility and Consciousness.Matt King & Peter Carruthers - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):200-228.details
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Racial cognition and the ethics of implicit bias.Daniel Kelly & Erica Roedder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):522–540.details
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A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism.Thomas J. McKay & David Johnson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):113-122.details
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When is the Will Free?Peter van Inwagen - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:399 - 422.details
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Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.details
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